The too short argument against Immanent Action being in the Category of Quality

The Thomistic commentator tradition almost ubiquitously holds that "immanent action" does not fall within the category of "action" but rather falls within the first species of the category of "quality." Yves Simon has a very forceful argument summarizing and defending the Commentator tradition on this point (cf. An Introduction to the Metaphysics of Knowledge, ch. 2 "Cognition and Activity"). The argument merits serious consideration as his analysis of the metaphysics of action, like all his other analysis in this impressive work (esp. his presentation of "abstraction"), is penetratingly perspicuous. Nevertheless, I believe he and the Commentator tradition are incorrect on this point and that they have made a categorical error by delimiting the categories of action and passion to exclude immanent action. It should be said from the beginning, as far as I know, and Simon admits, Aquinas has no explicit text confirming their thesis, any text to the contrary then reveals a lot about Aquinas' own position.

I know of no text in which Aristotle or Aquinas addresses specifically the question of whether immanent action belongs to the category of action or to the category of quality. (Simon, An Introduction to the Metaphysics of Knowledge, p. 66 n. 29)

Well, as we shall soon see, Aquinas does this very thing within the first ten opening chapters of Contra Gentiles II. He continues:

No importance should be attached to this, however, because Aquinas never tires of saying that immanent action lacks the characteristics that the whole Aristotelian school considers to be essential to the category of action: to exist with motion, to produce a passion, to be the perfection of the patient. Indeed, one would have to be rather obtuse to assume that anything could be preserved of the Thomistic theory of knowledge if immanent action were to be placed in the category of action. All major Thomists are unanimous in affirming that immanent action is a quality. The contrary is held by some minor Thomists and para-Thomists, which makes for an interesting discussion. (ibid.)

Indeed it does. I shall then be obtuse enough to assume the contrary, and hope that I do not become a para-Thomist by doing so. Again, I think that Simon would be quite right, if the Aristotelian schools were correct about what is essential to the Category of "action." What reason does he have for supposing Aquinas held what they held? Simon cites all the usual suspects that hold the same thesis as his own. Looking over this list of Thomists makes my own thesis seem rather unlikely considering the serious and admirable philosophical acumen of these masters. (The following comes from the same footnote in Simon, ibid.)

Cajetan, In de An. II, 5 (B. 114B): "It is only grammatically that immanent actions are actions; in reality they are operations that are truly kinds of qualities."

Sylvester of Ferrara, In Cont. gent. II, 9: "Immanent action does not belong to the genus of action but to the genus of quality."

Javellus, Compendium logicae, De Praedicamentis; Banez, In Sum. th. I. q. 79, a. 2 (D, II, 290A): "The act of intellection is not an action but a quality, though ti may have the mode of an action."

John of St. Thomas. See, in particular, Phil. nat. IV, q. 6, a. 4 (R, III, 195B41) [Simon cites many others.]

Of these references, the one from Sylvester is especially concerning, because this is the very text which we will examine. So long as Simon has cited him accurately, I cannot possibly understand how Sylvester has asserted anything other than the contradiction of what Aquinas has said in this exact text. This shall become apparent as we make our way through the texts of Aquinas from the beginning of Book II of the Contra Gentiles. These texts, so far as I can tell from looking through the vast range of texts cited by Simon, escape his attention. However, He does cite chapter one, as we will, but then he skips over chapters eight through ten which offer the clearest employment of the terms used in chapter one. He instead goes on to chapters twenty two and twenty three.

I have entitled this the "too short argument" because I simply wish to note one passage that I came across in Thomas Aquinas that makes it quite clear that Thomas does not hold the position that: the category of "action" excludes immanent action and only generically contains species of transitive action.

This is an essay written in haste merely to get these ideas down while my recent research on powers and operations is fresh. At some later date I hope to pursue a systematic textual and philosophical study of the categories of action and passion and produce a cogent response to Simon and the Commentator tradition on this point. For it seems to me, this categorical mistake makes Thomas' many discussions of the "operation" or the metaphorical "motion" of the will, intellect, etc. rather awkward and misplaced. For we often find in such discussions explicit suggestions and qualifications to the analysis, that are better known to us, of motion and action and passion. But if immanent action is in the category of quality, appealing to doctrines found within other categories to explain a different category is a rather muddled procedure, if not question begging. Certainly, we should expect a lot more explanation from Thomas if immanent action is a quality, why does he so frequently appeal to discussions of action from the category of action without the slightest qualification?

In Contra Gentiles II. ch. 1, Aquinas distinguishes between two Aristotelian senses of "operation" or second act. "One that remains in the agent and is a perfection of it, as the act of sensing, understanding, and willing; another that passes over into an external thing, and is a perfection of the thing made as a result of that operation, the acts of healing, cutting and building, for example." Aquinas immediately follows up this division affirming that both kinds of operations belong to God, but the former is the ground of the second. To further clarify terminology Aquinas says that immanent action, as the simple perfection of the operator, claims the appellations "operation" (operationis) and "action" (actionis); whereas transitive action, as the perfection of the thing made, more properly called, "making" (factionis) and not "action". (N.B. The translator placed in italics these three terms, and as we will see does so again in the text cited below.)

Aquinas proceeds to establish in the following chapters a number of clarifications about God's entitative and operative attributes in view of Divine Simplicity. In chapter nine Thomas introduces the unity and identity of God's power and his action. Just as God's substance and power are identical, likewise are his powers and their action one. "God's power is His substance, [...] And His action is His Substance, as was shown in Book I with regard to His intellectual operation; for the same argument applies to His other operations." (ibid., ch. 9 [2]) In paragraph five of this chapter we meet Aquinas' final argument.

Furthermore, an action that is not the substance of the agent is in the agent as an accident in its subject; and that is why action is reckoned as one of the nine categories of accident. But nothing can exist in God in the manner of an accident. Therefore, God's action is not other than his substance and His power. (SCG. II.9 [5])

Adhuc. Actio quae non est substantia agentis, inest ei sicut accidens subiecto: unde et actio unum inter novem praedicamenta accidentis computatur. In Deo autem non potest esse aliquid per modum accidentis. In Deo igitur sua actio non est aliud a sua substantia et sua potentia.

There is nothing within this short chapter of Aquinas to suggest that he is only thinking of and discussing transitive action. On the contrary, it seems more reasonable to think that this entire discussion is directed towards power's with immanent action. Of course, Aquinas makes the qualification that the argument in [2] applies to all the powers, and we should agree with him on this point. But again, the only example Thomas provides for us here is of intellectual operations, and the intellect is a power with an immanent action.

Further in the quote just cited, Aquinas brings up that an action of an agent that is not commensurate with the substance simpliciter, is in the agent as an accident. An obvious example that fits this criterion is a created intellect; it is an accidental power with an accidental act. No Thomist will disagree this. But where does Thomas place this generally considered accident of action? Not in the category of quality. He places it in the category of "action".

Now why would Aquinas do this, especially if he held the position attributed to him by Simon and many of the Commentators? Further, in a discussion where "action" has been specifically designated as the proper appellation of immanent action, how could Aquinas maintain the Simon thesis in this context without some qualification?

If we look to the previous chapter and the subsequent chapter, the Simon thesis becomes more peculiar. In chapter eight paragraph five Aquinas has nearly the exact same argument as paragraph five of chapter nine. He has simply substituted power for action.

