Gilson's "Aristoteles" from Being and Some Philosophers

The following is an excerpt from Etienne Gilson Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed., Ch. II Being and Substance, p. 49-50.

The Aristoteles

The primary mistake of Aristotle, as well as of his followers, was to use the verb "to be" in a single meaning, whereas it actually has two. If it means that a thing is, then individuals alone are, and forms are not; if it means what a thing is, then forms alone are and individuals are not. The controversy on the being of universals has no other origin than the failure of Aristotle himself to make this fundamental distinction. In his philosophy, as much as in that of Plato, what is does not exist, and that which exists is not.

Had Plato lived long enough to read, in the First Book of Aristotle's Metaphysics, the criticism of his own doctrine of ideas, he might have written one more dialogue, the Aristoteles, in which it would have been child's play for Socrates to get Aristotle entangled in hopeless difficulties:

"I should like to know, Aristotle, whether you really mean that there are certain forms of which individual beings partake and from which they derive their names: that men, for instance are men because they partake of the form and essence of man."
"Yes, Socrates, that is what I mean."
"Then each individual partakes of the whole of the essence or else of part of the essence. Can there be any other mode of participation?"
"There cannot be."
"Then do you think that the whole essence is one, and yet being one, is in each one of the things?"
"Why not, Socrates?"
"Because, one and the same thing will then at one and the same time exist as a whole in many separate individuals, and will therefore be in a state of separation from itself!"
"Nay, Socrates, it is not so. Essences are not Ideas; they do not subsist in themselves but only in particular things, and this is why, although we conceive them as one, they can be predicated of many."
"I like your way, Aristotle, of locating one in many places at once; but did you not say that essence is that whereby individual beings are?"
"Yes, Socrates, I did."
"Then, my lad, I wish you could tell me how it may be that beings are through sharing in an essence, which itself is not!"

The history of the problem of universals has precisely been such a dialogue, and it could have no conclusion. If essences exist, they cannot be shared in without losing their unity and consequently their being. If individuals are, then each of them should be a distinct species and there could not be, as in point of fact there are, species that include in their unity a multiplicity of individuals. What is true is that essences are and that individuals exist, so that each essence exists in and through some individual, just as in and through its essence every individual truly is. But, to be in a position to say so, one must first have distinguished between individuation and individuality, that is, one must have realized that, no less necessarily and perhaps more deeply than essence, existence enters the structure of actual being.

Thomistic Metaphysics. Lecture Notes: 2. Commonality of Ens Commune

Thomistic Metaphysics: Directed Study

Dr. John F.X. Knasas

Lecture Notes: 2. Commonality of ens commune

The following is my digest and reflections on the lecture notes given by Dr. Knasas. While I am indebted to his notes, texts, and comments, these reflections are not necessarily the views of Dr. Knasas.

The Subject of Metaphysics:

The Commonality and Separateness of Ens Commune

This reflection will be a further clarification of the first part of the subject of metaphysics, namely, its separateness. The question posed at the end of the last reflection queried what must be established concerning the subject of metaphysics at the initial steps of the science. Must we know and have had established ens commune as separability, composite, or both to begin genuine metaphysics? If separability simpliciter had to be established, then we could not legitimately begin metaphysics until we demonstrated the existence of an immaterial subsisting existent. However, in light of the procedure set out by Aquinas, following Avicenna and Aristotle, it seems clear such demonstrations come at the end of metaphysics when we demonstrate the causes of our subject, ens commune. But what about the second sort of separability that we find in being, substance, act, and potency. (In de Trin. V, 4, ad 5m) The sort of separateness of things that are not necessarily immaterial but are able to be immaterial. Must we establish the immaterial separateness of such realities in order to begin the science of metaphysics?

If not, how else can we say we have successfully achieved distinguishing ens commune from ens mobile, the subject of natural philosophy? How can we hold that a science of ens qua ens is any different from a science of ens mobile if we have not established that ens commune can be separate from matter?

Also, does it not seem that we are unable to establish the second element of ens commune, its compositeness, if we are unable to grasp ens commune in its separateness from matter?

In analysis the intellect, by its first act, is able to grasp what is common to many; it is able to apprehend the quiddity shared amongst many particulars. The intellect can grasp that what is common to Peter, Paul, and John is the quiddity, "humanness." If an ox and ass are added to this list the intellect will grasp the more general commonness "animalness" that is shared by all. Similarly in the case of generation-corruption, increase-decrease, alteration, and locomotion the intellect readily grasps ens mobile (mobile being) as the commonality found in these distinct types of change. Our problem is: how can we establish the subject of metaphysics, ens commune, as distinct from ens mobile without demonstrating the existence of separatable or immaterial beings? It would seem pace the latter demonstration there is initially no clear distinction between ens mobile and ens commune. However we have Aquinas suggesting that our subject matter is "discovered by a process of analysis as the more universal is discovered after the less universal." (In Meta., Proem)

There is one type of immaterial existence that is discovered and established without the demonstrations of metaphysics, namely, intentional being (esse intentionale) or cognitional being (ST. I. 14.1; 78.3). The unique causality found in cognitional being is not embeded with matter but operates without matter - although not always without material conditions. Unlike natural immutation, cognitional immutation must occur in a manner wherein the form is impressed on the cognitive subject without corrupting the form of its terminus, that is, the cognitive faculty. The form is received as other while the cognitive faculty remains itself. Hence, the natural material immutation (the immutation of ens mobile) found in esse naturale is distinct from the immaterial immutation found in esse intentionale. Here we have a readily discoverable order of causality distinct from that of ens mobile. Further, the commoness able to be grasped by the intellect from ens mobile and esse intentionale is ens commune. Therefore we are able to sufficiently establish ens commune as a distinct subject from ens mobile without the demonstration of subsisting immaterial beings.

Thomistic Metaphysics. Lecture Notes: 1

Thomistic Metaphysics: Directed Study
Dr. John F.X. Knasas
Lecture Notes: 1

The following is my digest and reflections on the lecture notes given by Dr. Knasas. While I am indebted to his notes, texts, and comments, these reflections are not necessarily the views of Dr. Knasas.

The fundamental content of Thomistic metaphysics is two-fold: 1) its subject genus and 2) the cause of its subject genus.

