Aquinas: On Being and Essence - Chapter 6

Chapter Six

ESSENCE AS FOUND IN ACCIDENTS

[1] Now that we have explained how essence is present in all substances, it remains for us to see how essence exists in accidents. Because essence is what the definition signifies, as has been said,†1 accidents must have an essence in the same way that they have a definition. Now their definition is incomplete, because they cannot be defined without including a subject in their definition.†2 This is because they do not have being in themselves, independent of a subject; as substantial being results from form and matter when they come together, so accidental being results from an accident and a subject when the former comes to the latter. For the same reason neither a substantial form nor matter has a complete essence, because the definition of a substantial form must include the subject of the form. It is defined, therefore, by adding something outside its genus, just like the definition of an accidental form. That is also why the body is included in the definition of the soul when it is defined by the natural philosopher, who considers the soul only as the form of a physical body.

[2] There is a considerable difference, however, between substantial and accidental forms. As a substantial form does not have being in itself, independent of that to which it is united, so neither does the matter to which it is joined. From their union results that being in which the reality subsists in itself, and from them is produced something essentially one. An essence, therefore, results from their union. It follows that although a form, considered in itself, does not have the complete nature of an essence, nevertheless it is part of a complete essence. But that to which an accident is added is a complete being in itself, subsisting in its own being; and this being is by nature prior to the supervening accident. That is why the supervening accident, by its union with the subject to which it comes, does not cause that being in which the reality subsists, and through which the reality is a being in itself. Rather, it causes a secondary being, without which we can conceive the subsistent reality to exist, as what is primary can be understood without what is secondary. So the accident and its subject do not produce something essentially, but accidentally, one. This explains why their union does not result in an essence, like the conjunction of form and matter. It also explains why an accident neither has the nature of a complete essence nor is part of a complete essence. As it is a being in a qualified sense, so it has an essence in a qualified sense.†3

[3] Furthermore, that which is said to be most fully and truly in a genus is the cause of everything posterior in the genus. For example, fire, which is the ultimate in heat, is the cause of heat in hot things, as the Metaphysics says.†4 That is why substance, which holds the first place in the genus of being, having essence most truly and fully, must be the cause of accidents, which share the nature of being secondarily and in a qualified sense.

[4] This happens in different ways. The parts of substance being matter and form, some accidents result principally from form and others from matter.†5 There is a form whose being does not depend on matter (for example, the intellectual soul),†6 whereas matter has being only through form. That is why among accidents that result from form there are some that have nothing in common with matter, as for example understanding, which does not take place through a bodily organ, as the Philosopher proves.†7 On the contrary, other accidents deriving from form do have something in common with matter, as for example sensation and the like. But no accident results from matter without having something in common with form.

[5] Among accidents that derive from matter we find the following difference. Some accidents result from matter because of its relation to a special form. Examples are male and female among animals--a difference that is reducible to matter, as the Metaphysics says.†8 That is why, once the form of animal has been removed, these accidents no longer remain except in an equivocal sense. Other accidents result from matter in its relation to a general form. In this case, when the special form is taken away, these accidents still remain in the matter. An example is the blackness of an Ethiopian's skin, which comes from the mixture of the elements and not from the nature of the soul, with the result that it remains in him after death.

[6] Because everything is individuated by matter and located in a genus or species through its form, accidents that derive from matter are accidents of the individual and they differentiate individuals within the same species. On the contrary, accidents that result from the form are properties belonging to the genus or species, and consequently they are found in everything sharing the nature of the genus or species. For example, the ability to laugh results from man's form, for laughter occurs because of some perception on the part of the human soul.

[7] Another point to notice is that accidents are sometimes caused in perfect actuality by the essential principles, like heat in fire, which is always actually hot. But sometimes accidents are caused only as aptitudes, and they are completed by an external agent, like transparency in the air, which is complemented by an external luminous body.†9 In cases like these the aptitude is an inseparable accident, whereas the completion that comes from a source external to the essence of the thing, or that does not enter into its constitution, will be separable from it, like movement and other accidents of this kind.

[8] Still another fact worthy of notice is that genus, species, and difference are derived differently in accidents and in substances. In substances, from substantial form and matter there is constituted something essentially one, the consequence of their union being one nature that is properly in the category of substance. That is why, in the case of substances, concrete names that signify the composite are properly said to be in a category, either as a species or as a genus, as for example 'man' or 'animal'. Form or matter, on the contrary, is not in a category in this way but only by reduction, as principles are said to be in a category.†10 From an accident and its subject, however, there is not produced something essentially one. Hence the result of their union is not one nature to which the notion of genus or species can be attributed. That is why terms designating accidents concretely, like 'something white' or 'something musical', cannot be placed in a category except by reduction. They are in a category only when expressed abstractly, like 'whiteness' or 'music'.