Again, in things whose powers are not their substance, the powers themselves are accidents. Hence, natural power is placed in the second species of quality. But in God there can be no accident, as was shown in Book I. Therefore, God is His power. (SCG. II. 8. [5])

The category of "quality" is not far from Thomas's mind. If immanent action was the first species of "quality" as Simon and many of the Commentators hold, then why Thomas fail to make this distinction is the following chapter, that uses the exact same argument for "action"? And why would Thomas use the term, "action" to exclusively signify transitive action in this paragraph alone without explicitly mentioning it or even suggesting it by example? Especially considered the entire context of this discussion on powers and action began, as we have seen, by designating immanent action as the proper sense of the term, "action." The Simon thesis continues to become more implausible. Just from what we have seen so far in chapter one, eight and nine, how does Sylvester of Ferrara's assertion make any sense here?

One thing should be apparent from the quotes from Aquinas we have seen so far, namely, Thomas is taking every opportunity he can to make categorical distinctions and appeal to them in his arguments. The Aristotelian Categories are playing a crucial role in his many arguments here at the beginning of Contra Gentiles II. This is not to say Aquinas is inconsistent in his appeals to the Categories, but rather their emphasis here in this chapters is perhaps more striking then it is in other passages. This point is suggestive interpretative point for my own thesis. Why in a set of interconnected chapters wherein Aquinas is making numerous explicit categorical distinctions on powers and their operations by referencing Aristotle's Categories, would he not only fail to explicitly place immanent action in the category of quality; but further properly designate immanent action as "action" and then a few chapters later make an explicit reference that "action" is itse own distinct category of action?

If we look to the subsequent chapter, Aquinas makes a unique qualification on how we attribute powers to God. The concern of this chapter is God's relation to creatures, which seems to undermine Divine Simplicity. It is directly related to the discussion of powers, because powers implies a relation to something else. The appellative distinctions that come into relief, in the paragraph immediately following his placement of action as one of the nine categories of action, are the same found in the first chapter, namely, "action" and "thing made". Clearly Aquinas has not forgotten the distinctions made in the first chapter.

But, since nothing is its own principle, and God's action is not other than his power, it is clear from the foregoing that power is attributed to God, not as a principle of action, but as a principle of things made. (SCG II. 10 [1])

This is the first paragraph of chapter ten that immediately follows paragraph five of chapter nine. Aquinas is explicitly referring to the arguments of the preceding chapter, that God's action is not other than his power. Further, this opening line explicitly confirms that the entire discussion of chapter nine was about immanent action. Aquinas clearly contrasts "action" from things "made", which is the proper appellation for transitive action. If we read further on the contrasts between immanent action as action and transitive action as making or as "actions passing into something made" are only clearer. Aquinas is especially fastidious with his terminology in this chapter, and he gives us every suggestion that the same care in terminological consistency has been kept throughout these chapters. I will only quote the final part of the first paragraph of chapter ten where Aquinas explicitly identifies immanent action with the operations of the intellect and the will.

Hence, if certain actions are proper to God which do not pass into something made but remain in Him, power is not attributed to Him in their regard, except according to our manner of understanding, and not according to reality. Such actions are understanding and willing. Properly speaking, therefore, God's power does not regard such actions, but only effects. Consequently, intellect and will are in God, not as powers, but only as actions. (SCG II. 10. [1])

Immanent actions, actions that remain in God like understanding and willing, are "actions" in the most proper sense, whereas transitive actions that do not remain in God are not properly referred to as actions. This is likewise the force behind maintaining that the latter still impliey a power whereas properly speaking immanent actions in God are simply God with no real need to speak of them as having power in God.

Unless Aquinas completely changes this fundamental categorical doctrine later on, these quotations from the Contra Gentiles make his position explicitly clear. Aquinas holds that not only is immanent action in the category of "action", but that is it also the most proper sense of action. This does not exclude transitive action from the category of action, but merely clarifies that it is a less proper sense of action. And this should go without saying, for the less perfect is secondary to what is perfect more simply. That which perfects itself in action is more perfect then that which can only perfect another. (SCG II. 1. [4])

I certainly believe that this textual argument, barring some other equally cogent textual argument, settles the position of Thomas Aquinas contra Simon and the many commentators whom he cites in support of his thesis. This brief essay is not meant to distance myself from the latter's other positions and works. On the contrary, I have never read anything by Yves Simon that I did not think was simply amazing. I have always learned a lot reading his articles and books, and admire the quality of his scholarship. The chapter we have been discussing comes from one of the best books I have ever read on Thomistic cognition, and its final chapter's presentation on the doctrine of abstraction in Aquinas is the finest piece of 20th century scholarship I have read on the subject. John Piefer's The Concept in Thomism discussion on abstraction is the next closest.

I would be interested in any comments or texts and arguments to the contrary. As I said this is just the principle textual argument of a longer essay I hope to pursue in the future. An essay that takes on the philosophical arguments of Simon and the Commentators.

Gilson's "Aristoteles" from Being and Some Philosophers

The following is an excerpt from Etienne Gilson Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed., Ch. II Being and Substance, p. 49-50.

The Aristoteles

The primary mistake of Aristotle, as well as of his followers, was to use the verb "to be" in a single meaning, whereas it actually has two. If it means that a thing is, then individuals alone are, and forms are not; if it means what a thing is, then forms alone are and individuals are not. The controversy on the being of universals has no other origin than the failure of Aristotle himself to make this fundamental distinction. In his philosophy, as much as in that of Plato, what is does not exist, and that which exists is not.

Had Plato lived long enough to read, in the First Book of Aristotle's Metaphysics, the criticism of his own doctrine of ideas, he might have written one more dialogue, the Aristoteles, in which it would have been child's play for Socrates to get Aristotle entangled in hopeless difficulties:

"I should like to know, Aristotle, whether you really mean that there are certain forms of which individual beings partake and from which they derive their names: that men, for instance are men because they partake of the form and essence of man."
"Yes, Socrates, that is what I mean."
"Then each individual partakes of the whole of the essence or else of part of the essence. Can there be any other mode of participation?"
"There cannot be."
"Then do you think that the whole essence is one, and yet being one, is in each one of the things?"
"Why not, Socrates?"
"Because, one and the same thing will then at one and the same time exist as a whole in many separate individuals, and will therefore be in a state of separation from itself!"
"Nay, Socrates, it is not so. Essences are not Ideas; they do not subsist in themselves but only in particular things, and this is why, although we conceive them as one, they can be predicated of many."
"I like your way, Aristotle, of locating one in many places at once; but did you not say that essence is that whereby individual beings are?"
"Yes, Socrates, I did."
"Then, my lad, I wish you could tell me how it may be that beings are through sharing in an essence, which itself is not!"

The history of the problem of universals has precisely been such a dialogue, and it could have no conclusion. If essences exist, they cannot be shared in without losing their unity and consequently their being. If individuals are, then each of them should be a distinct species and there could not be, as in point of fact there are, species that include in their unity a multiplicity of individuals. What is true is that essences are and that individuals exist, so that each essence exists in and through some individual, just as in and through its essence every individual truly is. But, to be in a position to say so, one must first have distinguished between individuation and individuality, that is, one must have realized that, no less necessarily and perhaps more deeply than essence, existence enters the structure of actual being.