The Subject of Metaphysics

Within the Aristotelian tradition any scientia has three parts 1) its subject-genus, 2) its principles, and 3) proper attributes or conclusions. “The object of which scientific knowledge is sought through demonstration is some conclusion in which a proper attribute is predicated of some subject, which conclusion is inferred from the principles.” (In PA, I.2) This reflection is concerned with the subject of metaphysics.

First, Aquinas suggests a variety of formulae for the subject of metaphysics such as: ens commune, ens qua ens, and ens inquantum ens. The subject of metaphysics, ens, has two features of note 1) its separateness or separatability and 2) its compositeness.

The Subject of Metaphysics: The Separateness of ens

Aquinas holds that metaphysics is concerned with "what is separate from matter both in existence and in thought." This is the highest grade of immateriality and therefore the highest order of intelligibility. This metaphysical "separateness" from matter is the last order in the tripartite degrees of abstraction. This doctrine has its roots in Plato's Divided Line and more importantly Aristotle's Metaphysics E 1. 1025b3-6a32. Our key texts for the separateness of ens are: In Meta. Proem and In BDT Q. V, 4., & ad. 5

Text A

However, even though the subject of this science [metaphysics] is being-in-general [ens commune], the whole science is said to concern what is separate from matter both in existence and in thought. For not only are those things called separate in existence and thought that can never exist in matter, like God and the intellectual substances, but also those that can be without matter, such as being-in-general. (In Meta., Proem. Trans by Armand Maurer, Division and Methods, p. 89)

Text B

. . . for something can exist separate from matter and motion . . . because by its nature it does not exist in matter and motion; but it can exist without them, though we sometimes find it with them. In this way being [ens], substance, potency, and act are separate from matter and motion, because they do not depend on them for their existence, unlike the objects of mathematics, which can only exist in matter. Thus philosophical theology [also called metaphysics] investigates beings separate in [this] second sense as its subjects, . . . (In de Trin. V, 4c; Maurer, Division and Methods, p. 45.)

Separateness admits of a two-fold division between 1) that which necessarily is separate, like God and angels and 2) that which can be separate such as being-in-general and substance. A further qualification of this second sort of separateness is found here:

Text C

We say that being [ens] and substance are separate from matter and motion not because it is of their nature to be without them, as it is of the nature of ass to be without reason, but because it is not of their nature to be in matter and motion, although sometimes they are in matter and motion as animal abstracts from reason, although some animals are rational. (In de Trin. V, 4, ad 5m; Maurer, Division and Methods, p. 48-9.)

The first sense of separateness is applicable of pure spiritual realities, but the second sense of separateness is broader. It is applicable to a greater variety of realities both immaterial and material. This second sense of separateness is the subject of metaphysics; it is of ens qua ens which is able to be found both in material and immaterial realities.

Text D

It is called metaphysics because it considers being [ens] and its attendant properties; for these objects that go beyond physics are discovered by a process of analysis as the more universal is discovered after the less universal. (In Meta., Proem: Maurer, Division and Methods, p. 89.)

Metaphysica, inquantum considerat ens et ea quae consequuntur ipsum. Haec enim transphysica inveniuntur in via resolutionis, sicut magis communia post minus communia.

Aquinas is here taking a suggestion from Book I of Avicenna's Metaphysics of the Shifa. Metaphysics considers being and its quasi-species or as Rowen translates "ea quae consequuntur ipsum," "the attributes which naturally accompany being." It is also of note that Aquinas says that the objects discovered that go beyond physics, like ens, are discovered by analysis (resolutionis). There is no qualification that a demonstration is necessary to discover this object. Simply by analysis, like when we are searching for the primordial genera of a universal. A human is a rational animal, which is an animated thing, which is corporeal, which is a substance. We also discover ens by ascending Porphryr's tree, however we do not stop with genera; we proceed to the top, to the order of the non-univocal transcendentals.

The Subject of Metaphysics: The Compositeness of ens

Text E

It is therefore clear that composition of act and potentiality has greater extension than that of form and matter. Thus, matter and form divide natural substance, while potentiality and act divide common being [ens commune]. Accordingly, whatever follows upon potentiality and act, as such, is common to both material and immaterial created substances, as to receive and to be received, to perfect and to be perfected. Yet all that is proper to matter and form, as such, as to be generated and to be corrupted, and the like, are proper to material substances, and in no way belong to immaterial created substances. (Summa Contra Gentiles II. 54)

In the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas the Aristotelian act-potency composition extends beyond hylomorphic entities. It also divides ens commune which is able to be found without matter and would hence also admit of instances not hylomorphically composed. Aquinas does not hold a doctrine of universal hylomorphism. His doctrine of being is that ens commune is a composite of an actual and potential element.

Text F

. . . there is in [intellectual and immaterial] substances but one composition of act and potentiality, namely, the composition of substance and being [substantia et esse], which by some is said to be of that which is [quod est] and being [esse], or of that which is and that by which a thing is.
On the other hand, in substances composed of matter and form there is a twofold composition of act and potentiality: the first, of the substance itself which is composed of matter and form; the second, of the substance thus composed, and being; and this composition also can be said to be of that which is and being or of that which is and that by which a thing is. (Summa Contra Gentiles II. 54)

The act-potency composition of ens commune is constituted by a substance-existence composition. Aquinas will often say that something is a being in virtue of possessing an act of existence (actus essendi). A being is "quasi habens esse" as if a haver or possessor of esse. Aquinas makes this point in many places, such as:

Group A

“Cum autem in re sit quidditas ejus et suum esse, veritas fundatur in esse rei magis quam in quidditate, sicut et nomen entis ab esse imponitur” (In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1c)

“Sicut autem motus est actus ipsius mobilis inquantum mobile est; ita esse est actus existentis, inquantum ens est” (In I Sent., d. 19, q. 2, a. 2c)

“. . . quod cum dicitur: Diversum est esse, et quod est, distinguitur actus essendi ab eo cui actus ille convenit. Ratio autem entis ab actu essendi sumitur, non ab eo cui convenit actus essendi” (De Ver. I, 1, ad 3m second set)

“. . . esse dicitur actus entis inquantum est ens, idest quo denominatur aliquid ens actu in rerum natura” (Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 3c)

“et ipsum esse est quo substantia denominatur ens” (S.C.G. II, 54)

“Et ulterius aliqui erexerunt se ad considerandum ens inquantum est ens, et consideraverunt causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt haec vel talia, sed secundum quod sunt entia. Hoc igitur quod est causa rerum inquantum sunt entia, oportet esse causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt talia per formas accidentales, nec secundum quod sunt haec per formas substantiales, sed etiam secundum omne illud quod pertinet ad esse illorum quocumque modo” (S.T. I, 44, 2c)

“Nam ens dicitur quasi esse habens, hoc autem solum est substantia, quae subsistit” (In XII Meta., lect. 1)

Notes and Further Texts: On Esse

Group B

“Sciendum est quod, sicut in 5 Metaphys. Philosophus dicit, ens per se dicitur dupliciter: Uno modo, quod dividitur per decem genera: alio modo, quod significant propositionum veritatem” (De Ente, ch. 1.)

“Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio Metaphysicae suae. Unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens. Sed enti non potest addi aliquid quasi extranea natura, per modum quo differentia additur generi, vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens” (De Ver. I, 1c).

In the latter passage we have Aquinas repeating his remarks from the Proem to his commentary on the Metaphysics. All of our intellectual conceptions all resolvit to being (ens). "As Avicenna says, in the principles of his Metaphysics (I.v), that which the intellect first conceives as, in a way, the most knowable [or evident], in which all our concepts resolve, is being." (ibid.)

Group C

“Videmus in mundo quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non esse, scilicet generabilia et corruptibilia. Omne autem quod est possible esse, causam habet: quia, cum de se aequaliter se habeat ad duo, scilicet esse et non esse, oportet, si ei approprietur esse, quod hoc sit ex aliqua causa. (S.C.G. I, 15); “Omne quod est possible esse et non esse, habe causam aliquam: quia in se consideratum ad utrumlibet se habet; et sic oportet esse aliquod aliud quod ipsum ad unum determinet” (S.C.G. II, 15)

Here we have Aquinas explicating his doctrine of esse in modal terms, just as Avicenna introduces them in his Metaphysics of the Shifa I. vi-vii. Aquinas also does this in De Ente et Essentia when distinguishing God, necessary existence, from creatures, possibles.

Group C. 5

Primo ponit differentiam eius quod est esse, ad id quod est. Secundo manifestat huiusmodi differentiam, ibi, ipsum enim esse nondum est. Dicit ergo primo, quod diversum est esse, et id quod est. Quae quidem diversitas non est hic referenda ad res, de quibus adhuc non loquitur, sed ad ipsas rationes seu intentiones. Aliud autem significamus per hoc quod dicimus esse, et aliud: per hoc quod dicimus id quod est; sicut et aliud significamus cum dicimus currere, et aliud per hoc quod dicitur currens. Nam currere et esse significantur in abstracto, sicut et albedo; sed quod est, idest ens et currens, significantur sicut in concreto, velut album. (In de Hebd. ch. II)

Here Aquinas compares the meaning of ens and esse to currens and currere. He is making a distinction between the thing which is and its act. The signifance of esse is not the same as the significance of quod est (that-which-is), and this signficance refers to distinct aspects (ratio) of the reality.

"For we signify one thing by saying 'to be,' and something else by saying 'that-which- is,' just as we also signify one thing when we say 'to run,' and something else by saying 'one running.' For 'to run' and 'to be' are signified in the abstract, just as 'whiteness' is; but 'that-which-is,' that is, 'a being,' and 'one running' are signified in the concrete, as is 'a white thing.'" (ibid.)

This to be (esse) Aquinas takes to be the act of all acts and the perfection of all perfections. It is not an act consequent upon that-which-is or the act of the form/essence. It is, as we will see, prior to the act of the form. It is only through the actus essendi that the form exists and is thereby able to act in its order of essential causality. Thus, the actus essendi is the supreme act and perfection in the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas, as we see in the following:

Group D

“Esse actum quondam nominat: non enim dicitur esse aliquid ex hoc quod est in potentia, sed ex eo quod est in actu. Omne autem cui convenit actus aliquis diversum ab eo existens, se habet ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum: actus enim et potentia ad se invicem dicuntur” (S.C.G. I, 22)

“. . . quod hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia perfectissimum: quod ex hoc patet quia actus est semper perfectio potentia. Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod esse ponitur. Nam humanitas vel igneitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu: sed hoc quod habet esse, efficitur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum” (De Pot. VII, 2, ad 9m)

“Dicendum quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium; comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est; unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis sicut receptum ad recipiens. Cum enim dico esse hominis, vel equi, vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut formale et receptum, non autem ut illud cui competit esse” (S.T. I, 4, 1, ad 3m)

A important point arises in the text from the SCG I. 22. We read in the same chapter that:

". . . sequitur quod aliquid sit sibi ipsi causa essendi. Hoc autem est impossibile: quia prius secundum intellectum est causam esse quam effectum; si ergo aliquid sibi ipsi esset causa essendi, intelligeretur esse antequam haberet esse, quod est impossibile” (S.C.G. I, 22)

Not only is esse the act in composition with the substance as an existential potency, but esse is also prior (prius) to substance as the cause of its existence. It is also first (primus), most profound (profundius), and most intimate (magis intimum):

“Primus autem effectus est ipsum esse, quod omnibus aliis effectibus praesupponitur et ipsum non praesupponit aliquem alium effectum” (De Pot. III, 4c). (The first effect is esse, which all other effects presupposes and it itself does not presuppose any other effect.)

Group E

“Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt” (S.T. I, 8, 1c)

“. . . ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur, non solum esse, sed ipsa quidditas creari dicitur: quia antequam esse habeat, nihil est, nisi forte in intellectu creantis, ubi non est creatura, sed creatrix essentia” (De Pot. 3, 5, ad 2m)

“. . . quod Deus simul dans esse, producit id quod esse recipit: et sic non oportet quod agat ex aliquo praeexistenti” (De Pot. 3, 1, ad 17m)

“. . . esse est accidens, non quasi per accidens se habens, sed quasi actualitas cuiuslibet substantiae” (Quodl., II, 2, 1, ad 2m)

There are other texts that emphasize the complementariness of esse and its essence or form. Existence is the act of form -which is in potency to this existential act- and yet there is a sense in which form is the cause of esse. Yet, we should be clear this does not contradiction the primary act of esse and its priority to form.

“Unde oportet ut essentia, qua res denominatur ens, non tantum sit forma nec tantum materia, sed utrumque: quamvis huiusmodi esse suo modo sola forma sit caussa.” (De Ente, ch. II)

“Per hoc enim in compositas ex material et forma dicitur forma esse principium essendi, quia est complementum substantiae cuius actus est ipsum esse.” (S.C.G. II, 54) "For in things composed of matter and form the form is said to be the principle of existence (essendi), because it is the compliment of substance whose act is existence."