[9] Because accidents are not composed of matter and form, we cannot take their genus from matter and their difference from form, as we do in composite substances. Rather, we must take their primary genus from their mode of being, because the term 'a being' is predicated in diverse ways, by priority and posteriority, of the ten genera of the categories.†11 For example, quantity is called a being because it is the measure of substance, quality because it is the disposition of substance, and so on with the other accidents, as the Philosopher says.†12 Their differences, however, are derived from the diversity of the principles that cause them. And because properties result from the specific principles of the subject, this subject takes the place of the difference in their definition when they are defined in the abstract, which is the way they are properly in a category. For instance, we say that snubness is a curvature of the nose. But the converse would be true if we defined them in the concrete. In this case the subject would be placed in their definition as the genus, because these accidents would then be defined like composite substances, in which the concept of the genus is derived from matter. An example is calling a snub nose a curved nose. The same is true when one accident is the principle of another, as action, passion, and quantity are principles of relation. (That is why the Philosopher divides relation with reference to these in the Metaphysics).†13 But because the specific principles of accidents are not always evident, we sometimes take the differences of accidents from their effects, as when we say that colors are differentiated as 'dilating' and 'expanding'--differences that are caused by the abundance and scarcity of light, which produce the different species of color.†14

[10] It is clear, then, how essence exists in substances and in accidents, and in composite and simple substances. It is also evident how the universal concepts of logic are related to all these, with the exception of the first cause, which is absolutely simple. Because of its simplicity, neither the notion of genus nor of species, nor consequently the notion of definition, applies to it. In this being may our treatise find its end and fulfillment.

Amen

Aquinas: On Being and Essence - Chapter 5

Chapter Five

ESSENCE AS FOUND IN DIFFERENT BEINGS

[1] From what has been said we can see how essence is found in different things. There are in fact three ways in which substances have essence. There is a reality, God, whose essence is his very being.†1 This explains why we find some philosophers who claim that God does not have a quiddity or essence, because his essence is not other than his being.†2 From this it follows that he is not in a genus, for everything in a genus must have a quiddity in addition to its being. The reason for this is that the quiddity or nature of a genus or species does not differ, as regards the notion of the nature, in the individuals in the genus or species, whereas being is diverse in these different individuals.†3

[2] If we say that God is pure being, we need not fall into the mistake of those who held that God is that universal being by which everything formally exists.†4 The being that is God is such that no addition can be made to it. Because of its purity, therefore, it is being distinct from all other being. That is why the commentary on the Book of Causes says that the first cause, which is pure being, is individuated through its pure goodness.†5 But even though the notion of universal being does not include any addition, it implies no prescinding from an addition. If it did, we could not conceive anything existing in which there would be an addition to being.†6

[3] Furthermore, although God is pure being, it is not necessary that he lack other perfections or excellences. On the contrary, he possesses all the perfections of every kind of thing, so that he is called absolutely perfect, as the Philosopher and Commentator say.†7 In fact, he possesses these perfections in a more excellent way than other things, because in him they are one, whereas in other things they are diversified. This is because all these perfections belong to him in virtue of his simple being.†8 In the same way if someone could produce the operations of all the qualities through one quality alone, in that one quality he would possess every quality.†9 Similarly, God possesses all perfections is his being itself.

[4] Essence is found in a second way in created intellectual substances. Their being is other than their essence, though their essence is without matter. Hence their being is not separate but received, and therefore it is limited and restricted to the capacity of the recipient nature. But their nature or quiddity is separate and not received in matter. That is why the Book of Causes says that the intelligences are unlimited from below and limited from above.†10 They are, in fact, limited as to their being, which they receive from a higher reality, but they are not limited from below, because their forms are not limited to the capacity of a matter that receives them.

[5] That is why among these substances we do not find a multitude of individuals in the same species, as has been said,†11 except in the case of the human soul because of the body to which it is united. And even though the individuation of the soul depends on the body as for the occasion of its beginning, because it acquires its individuated being only in the body of which it is the actuality, it is not necessary that the individuation cease when the body is removed. Because the soul has a separate being, once the soul has acquired its individuated being by having been made the form of a particular body, that being always remains individuated. That is why Avicenna says that the individuation and multiplication of souls depends on the body as regards its beginning but not as regards its end.†12

[6] Furthermore, because the quiddity of these substances is not identical with their being, they can be classified in a category. For this reason they have a genus, species, and difference, though their specific differences are hidden from us.†13 Even in the case of sensible things we do not know their essential differences;†14 we indicate them through the accidental differences that flow from the essential differences, as we refer to a cause through its effect. In this way 'biped' is given as the difference of man. We are ignorant, however, of the proper accidents of immaterial substances; so we can designate their differences neither through themselves nor through accidental differences.

[7] We must observe that the genus and difference are not derived in the same way in these substances and in sensible substances.†15 In sensible substances the genus is obtained from the material side of the thing, whereas the difference is obtained from its formal side. That is why Avicenna says †16 that in substances composed of matter and form, the form is the simple difference of that which is constituted by it; not that the form itself is the difference but that it is the principle of the difference, as he says in his Metaphysics.†17 A difference of this kind is called a simple difference because it is derived from a part of the quiddity of the thing, namely its form. But since immaterial substances are simple quiddities, we cannot take their difference from a part of the quiddity, but from the whole quiddity. As Avicenna says, only those species have a simple difference whose essences are composed of matter and form.†18

[8] The genus of immaterial substances is also obtained from the whole essence, though in a different way. Separate substances are like one another in being immaterial, but they differ in their degree of perfection, depending on their distance from potentiality and their closeness to pure act. Their genus, then, is derived from what follows upon their immateriality, as for example intellectuality, or something of this sort. Their difference, which in fact is unknown to us, is derived from what follows upon their degree of perfection.