Thomistic Metaphysics. Lecture Notes: 2. Commonality of Ens Commune

Thomistic Metaphysics: Directed Study

Dr. John F.X. Knasas

Lecture Notes: 2. Commonality of ens commune

The following is my digest and reflections on the lecture notes given by Dr. Knasas. While I am indebted to his notes, texts, and comments, these reflections are not necessarily the views of Dr. Knasas.

The Subject of Metaphysics:

The Commonality and Separateness of Ens Commune

This reflection will be a further clarification of the first part of the subject of metaphysics, namely, its separateness. The question posed at the end of the last reflection queried what must be established concerning the subject of metaphysics at the initial steps of the science. Must we know and have had established ens commune as separability, composite, or both to begin genuine metaphysics? If separability simpliciter had to be established, then we could not legitimately begin metaphysics until we demonstrated the existence of an immaterial subsisting existent. However, in light of the procedure set out by Aquinas, following Avicenna and Aristotle, it seems clear such demonstrations come at the end of metaphysics when we demonstrate the causes of our subject, ens commune. But what about the second sort of separability that we find in being, substance, act, and potency. (In de Trin. V, 4, ad 5m) The sort of separateness of things that are not necessarily immaterial but are able to be immaterial. Must we establish the immaterial separateness of such realities in order to begin the science of metaphysics?

If not, how else can we say we have successfully achieved distinguishing ens commune from ens mobile, the subject of natural philosophy? How can we hold that a science of ens qua ens is any different from a science of ens mobile if we have not established that ens commune can be separate from matter?

Also, does it not seem that we are unable to establish the second element of ens commune, its compositeness, if we are unable to grasp ens commune in its separateness from matter?

In analysis the intellect, by its first act, is able to grasp what is common to many; it is able to apprehend the quiddity shared amongst many particulars. The intellect can grasp that what is common to Peter, Paul, and John is the quiddity, "humanness." If an ox and ass are added to this list the intellect will grasp the more general commonness "animalness" that is shared by all. Similarly in the case of generation-corruption, increase-decrease, alteration, and locomotion the intellect readily grasps ens mobile (mobile being) as the commonality found in these distinct types of change. Our problem is: how can we establish the subject of metaphysics, ens commune, as distinct from ens mobile without demonstrating the existence of separatable or immaterial beings? It would seem pace the latter demonstration there is initially no clear distinction between ens mobile and ens commune. However we have Aquinas suggesting that our subject matter is "discovered by a process of analysis as the more universal is discovered after the less universal." (In Meta., Proem)

There is one type of immaterial existence that is discovered and established without the demonstrations of metaphysics, namely, intentional being (esse intentionale) or cognitional being (ST. I. 14.1; 78.3). The unique causality found in cognitional being is not embeded with matter but operates without matter - although not always without material conditions. Unlike natural immutation, cognitional immutation must occur in a manner wherein the form is impressed on the cognitive subject without corrupting the form of its terminus, that is, the cognitive faculty. The form is received as other while the cognitive faculty remains itself. Hence, the natural material immutation (the immutation of ens mobile) found in esse naturale is distinct from the immaterial immutation found in esse intentionale. Here we have a readily discoverable order of causality distinct from that of ens mobile. Further, the commoness able to be grasped by the intellect from ens mobile and esse intentionale is ens commune. Therefore we are able to sufficiently establish ens commune as a distinct subject from ens mobile without the demonstration of subsisting immaterial beings.

Thomistic Metaphysics. Lecture Notes: 1

Thomistic Metaphysics: Directed Study
Dr. John F.X. Knasas
Lecture Notes: 1

The following is my digest and reflections on the lecture notes given by Dr. Knasas. While I am indebted to his notes, texts, and comments, these reflections are not necessarily the views of Dr. Knasas.

The fundamental content of Thomistic metaphysics is two-fold: 1) its subject genus and 2) the cause of its subject genus.

The Subject of Metaphysics

Within the Aristotelian tradition any scientia has three parts 1) its subject-genus, 2) its principles, and 3) proper attributes or conclusions. “The object of which scientific knowledge is sought through demonstration is some conclusion in which a proper attribute is predicated of some subject, which conclusion is inferred from the principles.” (In PA, I.2) This reflection is concerned with the subject of metaphysics.

First, Aquinas suggests a variety of formulae for the subject of metaphysics such as: ens commune, ens qua ens, and ens inquantum ens. The subject of metaphysics, ens, has two features of note 1) its separateness or separatability and 2) its compositeness.

The Subject of Metaphysics: The Separateness of ens

Aquinas holds that metaphysics is concerned with "what is separate from matter both in existence and in thought." This is the highest grade of immateriality and therefore the highest order of intelligibility. This metaphysical "separateness" from matter is the last order in the tripartite degrees of abstraction. This doctrine has its roots in Plato's Divided Line and more importantly Aristotle's Metaphysics E 1. 1025b3-6a32. Our key texts for the separateness of ens are: In Meta. Proem and In BDT Q. V, 4., & ad. 5

Text A

However, even though the subject of this science [metaphysics] is being-in-general [ens commune], the whole science is said to concern what is separate from matter both in existence and in thought. For not only are those things called separate in existence and thought that can never exist in matter, like God and the intellectual substances, but also those that can be without matter, such as being-in-general. (In Meta., Proem. Trans by Armand Maurer, Division and Methods, p. 89)

Text B

. . . for something can exist separate from matter and motion . . . because by its nature it does not exist in matter and motion; but it can exist without them, though we sometimes find it with them. In this way being [ens], substance, potency, and act are separate from matter and motion, because they do not depend on them for their existence, unlike the objects of mathematics, which can only exist in matter. Thus philosophical theology [also called metaphysics] investigates beings separate in [this] second sense as its subjects, . . . (In de Trin. V, 4c; Maurer, Division and Methods, p. 45.)

Separateness admits of a two-fold division between 1) that which necessarily is separate, like God and angels and 2) that which can be separate such as being-in-general and substance. A further qualification of this second sort of separateness is found here:

Text C

We say that being [ens] and substance are separate from matter and motion not because it is of their nature to be without them, as it is of the nature of ass to be without reason, but because it is not of their nature to be in matter and motion, although sometimes they are in matter and motion as animal abstracts from reason, although some animals are rational. (In de Trin. V, 4, ad 5m; Maurer, Division and Methods, p. 48-9.)

The first sense of separateness is applicable of pure spiritual realities, but the second sense of separateness is broader. It is applicable to a greater variety of realities both immaterial and material. This second sense of separateness is the subject of metaphysics; it is of ens qua ens which is able to be found both in material and immaterial realities.

Text D

It is called metaphysics because it considers being [ens] and its attendant properties; for these objects that go beyond physics are discovered by a process of analysis as the more universal is discovered after the less universal. (In Meta., Proem: Maurer, Division and Methods, p. 89.)

Metaphysica, inquantum considerat ens et ea quae consequuntur ipsum. Haec enim transphysica inveniuntur in via resolutionis, sicut magis communia post minus communia.