The act of existence is, in a sense, dependent on the potency that it actuates (like in a hylomorphic unity). Its metaphysical raison d'être, is to be the act of something. Any conditions of a potency, (refered in the text as "complementum") becomes a cause of esse.

The Cause of the Subject of Metaphysics

The second part of the content of metaphysics is the cause of its subject, namely, being. This cause is found in the first sense of separatness. In particular, one spiritual reality unlike all others. This will established by the demonstrations for the one who is ipsum esse subsitens.

Text G

Thus philosophical theology [i.e., metaphysics] investigates being separate in the second sense as its subjects, and beings separate in the first sense [God and the angels] as the principles of its subject. (In de Trin. V, 4c)

Text H

What is more, it belongs to the same science to investigate the proper causes of any genus and the genus itself, as for example natural philosophy investigates the principles of natural body. So it must belong to the same science to investigate the separated substances and being-in-general [ens commune], which is the genus of which the above-mentioned substances [God and the Intelligences] are the common and universal causes. (In Meta. Proem)

There is accordingly a proper order in the treatment of these two contents of metaphysics, first its subject and second, its causes.

Text I

We can reach them [divine beings] by the light of natural reason only to the extent that their effects reveal them to us . . . Philosophers, then, study these divine beings only insofar [nisi prout] as they are the principles of all things. Consequently, they are the objects of the science that investigates what is common to all being, which has for its subject being as being. The philosophers call this divine science. (In de Trin. V, 4c)

God is "agens per modum dantis esse" (In VI Meta., lect. 3, n. 1215).

Concluding Remarks

The attainment of the subject of metaphysics is essential, because without knowing how to attain a science's subject-genus we cannot begin the study of it. The subject, ens, admitted of two features, 1) its separatability and 2) its composition. Does the intial attainment of the subject require establishing one or both of these features? As we saw in the texts above (text I) the knowledge of spiritual realities follows demonstrations of metaphysics, strict separateness is something established within metaphysics itself, not something initially held. This suggests that the feature of separatability itself is not necessary to the intitial attainment of the subject. Also, it has been made clear (texts B, C) that separateness is not unique to ens but is also true of substance, one, many, potency, and act. However, the second feature, compositeness, is a salient facet of ens. Its composition of act-potency is fundamental. The most important aspect of this composition is its act, which for ens commune is its actus essendi. Understanding things, quiddity, in virtue of habens esse will be necessary for the initial attainment of the subject of metaphysics.

Questioning Demarcations: A Preliminary Survey of a Philosophical Problematic

Questioning Demarcations:

A Preliminary Survey of a Philosophical Problematic

Daniel D. De Haan

1/15/09

I.

This is a paper that seeks proper demarcations, demarcations of a problematic concerning reality and thought. This paper hopes to clarify the question, how is thought able to carve reality at its joints? [1] It is a preliminary inquiry, a prolegomena of sorts. It is an inquiry that hopes to attend to the admonition of the Peripatetic, that those who wish to succeed must ask the correct preliminary questions.[2] The problematic under investigation is a perennial one, one that goes under a variety of appellations. Depending on our own particular philosophical parlance we might call it the problem of: Forms, essence, being, universals, the one and the many, realism and nominalism, types and tokens, and so on. It may be that these are all meritorious accounts of the problematic, however it is too early to decide. This is a brief inquiry into the proper questions and demarcation of this problematic. Identifying the problem too precisely at the beginning will only beg the question and perhaps prevent the real questions from being asked. We must discover the problematic’s proper subject domain if it is to be treated with the proper principles and method.
This is a preliminary inquiry into a problematic that seeks truth. This will admittedly delimit and prescind a number answers suggested by some philosophical dispositions and that is unfortunate for those of such temperaments. Something has gone amiss in the thoughts of a thinker who is a skeptic; reality will not tolerant such a refusal from human beings. The skeptic may think that he does not think; yet he will continue to live according to the order of reality like a human being. Accordingly those of us who consider skepticism an impossible conclusion to philosophical speculation will also recognize that this problematic requires consistent attention. This is because the very possibility of truth and knowledge rests on a satisfactory resolution to the difficulties encountered in this problematic. Stated austerely, our problem is: what is the relation between thought and things? When we reflect on the nature of knowledge we soon realize that while the beings we encounter in reality are particular, the concepts we employ when thinking about these particular realities are common. A question follows, how is it that there is something one in many? Or, how is there something common to all these particulars? Is this a condition of reality, thought, or both? Those mildly acquainted with the history of philosophy are aware of the variety of endeavors to answer this problematic. Some humble philosophers have shied away from the problem admitting its recondite nature. Porphyry in that memorable opening passage of his Isagoge said,

I shall abstain from deeper enquires and aim, as appropriate, at simpler ones. […] I shall beg off saying anything about (a) whether genera and species are real or are situated in bare thoughts alone, (b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and (c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them. Such business is profound, and requires another, greater investigation.[3]

II.

How do we begin to answer these profound difficulties? The above questions force a decision of precedence; do we take the question of reality, mind, or both to be more fundamental? If we privilege reality many shall protest that we have already granted the problematic into the hands of the metaphysical Hamlets. Those scruffy bearded ontologists who will not hesitate to posit a surfeit of heavenly and earthly realities and will in the end produce an ontology so encumbering with existents that it is even a burden for reality to bear. On the other hand, if we give precedence to thought we will hear similar protests of the mental sorcery incanted by the epistemologist’s, logician’s, and semanticist’s ratiocinations. Since the problem is concerning the relation between thought and things the middle path considering both thought and reality offers this cursory inquiry the most diplomatic and transcendent vision of the problematic. This approach has the merit of charity for it acknowledges that there may be insights in both when we give due regard to the real and to thought. It also forces the philosopher to reconcile thought to reality, which is to say it forces the philosopher to search for the truth.[4]

III.