[9] These differences need not be accidental because they are determined by degrees of perfection, which do not diversity the species. True, the degree of perfection in receiving the same form does not produce different species, as for example the more white and the less white in participating whiteness of the same nature. But different degrees of perfection in the forms themselves or in the participated natures do produce different species. Nature, for example, advances by degrees from the plant to the animal world using as intermediaries types of things that are between animals and plants, as the Philosopher says.†19 Of course intellectual substances do not always have to be divided by two real differences; as the Philosopher shows, this cannot happen in all cases.†20

[10] In a third way essence is found in substances composed of matter and form. In these, too, being is received and limited, because they have being from another. Their nature or quiddity, moreover, is received in designated matter. Thus they are limited both from above and from below. A multitude of individuals in the same species is also possible in their case because of the division of designated matter. As for the relation of the essence of these substances to logical notions, that has been explained above.†21

Aquinas: On Being and Essence - Chapter 4

Chapter Four

ESSENCE AS FOUND IN SEPARATE SUBSTANCES

[1] It remains for us to see how essence exists in the separate substances: in souls, intelligences,†1 and the first cause. Although everyone admits the simplicity of the first cause, some would like to introduce a composition of form and matter in intelligences and souls,†2 an opinion that seems to have begun with Avicebron, the author of The Source of Life.†3 But this is opposed to what philosophers generally say; they call these substances separated from matter and prove that they are completely immaterial.†4 This is best demonstrated from their power of understanding.†5 We see that forms are actually intelligible only when they are separated from matter and its conditions; and they are made actually intelligible only through the power of an intelligent substance, by receiving them into itself and acting upon them.†6 That is why every intellectual substance must be completely free from matter, neither having matter as a part of itself nor being a form impressed on matter, as is the case with material forms.

[2] The position is untenable that not all matter prevents intelligibility but only corporeal matter. If this resulted only from corporeal matter, matter would have this opaqueness to understanding from its corporeal form, since matter is called corporeal only because it exists under a corporeal form. This is impossible, because this corporeal form, like other forms, is actually intelligible insofar as it is abstracted from matter. In a soul or intelligence, therefore, there is no composition of matter and form, understanding matter in them as it is in corporeal substances. But there is in them a composition of form and being.†7 That is why the commentary on the Book of Causes says that an intelligence is that which has form and being;†8 and by form is here understood the quiddity itself or simple nature.

[3] It is easy to see how this is so. Whenever things are so related to each other that one is the cause of the other's being, the one that is the cause can have being without the other, but not vice versa. Now matter and form are so related that form gives being to matter. Matter, then, cannot exist without some form, but there can be a form without matter: form as such does not depend on matter. If we find some forms that can exist only in matter, this happens to them because they are far removed from the first principle, which is the primary and pure act. It follows that those forms closest to the first principle are forms subsisting in themselves without matter. In fact, not every kind of form needs matter, as has been said; and the intelligences are forms of this kind. There is no necessity, then, that the essences or quiddities of these substances be anything else than form.

[4] The essence of a composite substance accordingly differs from that of a simple substance because the essence of a composite substance is not only form but embraces both form and matter, whereas the essence of a simple substance is form alone. Two other differences follow from this. The first is that we can signify the essence of a composite substance as a whole or as a part. This happens because of the designation of matter, as has been said.†9 As a result we do not attribute the essence of a composite in every way to the composite; we cannot say, for example, that man is his quiddity. But the essence of a simple reality, which is its form, can only be signified as a whole, because nothing is there beside the form as its recipient. That is why the essence of a simple substance, no matter how we conceive it, can be attributed to the substance. As Avicenna says, "The quiddity of a simple substance is the simple entity itself," because there is nothing else that receives it.†10

[5] The second difference is that the essences of composite things, by being received in designated matter, are multiplied according as it is divided. From this it happens that there are things the same in species and different in number. But since the essence of a simple entity is not received in matter, it cannot be multiplied in this way. That is why in these substances we cannot find many individuals in the same species; there are as many species among them as there are individuals, as Avicenna expressly says.†11

[6] Substances of this kind, though pure forms without matter, are not absolutely simple; they are not pure act but have a mixture of potentiality. The following consideration makes this evident. Everything that does not belong to the concept of an essence or quiddity comes to it from outside and enters into composition with the essence, because no essence can be understood without its parts. Now, every essence or quiddity can be understood without knowing anything about its being. I can know, for instance, what a man or a phoenix is and still be ignorant whether it has being in reality.†12 From this it is clear that being is other than essence or quiddity, unless perhaps there is a reality whose quiddity is its being. This reality, moreover, must be unique and primary;†13 because something can be multiplied only [1] by adding a difference (as a generic nature is multiplied in species), [2] by the reception of a form in different parts of matter (as a specific nature is multiplied in different individuals), [3] by the distinction between what is separate and what is received in something (for example, if there were a separated heat,†14 by the fact of its separation it would be distinct from heat that is not separated). Now, granted that there is a reality that is pure being, so that being itself is subsistent, this being would not receive the addition of a difference, because then it would not be being alone but being with the addition of a form. Much less would it receive the addition of matter, because then it would not be subsistent, but material, being. It follows that there can be only one reality that is identical with its being. In everything else, then, its being must be other than its quiddity, nature, or form. That is why the being of the intelligences must be in addition to their form; as has been said,†15 an intelligence is form and being.