Aquinas is here taking a suggestion from Book I of Avicenna's Metaphysics of the Shifa. Metaphysics considers being and its quasi-species or as Rowen translates "ea quae consequuntur ipsum," "the attributes which naturally accompany being." It is also of note that Aquinas says that the objects discovered that go beyond physics, like ens, are discovered by analysis (resolutionis). There is no qualification that a demonstration is necessary to discover this object. Simply by analysis, like when we are searching for the primordial genera of a universal. A human is a rational animal, which is an animated thing, which is corporeal, which is a substance. We also discover ens by ascending Porphryr's tree, however we do not stop with genera; we proceed to the top, to the order of the non-univocal transcendentals.

The Subject of Metaphysics: The Compositeness of ens

Text E

It is therefore clear that composition of act and potentiality has greater extension than that of form and matter. Thus, matter and form divide natural substance, while potentiality and act divide common being [ens commune]. Accordingly, whatever follows upon potentiality and act, as such, is common to both material and immaterial created substances, as to receive and to be received, to perfect and to be perfected. Yet all that is proper to matter and form, as such, as to be generated and to be corrupted, and the like, are proper to material substances, and in no way belong to immaterial created substances. (Summa Contra Gentiles II. 54)

In the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas the Aristotelian act-potency composition extends beyond hylomorphic entities. It also divides ens commune which is able to be found without matter and would hence also admit of instances not hylomorphically composed. Aquinas does not hold a doctrine of universal hylomorphism. His doctrine of being is that ens commune is a composite of an actual and potential element.

Text F

. . . there is in [intellectual and immaterial] substances but one composition of act and potentiality, namely, the composition of substance and being [substantia et esse], which by some is said to be of that which is [quod est] and being [esse], or of that which is and that by which a thing is.
On the other hand, in substances composed of matter and form there is a twofold composition of act and potentiality: the first, of the substance itself which is composed of matter and form; the second, of the substance thus composed, and being; and this composition also can be said to be of that which is and being or of that which is and that by which a thing is. (Summa Contra Gentiles II. 54)

The act-potency composition of ens commune is constituted by a substance-existence composition. Aquinas will often say that something is a being in virtue of possessing an act of existence (actus essendi). A being is "quasi habens esse" as if a haver or possessor of esse. Aquinas makes this point in many places, such as:

Group A

“Cum autem in re sit quidditas ejus et suum esse, veritas fundatur in esse rei magis quam in quidditate, sicut et nomen entis ab esse imponitur” (In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1c)

“Sicut autem motus est actus ipsius mobilis inquantum mobile est; ita esse est actus existentis, inquantum ens est” (In I Sent., d. 19, q. 2, a. 2c)

“. . . quod cum dicitur: Diversum est esse, et quod est, distinguitur actus essendi ab eo cui actus ille convenit. Ratio autem entis ab actu essendi sumitur, non ab eo cui convenit actus essendi” (De Ver. I, 1, ad 3m second set)

“. . . esse dicitur actus entis inquantum est ens, idest quo denominatur aliquid ens actu in rerum natura” (Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 3c)

“et ipsum esse est quo substantia denominatur ens” (S.C.G. II, 54)

“Et ulterius aliqui erexerunt se ad considerandum ens inquantum est ens, et consideraverunt causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt haec vel talia, sed secundum quod sunt entia. Hoc igitur quod est causa rerum inquantum sunt entia, oportet esse causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt talia per formas accidentales, nec secundum quod sunt haec per formas substantiales, sed etiam secundum omne illud quod pertinet ad esse illorum quocumque modo” (S.T. I, 44, 2c)

“Nam ens dicitur quasi esse habens, hoc autem solum est substantia, quae subsistit” (In XII Meta., lect. 1)

Notes and Further Texts: On Esse

Group B

“Sciendum est quod, sicut in 5 Metaphys. Philosophus dicit, ens per se dicitur dupliciter: Uno modo, quod dividitur per decem genera: alio modo, quod significant propositionum veritatem” (De Ente, ch. 1.)

“Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio Metaphysicae suae. Unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens. Sed enti non potest addi aliquid quasi extranea natura, per modum quo differentia additur generi, vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens” (De Ver. I, 1c).

In the latter passage we have Aquinas repeating his remarks from the Proem to his commentary on the Metaphysics. All of our intellectual conceptions all resolvit to being (ens). "As Avicenna says, in the principles of his Metaphysics (I.v), that which the intellect first conceives as, in a way, the most knowable [or evident], in which all our concepts resolve, is being." (ibid.)

Group C

“Videmus in mundo quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non esse, scilicet generabilia et corruptibilia. Omne autem quod est possible esse, causam habet: quia, cum de se aequaliter se habeat ad duo, scilicet esse et non esse, oportet, si ei approprietur esse, quod hoc sit ex aliqua causa. (S.C.G. I, 15); “Omne quod est possible esse et non esse, habe causam aliquam: quia in se consideratum ad utrumlibet se habet; et sic oportet esse aliquod aliud quod ipsum ad unum determinet” (S.C.G. II, 15)

Here we have Aquinas explicating his doctrine of esse in modal terms, just as Avicenna introduces them in his Metaphysics of the Shifa I. vi-vii. Aquinas also does this in De Ente et Essentia when distinguishing God, necessary existence, from creatures, possibles.

Group C. 5

Primo ponit differentiam eius quod est esse, ad id quod est. Secundo manifestat huiusmodi differentiam, ibi, ipsum enim esse nondum est. Dicit ergo primo, quod diversum est esse, et id quod est. Quae quidem diversitas non est hic referenda ad res, de quibus adhuc non loquitur, sed ad ipsas rationes seu intentiones. Aliud autem significamus per hoc quod dicimus esse, et aliud: per hoc quod dicimus id quod est; sicut et aliud significamus cum dicimus currere, et aliud per hoc quod dicitur currens. Nam currere et esse significantur in abstracto, sicut et albedo; sed quod est, idest ens et currens, significantur sicut in concreto, velut album. (In de Hebd. ch. II)

Here Aquinas compares the meaning of ens and esse to currens and currere. He is making a distinction between the thing which is and its act. The signifance of esse is not the same as the significance of quod est (that-which-is), and this signficance refers to distinct aspects (ratio) of the reality.

"For we signify one thing by saying 'to be,' and something else by saying 'that-which- is,' just as we also signify one thing when we say 'to run,' and something else by saying 'one running.' For 'to run' and 'to be' are signified in the abstract, just as 'whiteness' is; but 'that-which-is,' that is, 'a being,' and 'one running' are signified in the concrete, as is 'a white thing.'" (ibid.)

This to be (esse) Aquinas takes to be the act of all acts and the perfection of all perfections. It is not an act consequent upon that-which-is or the act of the form/essence. It is, as we will see, prior to the act of the form. It is only through the actus essendi that the form exists and is thereby able to act in its order of essential causality. Thus, the actus essendi is the supreme act and perfection in the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas, as we see in the following:

Group D

“Esse actum quondam nominat: non enim dicitur esse aliquid ex hoc quod est in potentia, sed ex eo quod est in actu. Omne autem cui convenit actus aliquis diversum ab eo existens, se habet ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum: actus enim et potentia ad se invicem dicuntur” (S.C.G. I, 22)

“. . . quod hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia perfectissimum: quod ex hoc patet quia actus est semper perfectio potentia. Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod esse ponitur. Nam humanitas vel igneitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu: sed hoc quod habet esse, efficitur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum” (De Pot. VII, 2, ad 9m)

“Dicendum quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium; comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est; unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis sicut receptum ad recipiens. Cum enim dico esse hominis, vel equi, vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut formale et receptum, non autem ut illud cui competit esse” (S.T. I, 4, 1, ad 3m)

A important point arises in the text from the SCG I. 22. We read in the same chapter that:

". . . sequitur quod aliquid sit sibi ipsi causa essendi. Hoc autem est impossibile: quia prius secundum intellectum est causam esse quam effectum; si ergo aliquid sibi ipsi esset causa essendi, intelligeretur esse antequam haberet esse, quod est impossibile” (S.C.G. I, 22)

Not only is esse the act in composition with the substance as an existential potency, but esse is also prior (prius) to substance as the cause of its existence. It is also first (primus), most profound (profundius), and most intimate (magis intimum):

“Primus autem effectus est ipsum esse, quod omnibus aliis effectibus praesupponitur et ipsum non praesupponit aliquem alium effectum” (De Pot. III, 4c). (The first effect is esse, which all other effects presupposes and it itself does not presuppose any other effect.)