What are the respective problems on the side of reality and on the side of thought? On the side of reality we encounter the difficulty that existents are manifestly many, but we are able to think of these many existents as having a variety of common aspects allowing us to think of many as one. These commonalities constitute our knowledge and opinions concerning reality. What is it in reality that permits this commonness in thought to be veridical? Is there actually anything one in the many? If not how can we maintain our thoughts conform to the real?
If we examine the side of thought we find similar problems. There is the question of efficiency and origin. To begin with we might ask what is thought? Privileging what is most obvious about thought I shall provide an account that attempts to identify the aspects of thought essential to our problematic. In this brief account I shall have to omit the question of thought’s agency, whether it is caused by a soul, mind, brain, etc.
One thing that should strike us is that thought has a peculiar aboutness by which we attend to and are aware of things and our own thoughts. In comparison to the obviously material things that we encounter, thought has a decidedly elastic, transcendent, and self-determining or intentional nature. This aspect of aboutness in thought is clearly relational, or if understood properly, intentional. What follows is at least one account of thought that clarifies our problematic and opens thought up towards reality.
When thought is about some particular realities the realities themselves are what we are aware of as present to thought. Initially and continuously reality seems to strike itself upon thought making us aware of realities’ existence and quidditative features. At this ubiquitous interface between thought and reality it is not thought that we are aware of but reality; thought relates and orders itself to the reality acting on it. Thus thought is receptive of the thing, the reality; it is about what is other because it is received as other. In some manner the thing is able to exist in reality and yet also exist in thought by affecting a cognitive-subject. A thing’s existence in thought is not inextricable to the thing; this condition of thing and existence shall require further comment below when we consider reality. This existential condition safeguards the principle of identity because it permits a thing to exist in distinct orders – reality and thought – without alteration of its quidditative constitution and without asserting thought and reality are in every way identical. Unlike material things that cease to have identity in becoming other, thought becomes the reality without ceasing to be thought; it is in a certain way able to become all things.[5] Maturity in thought is simply the virtuous activity of bringing thought into greater identity or isomorphism with reality.
The order of sensation, perception, and conception are different grades of aboutness found in thought that pertain to our different receptive cognitional interfaces with reality. The very appellation “concept” is suggestive of this receptivity and potency in thought. Reality affects a cognitive-subject; this subject by relating to reality conceives and gives birth to an aboutness, i.e., a concept. Thought is not of itself fecund, it must be quidditatively fecundated by reality in order to conceive its concepts or ideas.
Furthermore, thought is not compartmentalized into various cognitional functions, operative powers, or mental states - as some atomistic philosophers would have us believe. All appearances of thought are definitively incommensurable with atomism. The whole cognitive spectrum of thought is one as human beings are one. Thought itself is unified even though it may operate by virtue of various functions, operative powers, or mental states. There is nothing to suggest that it is disparate or incongruent from one order of aboutness to the next. This unity of the cognitive agent is the necessary condition for an apt account of thought’s activity. Simply put, an occurrence or act of thought is itself unified par excellence. While the vocal expression of a thought occurs in motion and requires a temporal duration to complete, the thought itself cannot have this disparateness in its act.

Thought […] occurs in discrete pulses which are indivisible: the thought that the pack of cards is on the table occurs all at once or not at all, and though it has some sort of correlation with such a physical process as the words in which I express it, it does not occur in physical time, either at an instant or over a period. (What sort of ideas the contrary view lead to may be seen from William James’s fantasy: that the thought lasts for the whole time of the sentence ‘the pack of cards is on the table’, and goes through successive phases, in which bits of the thought corresponding to the successive words are prominent – including bits corresponding to ‘the’ and ‘of’.) And again, if I think of two pennies, there is no such ‘doubleness’ in my thought as there is in my seeing or imagining if I see or visualize two pennies. [6]

This brief account of thought will be sufficient for a consideration of its concepts, which are the most salient feature of thought’s side of the problematic. The extraordinary feature of concepts is that they are fundaments of the abstract and more transcendent operations of thought. This is the order of cognition where thought ceases to be fixed to a particular and is able to gaze over or be about many particulars simultaneously. The lower orders of thought do not share this unique abstract transcendence with concepts. This is not to say that they are not nearly inextricable employed together in thought and utterance. Most of us hardly notice that in a single statement thought has rather casually ascended and descended the gamut of cognitional aboutness, from the transcendent relatedness of notions like being, good, and rational animal to the singular fixity of individuals like Socrates or St. Paul. This is another salient element to our problematic often left unmentioned. While it is curious that thought is able to grasp something common to many things in reality, it is just as peculiar that thought in its very act dynamically bounds from common aboutness to particular aboutness. If it is odd that thought generalizes what is particular in reality it is no less bizarre that thought generalizes what is likewise particular in thought. Our problematic must not only consider the relation between thought and reality, it must also consider the relation in thought of particular aboutness to common aboutness. Veridicality between thought and reality is not simply enough; there must also be an isomorphic continuity in thought. The existential condition alone is not sufficient to account for this veridical continuity. There must be something on the side of the thing’s conceived aboutness that is distinct from its existence, which can sufficiently render this unexceptional occurrence in thought veridical. There must be something in both particular aboutness and common aboutness that is the same.
Since it is equally true to answer the question, “what is it?” concerning a particular Athenian thing by replying either “Socrates” or “rational animal,” we shall call to this underlying sameness a whatness or quiddity, as we have called it above. Too many have understood quiddity to be inextricable with existence, particularity, generality or universality. But as was briefly mentioned above we should not take thing or its quidditative principle to entail any manner of existence in itself. Existence is extrinsic to quiddity; it is a concomitant not a constituent. Likewise we should not suppose that particular aboutness, common aboutness, or universality are inextricable with quiddity in se. These are conditions that like, existence, occur to extrinsically to quiddity in se. However this account will not go so far as to say quiddity in se prescinds from these conditions but rather that it is indifferent or neutral with regard to them. Inasmuch as it is quiddity in se they are not to be found. Avicenna has stated this position quite clearly in a well-known passage concerning the quiddity “horseness.”