[7] Whatever belongs to a thing is either caused by the principles of its nature (as the capacity for laughter in man) or comes to it from an extrinsic principle (as light in the air from the influence of the sun). Now being itself cannot be caused by the form or quiddity of a thing (by 'caused' I mean by an efficient cause), because that thing would then be its own cause and it would bring itself into being, which is impossible.†16 It follows that everything whose being is distinct from its nature must have being from another. And because everything that exists through another is reduced to that which exists through itself as to its first cause, there must be a reality that is the cause of being for all other things, because it is pure being.†17 If this were not so, we would go on to infinity in causes, for everything that is not pure being has a cause of its being, as has been said. It is evident, then, that an intelligence is form and being, and that it holds its being from the first being, which is being in all its purity; and this is the first cause, or God.

[8] Everything that receives something from another is potential with regard to what it receives, and what is received in it is its actuality. The quiddity or form, therefore, which is the intelligence, must be potential with regard to the being it receives from God, and this being is received as an actuality. Thus potency and act are found in the intelligences, but not form and matter, except in an equivocal sense.†18 So, too, 'to suffer', 'to receive', 'to be a subject', and all similar expressions which seem to be attributed to things because of matter, are understood in an equivocal sense of intellectual and corporeal substances, as the Commentator remarks.†19

[9] Because, as we have said,†20 the quiddity of an intelligence is the intelligence itself, its quiddity or essence is identical with that which it is, while its being, which is received from God, is that by which it subsists in reality.†21 That is why some say that a substance of this kind is composed of 'that by which it is' (quo est) and 'that which is' (quod est),†22 or, according to Boethius, of 'that which is' (quod est) and 'being' (esse).†23

[10] Since there is both potency and act in the intelligences, it will not be difficult to find a multitude of them, which would be impossible if they had no potentiality. That is why the Commentator says †24 that if the nature of the possible intellect were unknown, we could not find a multitude of separate substances. These substances, moreover, are distinct from one another according to their degree of potency and act, a superior intelligence, being closer to the primary being, having more act and less potency, and so with the others. This gradation ends with the human soul, which holds the lowest place among intellectual substances. As a result, its possible intellect bears the same relation to intelligible forms that primary matter, which holds the lowest position in sensible being, bears to sensible forms, as the Commentator says.†25 That is why the Philosopher compares the possible intellect to a blank tablet on which nothing is written.†26 Having more potentiality than other intellectual substances, the human soul is so close to matter that a material reality is induced to share its own being, so that from soul and body there results one being in the one composite, though this being, as belonging to the soul, does not depend on the body.†27 After this form, which is the soul, there are found other forms which have more potentiality and are even closer to matter, to such a point that they do not have being without matter. Among these forms, too, we find an order and a gradation, ending in the primary forms of the elements, which are closest to matter. For this reason they operate only as required by the active and passive qualities and other factors that dispose matter to receive form.

Aquinas: On Being and Essence - Chapter 3

Chapter Three

THE RELATION OF ESSENCE TO GENUS, SPECIES, AND DIFFERENCE

[1] Having seen what the term 'an essence' means in composite substances, we must examine how it is related to the notion †1 of genus, species, and difference. That to which the notion of genus, species, or difference belongs is attributed to an individual, determinate thing. It is therefore impossible that the notion of universal (that is to say, of genus or species) should belong to an essence when it is expressed as a part, for example by the term 'humanity' or 'animality'. That is why Avicenna says †2 that 'rationality' is not a difference, but the principle of a difference; and for the same reason 'humanity' is not a species nor 'animality' a genus. Nor can we say that the notions of genus and species belong to an essence as a reality existing outside individual things, as the Platonists held,†3 because then the genus and species would not be attributed to the individual: we cannot say that Socrates is something separated from himself. This separated entity, moreover, would be of no help in knowing the individual. We conclude, therefore, that the notion of genus or species applies to an essence when it is expressed as a whole, for example by the term 'man' or 'animal', containing implicitly and indistinctly everything in the individual.

[2] Understood in this sense, a nature or essence can be considered in two ways.†4 First, absolutely, according to its proper meaning. In this sense nothing is true of it except what belong to it as such; whatever else may be attributed to it, the attribution is false. For example, to man as man belong 'rational', 'animal', and everything else included in his definition; but 'white' or 'black', or any similar attribute not included in the notion of humanity, does not belong to man as man. If someone should ask, then, whether a nature understood in this way can be called one or many, we should reply that it is neither, because both are outside the concept of humanity, and it can happen to be both. If plurality belonged to its concept, it could never be one, though it is one when present in Socrates. So, too, if oneness belonged to its concept, the nature of Socrates and of Plato would be identical, and it could not be multiplied in many individuals.

[3] In a second way a nature or essence can be considered according to the being it has in this or that individual. In this way something is attributed to it accidentally, because of the subject in which it exists, as we say that man is white because Socrates is white, though this does not belong to man insofar as he is man.

[4] This nature has a twofold being: one in individual things and the other in the soul, and accidents follow upon the nature because of both beings. In individuals, moreover, the nature has a multiple being corresponding to the diversity of individuals; but none of these beings belongs to the nature from the first point of view, that is to say, when it is considered absolutely. It is false to say that the essence of man as such has being in this individual: if it belonged to man as man to be in this individual it would never exist outside the individual. On the other hand, if it belonged to man as man not to exist in this individual, human nature would never exist in it. It is true to say, however, that it does not belong to man as man to exist in this or that individual, or in the soul. So it is clear that the nature of man, considered absolutely, abstracts from every being, but in such a way that is prescinds from no one of them; and it is the nature considered in this way that we attribute to all individuals.