Group E

“Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt” (S.T. I, 8, 1c)

“. . . ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur, non solum esse, sed ipsa quidditas creari dicitur: quia antequam esse habeat, nihil est, nisi forte in intellectu creantis, ubi non est creatura, sed creatrix essentia” (De Pot. 3, 5, ad 2m)

“. . . quod Deus simul dans esse, producit id quod esse recipit: et sic non oportet quod agat ex aliquo praeexistenti” (De Pot. 3, 1, ad 17m)

“. . . esse est accidens, non quasi per accidens se habens, sed quasi actualitas cuiuslibet substantiae” (Quodl., II, 2, 1, ad 2m)

There are other texts that emphasize the complementariness of esse and its essence or form. Existence is the act of form -which is in potency to this existential act- and yet there is a sense in which form is the cause of esse. Yet, we should be clear this does not contradiction the primary act of esse and its priority to form.

“Unde oportet ut essentia, qua res denominatur ens, non tantum sit forma nec tantum materia, sed utrumque: quamvis huiusmodi esse suo modo sola forma sit caussa.” (De Ente, ch. II)

“Per hoc enim in compositas ex material et forma dicitur forma esse principium essendi, quia est complementum substantiae cuius actus est ipsum esse.” (S.C.G. II, 54) "For in things composed of matter and form the form is said to be the principle of existence (essendi), because it is the compliment of substance whose act is existence."

The act of existence is, in a sense, dependent on the potency that it actuates (like in a hylomorphic unity). Its metaphysical raison d'être, is to be the act of something. Any conditions of a potency, (refered in the text as "complementum") becomes a cause of esse.

The Cause of the Subject of Metaphysics

The second part of the content of metaphysics is the cause of its subject, namely, being. This cause is found in the first sense of separatness. In particular, one spiritual reality unlike all others. This will established by the demonstrations for the one who is ipsum esse subsitens.

Text G

Thus philosophical theology [i.e., metaphysics] investigates being separate in the second sense as its subjects, and beings separate in the first sense [God and the angels] as the principles of its subject. (In de Trin. V, 4c)

Text H

What is more, it belongs to the same science to investigate the proper causes of any genus and the genus itself, as for example natural philosophy investigates the principles of natural body. So it must belong to the same science to investigate the separated substances and being-in-general [ens commune], which is the genus of which the above-mentioned substances [God and the Intelligences] are the common and universal causes. (In Meta. Proem)

There is accordingly a proper order in the treatment of these two contents of metaphysics, first its subject and second, its causes.

Text I

We can reach them [divine beings] by the light of natural reason only to the extent that their effects reveal them to us . . . Philosophers, then, study these divine beings only insofar [nisi prout] as they are the principles of all things. Consequently, they are the objects of the science that investigates what is common to all being, which has for its subject being as being. The philosophers call this divine science. (In de Trin. V, 4c)

God is "agens per modum dantis esse" (In VI Meta., lect. 3, n. 1215).

Concluding Remarks

The attainment of the subject of metaphysics is essential, because without knowing how to attain a science's subject-genus we cannot begin the study of it. The subject, ens, admitted of two features, 1) its separatability and 2) its composition. Does the intial attainment of the subject require establishing one or both of these features? As we saw in the texts above (text I) the knowledge of spiritual realities follows demonstrations of metaphysics, strict separateness is something established within metaphysics itself, not something initially held. This suggests that the feature of separatability itself is not necessary to the intitial attainment of the subject. Also, it has been made clear (texts B, C) that separateness is not unique to ens but is also true of substance, one, many, potency, and act. However, the second feature, compositeness, is a salient facet of ens. Its composition of act-potency is fundamental. The most important aspect of this composition is its act, which for ens commune is its actus essendi. Understanding things, quiddity, in virtue of habens esse will be necessary for the initial attainment of the subject of metaphysics.

Analytic Thomism. Lecture 1. Part I.

Analytic Thomism
Lecture 1. Part I.
Dr. Christopher Martin
1/20/09

Analytic Thomism is a neologism attributed to John Haldane. It designates a small group of predominately British-American Thomists who apply their analytic philosophical acumen to the study St. Thomas Aquinas either as interpreters or as philosophers influenced by Aquinas. Although, not a course on meta-analytic Thomism, it should at least be made clear initially what exactly is meant by "Analytic Thomism" and whether prima facie this is a promising endeavor.

Is Analytic Thomism the coalescing of two doctrines? If so, it might be inquired whether or not such a task suggests an impossibility. Already in the twentieth century we saw two such attempts utterly fail. Critical Thomism, which attempted to combine Cartesian epistemology with Thomism and Transcendental Thomism, which attempted to defeat Kant at his own game by virtue of Thomistic insights. Both were destined to fail and have. Is Analytic Thomism attempting the same?

It seems not. Analytic Thomism would regard analytic philosophy as not a set of doctrines but as a method and technique for approaching philosophical problems. If this is the case then there is nothing on the surface to suggest that this would be an impossible task.

But are not many, if not most, analytic philosophers materialists and empiricists? Yes, but this is perhaps better explained because most of them are British and American philosophers, who come countries whose predominant philosophical attitude is materialism and empiricism. Many Analytic Thomists actual consider the methods of analytic philosophy to be ones which undermine both the empiricism and rationalism of modern philosophy. This is especially taken to be the case by those influenced by the later Wittgenstein.

But could not analytic philosophy and Wittgenstein's focus on language constitute another rationalism, one that undermines the possibility of philosophical realism? The linguistic approach to philosophy, so often pejoratively attributed to analytic philosophy, is not an obsession with language that brings about another innovative logical sophism. At least this is certainly not the case for those following the lead of Wittgenstein. These philosophers, in a qualified sense, start with words or language to get to realities. One might immediately object: "But is this not the same error as Descartes? You have only replaced thought (cogito) with language, and from there you shall never break out of language (an aspect of mind) to obtain reality." And of course this is quite true if we uncritically start with language as a mental phenomenon simpliciter. However, the philosophical progeny of Wittgenstein are not starting with language as if it were some a priori phenomenon. As a matter of fact, this the very reason they do begin with language, because language is inextricably a posteriori. Language is ordinary; it is necessarily common and therefore requires supersubjective reality, so to speak, as a necessary condition. Language is communication; it is the conveyance of meaning. In order to have language there must be some shared common reality between subjects in and by which they can participate in language. There is no primitive subjective experience before the real. Language must be learned in re antecedent to its utilization and employment in our thoughts. Descartes cogito ergo sum presupposes a mastery of language; it speaks of a prior reception and assimilation of reality into thought via, inter alia, language. It is through language that we are able to carry and convey our thoughts and concepts to ourselves and to others . Language is necessarily extrinsic to the subject. A subject that thinks and speaks via language entails a precedence of reality to thought. In this way Wittgenstein points away from modernity.