For the definition of “horseness” is not the definition of universality, nor is universality included in the definition of “horseness.” For “horseness” has a definition that is not in need of the definition of universality, but is [something] to which universality accidentally occurs. For in itself, it is nothing at all except “horseness” for, in itself, it is neither one for many and exists neither in concrete things nor in the soul, existing in none of these things either in potency or in act, such that [these] are included in “horseness.” Rather, in terms of itself, it is only “horseness.” [7]

This inchoate doctrine of quiddity in se offers a stable position from which a more perspicuous answer to our problematic can be produced. Particular and common aboutness are conditions added by thought to a received quiddity. Considering quiddity in se it has neither of these conditions; universality and particularity are kinds of relatedness to things in reality that thought is able to employ with quiddity when predicating and understanding things in reality. It is because quiddity is neutral to particularity and universality that it is able to be isomorphic in both particular and common aboutness. Thought grasps in quiddity in se a manifold of cognoscibility; particularity and universality are simply additions to quiddity that results from thought’s parsing of quiddity into particulars or categorical kinds. Thought’s shift from thinking of the same thing in particular and common aboutness is veridical because it is the same quiddity in both. Thought is able to apprehend the quiddity that is within both and duly employ it because quiddity is not in se inextricable to one condition or the other.
. What accounts for thought’s ability to shift its relatedness or aboutness? The question of how thought is able to penetrate or illuminate the quiddity in se is certainly an important and difficult question, but one that demands more than this cursory treatment can provide. What is important for this preliminary examination is recognizing that these shifts in thinking are ubiquitous within the unity of thought, and that there is veridical continuity in all of thought’s various aboutnesses and this is sufficiently accounted for by our inchoate doctrine of quiddity in se.
If we avoid adopting an atomistic psychology and epistemology there is certainly an avenue for developing a perspicuous noetics able to bring resolution to thought’s side of the problematic. Acknowledging this causal order of noetic isomorphism can provide a cogent correlative to the efficient causes or mechanisms in cognition and offer insights into epistemic issues of veridicality.

IV.

While this account of thought is promising we should not incorrectly suppose that an explanation of thought alone is sufficient to account for all the difficulties of this problematic. Despite the complaints of those who deny all of reality for thought it is quite clear that the causal relation of reality and human thought is asymmetrical. And for this prima facie reason reality should not be forced to relinquish its part in the conditions that admit of this isomorphism. We shall not be convinced into thinking “that to give a psychological analysis of human knowledge [is the same as] to give a philosophical analysis of reality.”[8] The part is not sufficient to account for the whole.
Our account on the side of reality must be brief, and yet the principles at work in the account of thought are not entirely different. The existential condition and the doctrine of quiddity in se are also important to reality’s side of the problematic. While our account of thought required employing these two principles their proper treatment is on the side of reality. It is because of these conditions of reality that we are able to have veridical thought. The quiddity is not simply a cognitional being but is first a being in reality that then affects thought.
The quiddity of the existent in reality is also under similar conditions as the quiddity received in thought from reality. The quiddity in se is not determined to any concrete particular and mode of existence; these are, like universality and particularity in thought, extrinsic concomitants to quiddity in se. How it is that two individuals are both humans and that we can further recognize this commonness in thought is due to the doctrine of quiddity in se. Being realized in a single or even many existents or conceptualized in thought are all extrinsic concomitants to quiddity in se. The same quiddity can be found under all these conditions because these are all possible extrinsic conditions that may occur to a quiddity in se. The quiddity is existentially neutral; it has no sort of shadow reality or existence proper to itself. Inasmuch as it is quiddity it is only quiddity. Inasmuch as it is real or existing under some condition this is due to some concomitant aspect. The problem of the one and the many dissolves in this metaphysical solvency. A great deal more must be said to make all the appropriate qualification, but it is outside the confines of this inquiry to do so.[9]

V.

It should be clear that the proper subject domain of our inquiry lies primarily in metaphysics. The seminal explanation offered on the side of reality was presupposed and employed throughout the discussion of epistemology and noetics. However the principles of epistemology, noetics, and logic are equally important to providing a perspicuous treatment of this problematic. It seems the proper demarcation of the problematic requires heeding the asymmetry of reality and thought by privileging the former without neglecting the latter.

---------------------------------------------------

Notes:

1. Plato Phaedrus 265e.
2. Aristotle Metaphysics B. 1. 995a28-29.
3. Porphryr. Isagoge in Five Texts on the Medieval Problem of Universals.trans.& ed. Paul V. Spade. Hackett: Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1994, (2) p. 1.
4. I shall continue to use “reality” improperly as equivalent to that which is extramental or outside thought. Properly speaking thought too is a part of reality it is a sort of being and existence. I do not take all that is to be bifurcated into two incommensurable ontological orders like thought and reality. There is an ontological interface if not intimacy between thought and extramental thought. Such an interface accounts for truth and the very problematic underconsideration.
5. Aristotle De Anima III. 8. 431b20
6. Anscombe, G.E.M. and P. T. Geach Three Philosophers, Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1961. p. 96
7. Avicenna. The Metaphysics of the Healing trans. Michael E. Marmura, Brigham Young University Press: Provo, Utah, 2005. V. 1. (4).
8. Gilson, Etienne The Unity of Philosophical Experience, Charles Scribner’s Sons: New York, 1937, pg. 87
9. I suggest that a more perspicuous account can be produced if we avail ourselves of a hylomorphic existentialism like that found in Avicenna or Thomas Aquinas.
   

Aquinas: On Being and Essence - Prologue. Chapter I

ON BEING AND ESSENCE

Latin: De Ente et Essentia


PROLOGUE

A slight initial error eventually grows to vast proportions, according to the Philosopher.†1 Now the first conceptions of the intellect are (as Avicenna says)†2'a being' and 'an essence'. If, then, we are to avoid mistakes through ignorance of these, we must begin exploring their difficulty by stating what is meant by saying 'a being' and 'an essence', how they are found in different things, and how they are related to the logical notions †3 of genus, species, and difference.

Chapter One

THE GENERAL MEANING OF THE TERMS 'A BEING' AND 'AN ESSENCE'

[1] We ought to get our knowledge of simple things from composite things and arrive at what is prior by way of what is posterior, so that the learning process will begin, appropriately, with what is easier. For this reason we must begin with the meaning of 'a being' and proceed to the meaning of 'an essence'.†1

[2] We must realize (with the Philosopher)†2 that the term 'a being' in itself has two meanings. Taken one way it is divided by the ten categories; taken in the other way it signifies the truth of propositions. The difference between the two is that in the second sense anything can be called a being if an affirmative proposition can be formed about it, even though it is nothing positive in reality. In this way privations and negations are called beings, for we say that affirmation is opposed to negation, and that blindness is in the eye. But in the first way nothing can be called a being unless it is something positive in reality. In the first sense, then, blindness and the like are not beings.†3

[3] The term 'an essence' is not derived from this second meaning of 'a being', for in this sense some things are called beings that do not have an essence, as is clear in the case of privations. Rather, 'an essence' is derived from 'a being' in the first meaning of the term. As the Commentator says,†4 a being in the first sense of the term is that which signifies the essence of a thing. And because, as we have said,†5'a being' in this sense is divided by the ten categories, essence must mean something common to all the natures through which different beings are placed in different genera and species, as for example humanity is the essence of man, and so with regard to other things.