[5] Nevertheless, it cannot be said that a nature thus considered has the character of a universal,†5 because unity and community are included in the definition of a universal, neither of which belongs to human nature considered absolutely. If community were included in the concept of man, community would be found in everything in which humanity is found. This is false, because there is nothing common in Socrates; everything in him is individuated.†6 Neither can it be said that human nature happens to have the character of a genus or species through the being it has in individuals, because human nature is not found in individual men as a unity, as though it were one essence belonging to all of them, which is required for the notion of a universal.

[6] It remains, then, that human nature happens to have the character of a species only through the being it has in the intellect. Human nature has being in the intellect abstracted from all individuating factors, and thus it has a uniform character with regard to all individual men outside the soul, being equally the likeness of all and leading to a knowledge of all insofar as they are men. Because it has this relation to all individual men, the intellect discovers the notion of species and attributes it to the nature. This is why the Commentator says that it is the intellect that causes universality in things.†7 Avicenna makes the same point.†8

[7] Although this nature apprehended by the intellect has the character of a universal from its relation to things outside the soul, because it is one likeness of them all, nevertheless as it has being in this or that intellect it is a particular apprehended likeness. The Commentator was clearly in error then; he wanted to conclude that the intellect is one in all men from the universality of the apprehended form.†9 In fact, the universality of this form is not due to the being it has in the intellect but to its relation to things as their likeness. In the same way, if there were a material statue representing many men, the image or likeness of the statue would have its own individual being as it existed in this determinate matter, but it would have the nature of something common as the general representation of many men.

[8] Because it is human nature absolutely considered that is predicated of Socrates, this nature does not have the character of a species when considered absolutely; this is one of the accidents that accompany it because of the being it has in the intellect. That is why the term 'species' is not predicated of Socrates, as though we were to say 'Socrates is a species'. This would necessarily happen, however, if the notion of species belonged to man in his individual being in Socrates, or according to his absolute consideration, namely insofar as he is man; for we predicate of Socrates everything that belongs to man as man. Nevertheless, it is essential to a genus to be predicated: this is included in its definition. Predication is something achieved by the intellect in its act of combining and dividing, having for its foundation in reality the unity of those things, one of which is attributed to the other.†10 That is why the notion of predicability can be included in the meaning of the notion of genus, a notion that is also produced by an act of the intellect. But that to which the intellect attributes the notion of predicability, combining it with something else, is not the concept itself of genus, but rather that to which the intellect attributes the concept of genus, as for example what is signified by the term 'animal'.

[9] From this we can see how essence or nature is related to the notion of species. The notion of species is not one of those items that belong to the nature when it is considered absolutely, nor is it one of the accidents that follow upon the nature because of the being it has outside the soul, like whiteness or blackness. Rather, the notion of species is one of the accidents that follow upon the nature because of the being it has in the intellect; and it is in this way, too, that the notions of genus and difference belong to it.

Aquinas: On Being and Essence - Chapter 2

Chapter Two

ESSENCE AS FOUND IN COMPOSITE SUBSTANCES

[1] Form and matter are found in composite substances, as for example soul and body in man. But it cannot be said that either one of these alone is called the essence. That the matter alone of a thing is not its essence is evident, for through its essence a thing is knowable and fixed in its species and genus. But matter is not a principle of knowledge, and a thing is not placed in a genus or species through it but through that by which a thing is actual.†1 Neither can the form alone of a composite substance be called its essence, though some want to assert this.†2 It is evident from what has been said that the essence is what is signified through the definition of a thing.†3 Now the definition of natural substances includes not only form but also matter; otherwise there would be no difference between definitions in physics and in mathematics.†4 Nor can it be said that the definition of a natural substance includes matter as something added to its essence, or as something outside its essence. This is the kind of definition proper to accidents; not having a perfect essence, their definition must include their subject, which is outside their genus. It is evident, therefore, that essence embraces both matter and form.

[2] Neither can it be said that essence signifies the relation between matter and form, or something added to them, because this would necessarily be accidental or not belonging to the thing, nor could the thing be known through it, both of which are characteristics of essence. For through form, which actualizes matter, matter becomes an actual being and this particular thing. Anything that comes after that does not give matter its basic actual being, but rather a certain kind of actual being, as accidents do, whiteness for example making something actually white. When a form of this kind is acquired, we say that something comes into being not purely and simply but in a certain respect.

[3] It remains, then, that in the case of composite substances the term 'an essence' signifies the composite of matter and form. Boethius agrees with this in his commentary on the Categories, where he says that {ousia} signifies the composite;†5 for {ousia} in Greek means the same as our essentia, as Boethius himself observes.†6 Furthermore, Avicenna remarks that the quiddity of composite substances is the composition itself of form and matter.†7 The Commentator, too, says, "The nature that species have in things subject to generation is something intermediate, a composite of matter and form."†8 This is reasonable, too, for the being that a composite substance has is not the being of the form alone nor of the matter alone but of the composite, and it is essence according to which a thing is said to be.†9 So the essence, according to which a thing is called a being, cannot be either the form alone or the matter alone, but both, though form alone is in its own way the cause of this being. We observe in the case of other things composed of several principles that they do not take their name from one of these principles alone, but from both together. This is clear in tastes. Sweetness is caused by the action of the hot dissolving the moist; and although in this way heat is the cause of sweetness, a body is not called sweet from its heat but from its taste, which includes the hot and the moist.†10

[4] Because matter is the principle of individuation, it might seem to follow that an essence, which embraces in itself both matter and form, is only particular and not universal. If this were true, it would follow that universals could not be defined, granted that essence is what is signified by the definition. What we must realize is that the matter which is the principle of individuation is not just any matter, but only designated matter.†11 By designated matter I mean that which is considered under determined dimensions.†12 This kind of matter is not part of the definition of man as man, but it would enter into the definition of Socrates if Socrates could be defined. The definition of man, on the contrary, does include undesignated matter. In this definition we do not put this particular bone and this particular flesh, but bone and flesh absolutely, which are the undesignated matter of man.