Analytic philosophers of this stripe do not confound reality like the moderns, their methods undermine modernity. They employ their reflective acumen on the common intuitions of reality. They take serious the initial connatural questions.

Q: What is given?

A: The Lot!

Questioning Demarcations: A Preliminary Survey of a Philosophical Problematic

Questioning Demarcations:

A Preliminary Survey of a Philosophical Problematic

Daniel D. De Haan

1/15/09

I.

This is a paper that seeks proper demarcations, demarcations of a problematic concerning reality and thought. This paper hopes to clarify the question, how is thought able to carve reality at its joints? [1] It is a preliminary inquiry, a prolegomena of sorts. It is an inquiry that hopes to attend to the admonition of the Peripatetic, that those who wish to succeed must ask the correct preliminary questions.[2] The problematic under investigation is a perennial one, one that goes under a variety of appellations. Depending on our own particular philosophical parlance we might call it the problem of: Forms, essence, being, universals, the one and the many, realism and nominalism, types and tokens, and so on. It may be that these are all meritorious accounts of the problematic, however it is too early to decide. This is a brief inquiry into the proper questions and demarcation of this problematic. Identifying the problem too precisely at the beginning will only beg the question and perhaps prevent the real questions from being asked. We must discover the problematic’s proper subject domain if it is to be treated with the proper principles and method.
This is a preliminary inquiry into a problematic that seeks truth. This will admittedly delimit and prescind a number answers suggested by some philosophical dispositions and that is unfortunate for those of such temperaments. Something has gone amiss in the thoughts of a thinker who is a skeptic; reality will not tolerant such a refusal from human beings. The skeptic may think that he does not think; yet he will continue to live according to the order of reality like a human being. Accordingly those of us who consider skepticism an impossible conclusion to philosophical speculation will also recognize that this problematic requires consistent attention. This is because the very possibility of truth and knowledge rests on a satisfactory resolution to the difficulties encountered in this problematic. Stated austerely, our problem is: what is the relation between thought and things? When we reflect on the nature of knowledge we soon realize that while the beings we encounter in reality are particular, the concepts we employ when thinking about these particular realities are common. A question follows, how is it that there is something one in many? Or, how is there something common to all these particulars? Is this a condition of reality, thought, or both? Those mildly acquainted with the history of philosophy are aware of the variety of endeavors to answer this problematic. Some humble philosophers have shied away from the problem admitting its recondite nature. Porphyry in that memorable opening passage of his Isagoge said,

I shall abstain from deeper enquires and aim, as appropriate, at simpler ones. […] I shall beg off saying anything about (a) whether genera and species are real or are situated in bare thoughts alone, (b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and (c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them. Such business is profound, and requires another, greater investigation.[3]

II.

How do we begin to answer these profound difficulties? The above questions force a decision of precedence; do we take the question of reality, mind, or both to be more fundamental? If we privilege reality many shall protest that we have already granted the problematic into the hands of the metaphysical Hamlets. Those scruffy bearded ontologists who will not hesitate to posit a surfeit of heavenly and earthly realities and will in the end produce an ontology so encumbering with existents that it is even a burden for reality to bear. On the other hand, if we give precedence to thought we will hear similar protests of the mental sorcery incanted by the epistemologist’s, logician’s, and semanticist’s ratiocinations. Since the problem is concerning the relation between thought and things the middle path considering both thought and reality offers this cursory inquiry the most diplomatic and transcendent vision of the problematic. This approach has the merit of charity for it acknowledges that there may be insights in both when we give due regard to the real and to thought. It also forces the philosopher to reconcile thought to reality, which is to say it forces the philosopher to search for the truth.[4]

III.

What are the respective problems on the side of reality and on the side of thought? On the side of reality we encounter the difficulty that existents are manifestly many, but we are able to think of these many existents as having a variety of common aspects allowing us to think of many as one. These commonalities constitute our knowledge and opinions concerning reality. What is it in reality that permits this commonness in thought to be veridical? Is there actually anything one in the many? If not how can we maintain our thoughts conform to the real?
If we examine the side of thought we find similar problems. There is the question of efficiency and origin. To begin with we might ask what is thought? Privileging what is most obvious about thought I shall provide an account that attempts to identify the aspects of thought essential to our problematic. In this brief account I shall have to omit the question of thought’s agency, whether it is caused by a soul, mind, brain, etc.
One thing that should strike us is that thought has a peculiar aboutness by which we attend to and are aware of things and our own thoughts. In comparison to the obviously material things that we encounter, thought has a decidedly elastic, transcendent, and self-determining or intentional nature. This aspect of aboutness in thought is clearly relational, or if understood properly, intentional. What follows is at least one account of thought that clarifies our problematic and opens thought up towards reality.
When thought is about some particular realities the realities themselves are what we are aware of as present to thought. Initially and continuously reality seems to strike itself upon thought making us aware of realities’ existence and quidditative features. At this ubiquitous interface between thought and reality it is not thought that we are aware of but reality; thought relates and orders itself to the reality acting on it. Thus thought is receptive of the thing, the reality; it is about what is other because it is received as other. In some manner the thing is able to exist in reality and yet also exist in thought by affecting a cognitive-subject. A thing’s existence in thought is not inextricable to the thing; this condition of thing and existence shall require further comment below when we consider reality. This existential condition safeguards the principle of identity because it permits a thing to exist in distinct orders – reality and thought – without alteration of its quidditative constitution and without asserting thought and reality are in every way identical. Unlike material things that cease to have identity in becoming other, thought becomes the reality without ceasing to be thought; it is in a certain way able to become all things.[5] Maturity in thought is simply the virtuous activity of bringing thought into greater identity or isomorphism with reality.
The order of sensation, perception, and conception are different grades of aboutness found in thought that pertain to our different receptive cognitional interfaces with reality. The very appellation “concept” is suggestive of this receptivity and potency in thought. Reality affects a cognitive-subject; this subject by relating to reality conceives and gives birth to an aboutness, i.e., a concept. Thought is not of itself fecund, it must be quidditatively fecundated by reality in order to conceive its concepts or ideas.
Furthermore, thought is not compartmentalized into various cognitional functions, operative powers, or mental states - as some atomistic philosophers would have us believe. All appearances of thought are definitively incommensurable with atomism. The whole cognitive spectrum of thought is one as human beings are one. Thought itself is unified even though it may operate by virtue of various functions, operative powers, or mental states. There is nothing to suggest that it is disparate or incongruent from one order of aboutness to the next. This unity of the cognitive agent is the necessary condition for an apt account of thought’s activity. Simply put, an occurrence or act of thought is itself unified par excellence. While the vocal expression of a thought occurs in motion and requires a temporal duration to complete, the thought itself cannot have this disparateness in its act.