[4] Because the definition telling what a thing is signifies that by which a thing is located in its genus or species, philosophers have substituted the term 'quiddity' for the term 'essence'. The Philosopher frequently calls this 'what something was to be';†6 that is to say, that which makes a thing to be what it is. It is also called 'form',†7 because form signifies the determination †8 of each thing, as Avicenna says.†9 Another term used for this is 'nature', using 'nature' in the first of the four senses enumerated by Boethius.†10 In this sense anything is called a nature which the intellect can grasp in any way; for a thing is intelligible only through its definition and essence. That is why the Philosopher, too, says that every substance is a nature.†11 The term 'nature'†12 in this sense seems to mean the essence of a thing as directed to its specific operation, for no reality lacks its specific operation. The term 'quiddity' is derived from what is signified by the definition, while 'essence'†13 is used because through it, and in it, that which is has being.†14

[5] Because we use the term 'a being' absolutely and primarily of substances,†15 and secondarily and with qualification of accidents, it follows that essence is in substances truly and properly, but in accidents in a restricted way and in a qualified sense.

[6] Furthermore, some substances are simple and some composite,†16 and essence is in both; but it is present in simple substances more truly and perfectly because they also have being more perfectly. Simple substances are also the cause of those that are composite; at least this is true of the primary and simple substance, which is God. But because the essences of these substances are to a greater degree hidden from us, we must start with the essences of composite substances, so that the learning process will begin, appropriately, with what is easier.

Reproduced from:

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS


ON BEING AND ESSENCE


Translated with an Introduction and Notes

by

ARMAND MAURER, C.S.B.


SECOND REVISED EDITION


THE PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES


On Being and Essence Bibliographic Data p 4
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING DATA (Revised)
Thomas Aquinas, Saint, 1225?-1274.
On being and essence. Tr., with an introd. and notes, by Armand Maurer. 2d. rev. ed. Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968.
(Mediaeval sources in translation; I ISSN 0316-0874)
79 p.
Bibliography: p. [73]-76.
Index: p. [77]-79.
ISBN 0-88844-250-5
B765.T53D431968189':4

First edition 1949
Second edition 1968
Reprinted 1991
(c) 1949, 1968, 1991 by

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies
59 Queen's Park Crescent East
Toronto, Ontario, Canada MSS 2C4
Reprinted by Universa, Wetteren, Belgium

Accidents and Existence in Avicenna's Metaphysics of the Healing, III

Avicenna's Metaphysics of the Healing (MotH), as we have seen, gives consideration to the subject, principles, and purpose of the science of metaphysics in the opening book of the treatise. Book two goes on to consider the first of the two divisions of the subject of metaphysics which is the existent/being (ens) inasmuch as it is an existent/being (ens). This first division is substance and he treats it according to his metaphysical principles drawn up in Bk.I. 5-8. We have now arrived at book three where Avicenna begins to treat the other side of the division, namely, accidents.

Book III. 1 is subtitled: "On indicating what ought to be investigated regarding the state of the nine categories and about their accidental [nature]"

He begins book three with a summation of book two's resolutions. "We have clearly [indicated] the quiddity of substance and have shown that it is predicable of the separable, of body, of matter and of form." If we recall Bk I. 5 (esp. (9)-(10)) Avicenna lays out his metaphysical conceptual theses, of which there are initially three 1. existent (ens), 2. thing (res) or quiddity, and 3. necessary. Following this enumeration a fourth arises, namely, 4. existence (esse) which is affirmative aspect of a thing. Here, in book III, we can see Avicenna not only employing these theses but also within the framework of an Aristotelian science. In Book II. ch. 1-2 of the Posterior Analytics Aristotle says that there are four questions we ask of a subject or things. "The kinds of things we inquire about are equal in number to those we know (επιστήμη or scientia), and they are four: (1) a fact, (2) the reason for a fact, (3) if an object exists, (4) what a thing is." (Post. Anal. II. 1. 89b21-25 )

Avicenna is framing his summation in this context and he believes that he has resolved question (4) because he has "clearly indicated the quiddity of substance[...]." He goes on to suggest, with some repetition of earlier comments, that he has also dealt sufficiently with substance and question (3). He says, "regarding body, there is no need to establish [its existence as a substance.] Regarding matter and form, we have already established [the existence of both {in MotH Bk. II}.] As for the separable, we have established its [substantial existence] in the potential [manner] that is close to act, and we will be establishing it [further] hereafter." He also mentions if one remembers what was earlier spoken of soul the existence of separable other than body should be clear.

Hence, he suggests that it is appropriate to move on now to consider and establish the existence of accidents. Remaining in the same framework of the Posterior Analytic Avicenna has two primary questions in mind, is it? and what is it? He begins paragraph (2) answering the latter, "Regarding the ten categories, you have come to understand their quiddities in the introduction to the Logic." So the question "what is it?" of the nine categories or predicamentals has alreadly been resolved in Avicenna's mind with his earlier treatment of them in his Logic. But what about the second question not yet answered, what about their existence?

Avicenna is thinking not simply in the manner of Aristotle here, but is applying his own metaphysical principles, which are similar to Aristotle's, to topics which are also similar to Aristotle's but in numerous and interesting ways they innovations from the Stagirite's own treatments. Considering the existence of accidents Avicenna immediately focuses on "relation."
"Doubtlessly, the relative [...] is something that necessarily occurs [as an accident] to a thing." Relation, he takes as that which is doubtlessly an accident, since it by nature is in another (in alio); it cannot be understood or taken as a relation without another in which its existences depends on. Here, relation is fundamental for Avicenna because establishing the existence of relation as an accident is sufficient to establish all the other categorical accidents that depend on relation, such as action, passion, when, where, position, and possession. That these latter exist as accidents is established by relation's existence as an accident, for what are these latter predicables other than distinct relatives of some kind. (e.g. where is at least a thing relative to place) He concludes accordingly that, "these are states that occur [as accidents] to things in which they inhere as an existent in a subject." (MotH, Bk III. 1 (2))

But there are two accidents that remain, whose existence is not yet established, namely, quantity and quality. With these two the matter is not so simple. This is because some have held various quantities or qualities to be substance or even existent itself, or that all is reducible to one of them. (III. 1. (3)). Avicenna briefly summarizes some of their positions and proposes what must be considered regarding them to show that they are in fact accidents existing in a substance and not substances themselves. This is the focus of chapters 2-9 of book III, first considering the one and quantity and then quality. Finally chapter ten closes book III on the relative.