[5] It is clear, therefore, that the difference between the essence of Socrates and the essence of man lies solely in what is designated and not designated. This is why the Commentator says, "Socrates is nothing else than animality and rationality, which are his quiddity."†13 The essence of the genus and the essence of the species also differ as designated and undesignated, though the mode of designation is different in the two cases. The individual is designated with respect to its species through matter determined by dimensions, whereas the species is designated with respect to the genus through the constitutive difference, which is derived from the form of the thing. This determination or designation which is in a species with regard to its genus is not caused by something existing in the essence of the species and in no way in the essence of the genus; rather, whatever is in the species is also in the genus but in an undetermined way. If indeed 'animal' were not wholly what 'man' is, but only a part of him, 'animal' could not be predicated of 'man', since no integral part may be predicated of its whole.

[6] We can see how this comes about if we examine the difference between body when it means a part of animal and body when it means a genus; for it cannot be a genus in the same way that it is an integral part. In short, the term 'body' can have several meanings.†14 In the genus of substance we give the name 'body' to that which has a nature such that three dimensions can be counted in it; but these three determined dimensions themselves are a body in the genus of quantity. It does happen that something having one perfection may also possess a further perfection, as is evident in man, who has a sensitive nature and, besides this, an intellectual nature. So, too, over and above the perfection of having a form such that three dimensions can be designated in it, another perfection can be added, such as life, or something of the kind. The term 'body', therefore, can signify that which has such a form as allows the determination of three dimensions in it, prescinding †15 from everything else, so that from that form no further perfection may follow. If anything else is added, it will be outside the meaning of body thus understood. In this way body will be an integral and material part of a living being, because the soul will be outside what is signified by the term 'body' and will be joined to this body in such a way that a living being is made up of these two, body and soul, as of two parts.

[7] The term 'body' can also be taken to mean a thing having a form such that three dimensions can be counted in it, no matter what that form may be, whether some further perfection can be derived from it or not. In this sense of the term, body is the genus of animal, because animal does not include anything that is not implicitly contained in body. The soul is not a form different from that which gives to the thing three determined dimensions. That is why, when we said that a body is that which has such a form as allows the determination of three dimensions in it, we understood this to mean any form whatsoever: animality, stoneness, or any other form. In this way the form of animal is implicitly contained in the form of body, inasmuch as body is its genus. And such also is the relation of animal to man. If 'animal' designated only a certain reality endowed with a perfection such that it could sense and be moved through an internal principle, prescinding from any other perfection, then any further perfection would be related to animal as a part and not as implicitly contained in the notion of animal, and then animal would not be a genus. But it is a genus when it signifies a thing whose form can be the source of sensation and movement, no matter what that form may be, whether it be only a sensitive soul or a soul that is both sensitive and rational.

[8] The genus, then, signifies indeterminately everything in the species and not the matter alone. Similarly, the difference designates the whole and not the form alone, and the definition also signifies the whole, as does the species too, though in a different way. The genus signifies the whole as a name designating what is material in the thing without the determination of the specific form. Thus the genus is taken from matter, though it is not matter, as we can clearly see from the fact that we call a body that which has a perfection such that it is determined by three dimensions, a perfection that is related as material with respect to a further perfection. On the contrary, the difference is a term taken from a definite form in a precise way, without including a definite matter in its primary notion; as for example when we say 'animated' (in other words, what has a soul) we do not specify what the thing is, whether it is a body or something else. That is why Avicenna says that the genus is not conceived in the difference as a part of its essence, but only as something outside its essence, as the subject is contained in the notion of its properties.†16 That is also why, according to the Philosopher,†17 a genus is not predicated of a difference properly speaking, except perhaps as a subject is predicated of its property. As for the definition or species, it embraces both, namely the determinate matter signified by the name of the genus, and the determinate form signified by the name of the difference.

[9] From this it is clear why genus, species, and difference are related proportionately to matter, form, and composite in nature, though they are not identical with them. A genus is not matter, but it is taken from matter as designating the whole; and a difference is not form, but it is taken from form as designating the whole. That is why we say that man is a rational animal, and not that he is composed of animal and rational, as we say that he is composed of soul and body. We say that man is a being composed of soul and body as from two things there is constituted a third entity which is neither one of them: man indeed is neither soul nor body. If in a sense we may say that man is composed of animal and rational, it will not be as a third reality is made up of two other realities, but as a third concept is formed from two other concepts. The concept 'animal' signifies the nature of a being without the determination of its special form, containing only what is material in it with respect to its ultimate perfection. The concept of the difference 'rational', on the other hand, contains the determination of the special form. From these two concepts is formed the concept of the species or definition. This is why, just as a reality composed of several things cannot be the subject of attribution of its constituent elements, neither can a concept be the subject of attribution of the concepts from which it is formed: we do not say that the definition is the genus or difference.