Thought […] occurs in discrete pulses which are indivisible: the thought that the pack of cards is on the table occurs all at once or not at all, and though it has some sort of correlation with such a physical process as the words in which I express it, it does not occur in physical time, either at an instant or over a period. (What sort of ideas the contrary view lead to may be seen from William James’s fantasy: that the thought lasts for the whole time of the sentence ‘the pack of cards is on the table’, and goes through successive phases, in which bits of the thought corresponding to the successive words are prominent – including bits corresponding to ‘the’ and ‘of’.) And again, if I think of two pennies, there is no such ‘doubleness’ in my thought as there is in my seeing or imagining if I see or visualize two pennies. [6]

This brief account of thought will be sufficient for a consideration of its concepts, which are the most salient feature of thought’s side of the problematic. The extraordinary feature of concepts is that they are fundaments of the abstract and more transcendent operations of thought. This is the order of cognition where thought ceases to be fixed to a particular and is able to gaze over or be about many particulars simultaneously. The lower orders of thought do not share this unique abstract transcendence with concepts. This is not to say that they are not nearly inextricable employed together in thought and utterance. Most of us hardly notice that in a single statement thought has rather casually ascended and descended the gamut of cognitional aboutness, from the transcendent relatedness of notions like being, good, and rational animal to the singular fixity of individuals like Socrates or St. Paul. This is another salient element to our problematic often left unmentioned. While it is curious that thought is able to grasp something common to many things in reality, it is just as peculiar that thought in its very act dynamically bounds from common aboutness to particular aboutness. If it is odd that thought generalizes what is particular in reality it is no less bizarre that thought generalizes what is likewise particular in thought. Our problematic must not only consider the relation between thought and reality, it must also consider the relation in thought of particular aboutness to common aboutness. Veridicality between thought and reality is not simply enough; there must also be an isomorphic continuity in thought. The existential condition alone is not sufficient to account for this veridical continuity. There must be something on the side of the thing’s conceived aboutness that is distinct from its existence, which can sufficiently render this unexceptional occurrence in thought veridical. There must be something in both particular aboutness and common aboutness that is the same.
Since it is equally true to answer the question, “what is it?” concerning a particular Athenian thing by replying either “Socrates” or “rational animal,” we shall call to this underlying sameness a whatness or quiddity, as we have called it above. Too many have understood quiddity to be inextricable with existence, particularity, generality or universality. But as was briefly mentioned above we should not take thing or its quidditative principle to entail any manner of existence in itself. Existence is extrinsic to quiddity; it is a concomitant not a constituent. Likewise we should not suppose that particular aboutness, common aboutness, or universality are inextricable with quiddity in se. These are conditions that like, existence, occur to extrinsically to quiddity in se. However this account will not go so far as to say quiddity in se prescinds from these conditions but rather that it is indifferent or neutral with regard to them. Inasmuch as it is quiddity in se they are not to be found. Avicenna has stated this position quite clearly in a well-known passage concerning the quiddity “horseness.”

For the definition of “horseness” is not the definition of universality, nor is universality included in the definition of “horseness.” For “horseness” has a definition that is not in need of the definition of universality, but is [something] to which universality accidentally occurs. For in itself, it is nothing at all except “horseness” for, in itself, it is neither one for many and exists neither in concrete things nor in the soul, existing in none of these things either in potency or in act, such that [these] are included in “horseness.” Rather, in terms of itself, it is only “horseness.” [7]

This inchoate doctrine of quiddity in se offers a stable position from which a more perspicuous answer to our problematic can be produced. Particular and common aboutness are conditions added by thought to a received quiddity. Considering quiddity in se it has neither of these conditions; universality and particularity are kinds of relatedness to things in reality that thought is able to employ with quiddity when predicating and understanding things in reality. It is because quiddity is neutral to particularity and universality that it is able to be isomorphic in both particular and common aboutness. Thought grasps in quiddity in se a manifold of cognoscibility; particularity and universality are simply additions to quiddity that results from thought’s parsing of quiddity into particulars or categorical kinds. Thought’s shift from thinking of the same thing in particular and common aboutness is veridical because it is the same quiddity in both. Thought is able to apprehend the quiddity that is within both and duly employ it because quiddity is not in se inextricable to one condition or the other.
. What accounts for thought’s ability to shift its relatedness or aboutness? The question of how thought is able to penetrate or illuminate the quiddity in se is certainly an important and difficult question, but one that demands more than this cursory treatment can provide. What is important for this preliminary examination is recognizing that these shifts in thinking are ubiquitous within the unity of thought, and that there is veridical continuity in all of thought’s various aboutnesses and this is sufficiently accounted for by our inchoate doctrine of quiddity in se.
If we avoid adopting an atomistic psychology and epistemology there is certainly an avenue for developing a perspicuous noetics able to bring resolution to thought’s side of the problematic. Acknowledging this causal order of noetic isomorphism can provide a cogent correlative to the efficient causes or mechanisms in cognition and offer insights into epistemic issues of veridicality.

IV.

While this account of thought is promising we should not incorrectly suppose that an explanation of thought alone is sufficient to account for all the difficulties of this problematic. Despite the complaints of those who deny all of reality for thought it is quite clear that the causal relation of reality and human thought is asymmetrical. And for this prima facie reason reality should not be forced to relinquish its part in the conditions that admit of this isomorphism. We shall not be convinced into thinking “that to give a psychological analysis of human knowledge [is the same as] to give a philosophical analysis of reality.”[8] The part is not sufficient to account for the whole.
Our account on the side of reality must be brief, and yet the principles at work in the account of thought are not entirely different. The existential condition and the doctrine of quiddity in se are also important to reality’s side of the problematic. While our account of thought required employing these two principles their proper treatment is on the side of reality. It is because of these conditions of reality that we are able to have veridical thought. The quiddity is not simply a cognitional being but is first a being in reality that then affects thought.
The quiddity of the existent in reality is also under similar conditions as the quiddity received in thought from reality. The quiddity in se is not determined to any concrete particular and mode of existence; these are, like universality and particularity in thought, extrinsic concomitants to quiddity in se. How it is that two individuals are both humans and that we can further recognize this commonness in thought is due to the doctrine of quiddity in se. Being realized in a single or even many existents or conceptualized in thought are all extrinsic concomitants to quiddity in se. The same quiddity can be found under all these conditions because these are all possible extrinsic conditions that may occur to a quiddity in se. The quiddity is existentially neutral; it has no sort of shadow reality or existence proper to itself. Inasmuch as it is quiddity it is only quiddity. Inasmuch as it is real or existing under some condition this is due to some concomitant aspect. The problem of the one and the many dissolves in this metaphysical solvency. A great deal more must be said to make all the appropriate qualification, but it is outside the confines of this inquiry to do so.[9]

V.

It should be clear that the proper subject domain of our inquiry lies primarily in metaphysics. The seminal explanation offered on the side of reality was presupposed and employed throughout the discussion of epistemology and noetics. However the principles of epistemology, noetics, and logic are equally important to providing a perspicuous treatment of this problematic. It seems the proper demarcation of the problematic requires heeding the asymmetry of reality and thought by privileging the former without neglecting the latter.