Dr. Knasas on "Maritain and the Cry of Rachel": Metaphysics and Evil

This past week at the Center for Thomistic Studies Dr. John Knasas presented the weekly colloquium paper. This paper was entitled, "Maritain and the Cry of Rachel" and was taken from his notes for a book on the problem of evil that he is currently working on. This particular lecture was on two different accounts that Jacques Maritain gives on the problem of evil, the first was his Aquinas lecture at Marquette the second was from a book he wrote later on.

There are two points I wish to present here, points that I myself found particularly illuminating from the lecture. 1) That God alone is an end in itself, with corrections to a few Kantian errors on this point, which take man to be an end in itself, and 2) The mistakes made with Being, and the consequences this has in our considerations of evil in reality.

I.

In the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is concerned with finding the end of all human action, and end that is an end-in-itself that is not sought for the sake of anything else. This end would then be absolutely sufficient in itself and all else that we seek would be for this end alone. Thomas Aquinas adopts this account for his of Philosophical-Theology and shows that God is this end. A robustness is added to the Saints account not found in the Peripatetic. The metaphysical doctrine of the Transcendentals allows Aquinas a certain felicity and elegance in undergirding Aristotle's ethics with a metaphysics and a theological end. For Thomas, God is Being Itself. But as we learn from the Transcendentals Being can be understood in a variety of ways. In so far as something exists it is a "being," being as known is "truth," as desired is "good" and so on. Aquinas can identify Being and the Good in reality; what is it that all things seek? The Good, which is "Being" under the aspect of the teleological desirable. The Absolute Being that is Absolute Goodness is God and all things seek this as the only end that is absolutely satisfying. The whole of Creation is ordered in its own way to God, Who is the only "whole" which is an end in itself.

Recently in theology and philosophy there has been a strong shift towards focusing on the primacy and excellence of human dignity. In virtue of the human soul, it is potentially all things and thus can be truly ordered to that which is infinitely Good and alone is satisfying, viz., God. This affords human beings a unique dignity, because of Man's infinite capacity for Absolute Goodness man can and should be taken as an end in itself. This infinite capacity allows one to consider man a "whole" unto himself and as such should be taken as an end in itself, that is, because of man's infinite dignity he can be infinitely satisfying as an ultimate end, fitting the sufficient conditions of being an "end-in-itself."

The criticism of this latter development is directed towards its Modernism; its subtle adoption of Modern atomism and the primacy of human autonomy and then its Kantian direction, taking a move from the categorical imperative that all men should be regarded as ends in themselves. This corrosive foundation has two unconscionable consequences one in theology and the other in the political order. 1) It subordinates the sovereignty and aseity of God as the only ultimate end, the only end-in-itself, it places human beings on a par with the Divine who IS infinitely superior. Man's infinite capacity for the Absolute Good, God, is a potency not an actuality. In those souls who have actually had some degree of this goodness realized within, still must necessarily "receive" this actualization from without. It is not theirs but is a gift. Taking this alone shows us that humans are still infinitely subordinate to the Divine Goodness; there infinite capacity is completely passive to the Divine Goodness causing in man what God has in simple perfection.
2) This subordination in political moral philosophy places the individual above the common good of all. It forces political philosophy into the deviant Modern turn denying the primacy of the common good of all and making it a secondary accidental social contract. This redefines human rights, placing the subject in the individual over the common good. Rights are defined then negatively as what you cannot do to the individual, it is what is owed to me as what capacities I deserve to exercise that you cannot deny me. I treat you as an end in itself without an essential context or teleology to the common good. I can am force to do good for you without the consideration of the good of the Whole. You and I treat each other as ends and provide goods for each other and not worry about others.

In the Medieval formula, where the Common Good is taken as essential and primary, rights are defined in terms of Justice. Justice being the Cardinal virtue that is essentially relational, it involves “the other” and is defined with the teleological aspect of the common good, as that which is due to another according to the common good. Human rights are seated in justice and the common good and the relation of affinity or friendship that supervenes when two or more are directed together to this end. Rights are defined in terms of justice as what is due to my fellow man according to the realization of the common good. This is a positive definition of human rights, affirming what must be done or what is “right’ for me to do according to my fellow man for his and my attainment and realization of the common good for all.

II.

The second point I wished to reflect on is related to Being and evil. Maritain’s initial objection is to one of Aquinas’s attempts to resolve the evil of human suffering. Aquinas responds to this by presenting a philosophical principle, often at work in Aquinas, relating to the teleological order of the whole, which is directed towards perfection in the ultimate good, God. Some parts may suffer evil, which is real, for the sake of the perfection of the whole, which is more real and is the ultimate and infinite good of All. Maritain finds this unsatisfactory because human beings can be taken as more than just principle parts of the whole. Humans can be understand as whole's in themselves and end in themselves, as was discussed above. As such there is nothing satisfactory about this explanation of Aquinas's as terminating in a pure philosophical conclusion.

The error pointed out here by Dr. Knasas is in a misunderstanding of Being, which is essentially the seat of why man sins and causes so much evil. Man misattributes what "Being" is, our one and only final end. We commit idolatry and obsessively mistake a part of being as Being Itself. We believe some thing or person to be our ultimate and satisfying end, when in fact God alone is this. Then, when we loose this thing or person, we mistakenly believe we have lost Being, we believe we have lost and are "deprived" of our only ultimate and satisfying end. This privation seems to us as the Ultimate Evil, the complete loss of Being. But this is in fact an idolatrous error. The loss of a child is a great evil, but the possession of the sublimity of a child is not close to having the infinite Goodness and fulfillment that God is and shares by His Love. It is a great evil itself to believe that the loss of only a part of being is the same as the privation of Actual Being, the loss of God.

I think there is a lot to be contemplated on in this latter point of Dr. Knasas's. How often we make the whole focus of our lives something that is not Being, something that is not Christ. We must pray and work to keep our soul fixed upon the Being that is Being Itself as our ultimate end, that lead us through the lesser goods up into the beatified consummation of ourselves with Being Itself.