[10] Although the genus signifies the whole essence of the species, it is not necessary that different species of the same genus have one essence. The unity of the genus comes from its indetermination or indifference, but not in such a way that what is signified by the genus is a nature numerically the same in different species, to which would be added something else (the difference) determining it as a form determines a matter that is numerically one. Rather, the genus denotes a form (though not precisely any one in particular) which the difference expresses in a definite way, and which is the same as that which the genus denotes indeterminately. That is why the Commentator asserts †18 that primary matter is said to be one because of the elimination of all forms, whereas a genus is said to be one because of the community of the designated form. It is clear, therefore, that when the indetermination which caused the unity of the genus is removed by the addition of the difference, there remain species different in essence.

[11] As we have said,†19 the nature of the species is indeterminate with regard to the individual, as the nature of the genus with regard to the species. It follows that, just as the genus, when attributed to the species, implies indistinctly in its signification everything that is in the species in a determinate way, so the species, when attributed to the individual, must signify everything essentially in the individual, though in an indistinct way. For example, the term 'man' signifies the essence of the species, and therefore 'man' is predicated of Socrates. But if the nature of the species is signified with precision from designated matter, which is the principle of individuation, then it will have the role of a part. This is the way it is signified by the term 'humanity', for humanity signifies that by which man is man. Now designated matter does not make man to be man, and thus it is not in any way included among the factors that make man to be man. Since, therefore, the concept of humanity includes only that which makes man to be man, its meaning clearly excludes or prescinds from designated matter; and because the part is not predicated of the whole, humanity is predicated neither of man nor of Socrates. Avicenna concludes †20 from this that the quiddity of a composite is not the composite itself whose quiddity it is, though the quiddity itself is a composite. For example, although humanity is a composite, it is not man; in fact, it must be received in something else, namely designated matter.

[12] As was said above,†21 the species is determined relative to the genus through form, while the individual is determined relative to the species through matter. That is why it is necessary that the term signifying that from which the nature of the genus is derived, prescinding from the determinate form completing the species, signify the material part of the whole, as for example the body is the material part of man. On the contrary, the term signifying that from which the nature of the species is derived, prescinding from designated matter, signifies the formal part. For this reason 'humanity' is a term signifying a certain form, called the form of the whole.†22 Not indeed that it is something as it were added to the essential parts, form and matter, as the form of a house is added to its integral parts; but it is the form which is the whole, embracing both form and matter, but prescinding from those factors which enable matter to be designated.
[13] It is clear, then, that the essence of man is signified by the two terms 'man' and 'humanity', but in different ways, as we have said.†23 The term 'man' expresses it as a whole, because it does not prescind from the designation of matter but contains it implicitly and indistinctly, as we said the genus contains the difference.†24 That is why the term 'man' can be predicated of individuals. But the term 'humanity' signifies the essence of man as a part, because its meaning includes only what belongs to man as man, prescinding from all designation of matter. As a result it cannot be predicated of individual men. Because of this the term 'essence' is sometimes attributed to a thing and sometimes denied of it: we can say 'Socrates is an essence' and also 'the essence of Socrates is not Socrates'.

Aquinas: On Being and Essence - Prologue. Chapter I

ON BEING AND ESSENCE

Latin: De Ente et Essentia


PROLOGUE

A slight initial error eventually grows to vast proportions, according to the Philosopher.†1 Now the first conceptions of the intellect are (as Avicenna says)†2'a being' and 'an essence'. If, then, we are to avoid mistakes through ignorance of these, we must begin exploring their difficulty by stating what is meant by saying 'a being' and 'an essence', how they are found in different things, and how they are related to the logical notions †3 of genus, species, and difference.

Chapter One

THE GENERAL MEANING OF THE TERMS 'A BEING' AND 'AN ESSENCE'

[1] We ought to get our knowledge of simple things from composite things and arrive at what is prior by way of what is posterior, so that the learning process will begin, appropriately, with what is easier. For this reason we must begin with the meaning of 'a being' and proceed to the meaning of 'an essence'.†1

[2] We must realize (with the Philosopher)†2 that the term 'a being' in itself has two meanings. Taken one way it is divided by the ten categories; taken in the other way it signifies the truth of propositions. The difference between the two is that in the second sense anything can be called a being if an affirmative proposition can be formed about it, even though it is nothing positive in reality. In this way privations and negations are called beings, for we say that affirmation is opposed to negation, and that blindness is in the eye. But in the first way nothing can be called a being unless it is something positive in reality. In the first sense, then, blindness and the like are not beings.†3

[3] The term 'an essence' is not derived from this second meaning of 'a being', for in this sense some things are called beings that do not have an essence, as is clear in the case of privations. Rather, 'an essence' is derived from 'a being' in the first meaning of the term. As the Commentator says,†4 a being in the first sense of the term is that which signifies the essence of a thing. And because, as we have said,†5'a being' in this sense is divided by the ten categories, essence must mean something common to all the natures through which different beings are placed in different genera and species, as for example humanity is the essence of man, and so with regard to other things.