---------------------------------------------------

Notes:

1. Plato Phaedrus 265e.
2. Aristotle Metaphysics B. 1. 995a28-29.
3. Porphryr. Isagoge in Five Texts on the Medieval Problem of Universals.trans.& ed. Paul V. Spade. Hackett: Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1994, (2) p. 1.
4. I shall continue to use “reality” improperly as equivalent to that which is extramental or outside thought. Properly speaking thought too is a part of reality it is a sort of being and existence. I do not take all that is to be bifurcated into two incommensurable ontological orders like thought and reality. There is an ontological interface if not intimacy between thought and extramental thought. Such an interface accounts for truth and the very problematic underconsideration.
5. Aristotle De Anima III. 8. 431b20
6. Anscombe, G.E.M. and P. T. Geach Three Philosophers, Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1961. p. 96
7. Avicenna. The Metaphysics of the Healing trans. Michael E. Marmura, Brigham Young University Press: Provo, Utah, 2005. V. 1. (4).
8. Gilson, Etienne The Unity of Philosophical Experience, Charles Scribner’s Sons: New York, 1937, pg. 87
9. I suggest that a more perspicuous account can be produced if we avail ourselves of a hylomorphic existentialism like that found in Avicenna or Thomas Aquinas.
   

Aquinas: On Being and Essence - Chapter 6

Chapter Six

ESSENCE AS FOUND IN ACCIDENTS

[1] Now that we have explained how essence is present in all substances, it remains for us to see how essence exists in accidents. Because essence is what the definition signifies, as has been said,†1 accidents must have an essence in the same way that they have a definition. Now their definition is incomplete, because they cannot be defined without including a subject in their definition.†2 This is because they do not have being in themselves, independent of a subject; as substantial being results from form and matter when they come together, so accidental being results from an accident and a subject when the former comes to the latter. For the same reason neither a substantial form nor matter has a complete essence, because the definition of a substantial form must include the subject of the form. It is defined, therefore, by adding something outside its genus, just like the definition of an accidental form. That is also why the body is included in the definition of the soul when it is defined by the natural philosopher, who considers the soul only as the form of a physical body.

[2] There is a considerable difference, however, between substantial and accidental forms. As a substantial form does not have being in itself, independent of that to which it is united, so neither does the matter to which it is joined. From their union results that being in which the reality subsists in itself, and from them is produced something essentially one. An essence, therefore, results from their union. It follows that although a form, considered in itself, does not have the complete nature of an essence, nevertheless it is part of a complete essence. But that to which an accident is added is a complete being in itself, subsisting in its own being; and this being is by nature prior to the supervening accident. That is why the supervening accident, by its union with the subject to which it comes, does not cause that being in which the reality subsists, and through which the reality is a being in itself. Rather, it causes a secondary being, without which we can conceive the subsistent reality to exist, as what is primary can be understood without what is secondary. So the accident and its subject do not produce something essentially, but accidentally, one. This explains why their union does not result in an essence, like the conjunction of form and matter. It also explains why an accident neither has the nature of a complete essence nor is part of a complete essence. As it is a being in a qualified sense, so it has an essence in a qualified sense.†3

[3] Furthermore, that which is said to be most fully and truly in a genus is the cause of everything posterior in the genus. For example, fire, which is the ultimate in heat, is the cause of heat in hot things, as the Metaphysics says.†4 That is why substance, which holds the first place in the genus of being, having essence most truly and fully, must be the cause of accidents, which share the nature of being secondarily and in a qualified sense.

[4] This happens in different ways. The parts of substance being matter and form, some accidents result principally from form and others from matter.†5 There is a form whose being does not depend on matter (for example, the intellectual soul),†6 whereas matter has being only through form. That is why among accidents that result from form there are some that have nothing in common with matter, as for example understanding, which does not take place through a bodily organ, as the Philosopher proves.†7 On the contrary, other accidents deriving from form do have something in common with matter, as for example sensation and the like. But no accident results from matter without having something in common with form.

[5] Among accidents that derive from matter we find the following difference. Some accidents result from matter because of its relation to a special form. Examples are male and female among animals--a difference that is reducible to matter, as the Metaphysics says.†8 That is why, once the form of animal has been removed, these accidents no longer remain except in an equivocal sense. Other accidents result from matter in its relation to a general form. In this case, when the special form is taken away, these accidents still remain in the matter. An example is the blackness of an Ethiopian's skin, which comes from the mixture of the elements and not from the nature of the soul, with the result that it remains in him after death.

[6] Because everything is individuated by matter and located in a genus or species through its form, accidents that derive from matter are accidents of the individual and they differentiate individuals within the same species. On the contrary, accidents that result from the form are properties belonging to the genus or species, and consequently they are found in everything sharing the nature of the genus or species. For example, the ability to laugh results from man's form, for laughter occurs because of some perception on the part of the human soul.

[7] Another point to notice is that accidents are sometimes caused in perfect actuality by the essential principles, like heat in fire, which is always actually hot. But sometimes accidents are caused only as aptitudes, and they are completed by an external agent, like transparency in the air, which is complemented by an external luminous body.†9 In cases like these the aptitude is an inseparable accident, whereas the completion that comes from a source external to the essence of the thing, or that does not enter into its constitution, will be separable from it, like movement and other accidents of this kind.

[8] Still another fact worthy of notice is that genus, species, and difference are derived differently in accidents and in substances. In substances, from substantial form and matter there is constituted something essentially one, the consequence of their union being one nature that is properly in the category of substance. That is why, in the case of substances, concrete names that signify the composite are properly said to be in a category, either as a species or as a genus, as for example 'man' or 'animal'. Form or matter, on the contrary, is not in a category in this way but only by reduction, as principles are said to be in a category.†10 From an accident and its subject, however, there is not produced something essentially one. Hence the result of their union is not one nature to which the notion of genus or species can be attributed. That is why terms designating accidents concretely, like 'something white' or 'something musical', cannot be placed in a category except by reduction. They are in a category only when expressed abstractly, like 'whiteness' or 'music'.

[9] Because accidents are not composed of matter and form, we cannot take their genus from matter and their difference from form, as we do in composite substances. Rather, we must take their primary genus from their mode of being, because the term 'a being' is predicated in diverse ways, by priority and posteriority, of the ten genera of the categories.†11 For example, quantity is called a being because it is the measure of substance, quality because it is the disposition of substance, and so on with the other accidents, as the Philosopher says.†12 Their differences, however, are derived from the diversity of the principles that cause them. And because properties result from the specific principles of the subject, this subject takes the place of the difference in their definition when they are defined in the abstract, which is the way they are properly in a category. For instance, we say that snubness is a curvature of the nose. But the converse would be true if we defined them in the concrete. In this case the subject would be placed in their definition as the genus, because these accidents would then be defined like composite substances, in which the concept of the genus is derived from matter. An example is calling a snub nose a curved nose. The same is true when one accident is the principle of another, as action, passion, and quantity are principles of relation. (That is why the Philosopher divides relation with reference to these in the Metaphysics).†13 But because the specific principles of accidents are not always evident, we sometimes take the differences of accidents from their effects, as when we say that colors are differentiated as 'dilating' and 'expanding'--differences that are caused by the abundance and scarcity of light, which produce the different species of color.†14

[10] It is clear, then, how essence exists in substances and in accidents, and in composite and simple substances. It is also evident how the universal concepts of logic are related to all these, with the exception of the first cause, which is absolutely simple. Because of its simplicity, neither the notion of genus nor of species, nor consequently the notion of definition, applies to it. In this being may our treatise find its end and fulfillment.

Amen