[4] Because the definition telling what a thing is signifies that by which a thing is located in its genus or species, philosophers have substituted the term 'quiddity' for the term 'essence'. The Philosopher frequently calls this 'what something was to be';†6 that is to say, that which makes a thing to be what it is. It is also called 'form',†7 because form signifies the determination †8 of each thing, as Avicenna says.†9 Another term used for this is 'nature', using 'nature' in the first of the four senses enumerated by Boethius.†10 In this sense anything is called a nature which the intellect can grasp in any way; for a thing is intelligible only through its definition and essence. That is why the Philosopher, too, says that every substance is a nature.†11 The term 'nature'†12 in this sense seems to mean the essence of a thing as directed to its specific operation, for no reality lacks its specific operation. The term 'quiddity' is derived from what is signified by the definition, while 'essence'†13 is used because through it, and in it, that which is has being.†14

[5] Because we use the term 'a being' absolutely and primarily of substances,†15 and secondarily and with qualification of accidents, it follows that essence is in substances truly and properly, but in accidents in a restricted way and in a qualified sense.

[6] Furthermore, some substances are simple and some composite,†16 and essence is in both; but it is present in simple substances more truly and perfectly because they also have being more perfectly. Simple substances are also the cause of those that are composite; at least this is true of the primary and simple substance, which is God. But because the essences of these substances are to a greater degree hidden from us, we must start with the essences of composite substances, so that the learning process will begin, appropriately, with what is easier.

Reproduced from:

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS


ON BEING AND ESSENCE


Translated with an Introduction and Notes

by

ARMAND MAURER, C.S.B.


SECOND REVISED EDITION


THE PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES


On Being and Essence Bibliographic Data p 4
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING DATA (Revised)
Thomas Aquinas, Saint, 1225?-1274.
On being and essence. Tr., with an introd. and notes, by Armand Maurer. 2d. rev. ed. Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968.
(Mediaeval sources in translation; I ISSN 0316-0874)
79 p.
Bibliography: p. [73]-76.
Index: p. [77]-79.
ISBN 0-88844-250-5
B765.T53D431968189':4

First edition 1949
Second edition 1968
Reprinted 1991
(c) 1949, 1968, 1991 by

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies
59 Queen's Park Crescent East
Toronto, Ontario, Canada MSS 2C4
Reprinted by Universa, Wetteren, Belgium

Accidents and Existence in Avicenna's Metaphysics of the Healing, III

Avicenna's Metaphysics of the Healing (MotH), as we have seen, gives consideration to the subject, principles, and purpose of the science of metaphysics in the opening book of the treatise. Book two goes on to consider the first of the two divisions of the subject of metaphysics which is the existent/being (ens) inasmuch as it is an existent/being (ens). This first division is substance and he treats it according to his metaphysical principles drawn up in Bk.I. 5-8. We have now arrived at book three where Avicenna begins to treat the other side of the division, namely, accidents.

Book III. 1 is subtitled: "On indicating what ought to be investigated regarding the state of the nine categories and about their accidental [nature]"

He begins book three with a summation of book two's resolutions. "We have clearly [indicated] the quiddity of substance and have shown that it is predicable of the separable, of body, of matter and of form." If we recall Bk I. 5 (esp. (9)-(10)) Avicenna lays out his metaphysical conceptual theses, of which there are initially three 1. existent (ens), 2. thing (res) or quiddity, and 3. necessary. Following this enumeration a fourth arises, namely, 4. existence (esse) which is affirmative aspect of a thing. Here, in book III, we can see Avicenna not only employing these theses but also within the framework of an Aristotelian science. In Book II. ch. 1-2 of the Posterior Analytics Aristotle says that there are four questions we ask of a subject or things. "The kinds of things we inquire about are equal in number to those we know (επιστήμη or scientia), and they are four: (1) a fact, (2) the reason for a fact, (3) if an object exists, (4) what a thing is." (Post. Anal. II. 1. 89b21-25 )

Avicenna is framing his summation in this context and he believes that he has resolved question (4) because he has "clearly indicated the quiddity of substance[...]." He goes on to suggest, with some repetition of earlier comments, that he has also dealt sufficiently with substance and question (3). He says, "regarding body, there is no need to establish [its existence as a substance.] Regarding matter and form, we have already established [the existence of both {in MotH Bk. II}.] As for the separable, we have established its [substantial existence] in the potential [manner] that is close to act, and we will be establishing it [further] hereafter." He also mentions if one remembers what was earlier spoken of soul the existence of separable other than body should be clear.

Hence, he suggests that it is appropriate to move on now to consider and establish the existence of accidents. Remaining in the same framework of the Posterior Analytic Avicenna has two primary questions in mind, is it? and what is it? He begins paragraph (2) answering the latter, "Regarding the ten categories, you have come to understand their quiddities in the introduction to the Logic." So the question "what is it?" of the nine categories or predicamentals has alreadly been resolved in Avicenna's mind with his earlier treatment of them in his Logic. But what about the second question not yet answered, what about their existence?

Avicenna is thinking not simply in the manner of Aristotle here, but is applying his own metaphysical principles, which are similar to Aristotle's, to topics which are also similar to Aristotle's but in numerous and interesting ways they innovations from the Stagirite's own treatments. Considering the existence of accidents Avicenna immediately focuses on "relation."
"Doubtlessly, the relative [...] is something that necessarily occurs [as an accident] to a thing." Relation, he takes as that which is doubtlessly an accident, since it by nature is in another (in alio); it cannot be understood or taken as a relation without another in which its existences depends on. Here, relation is fundamental for Avicenna because establishing the existence of relation as an accident is sufficient to establish all the other categorical accidents that depend on relation, such as action, passion, when, where, position, and possession. That these latter exist as accidents is established by relation's existence as an accident, for what are these latter predicables other than distinct relatives of some kind. (e.g. where is at least a thing relative to place) He concludes accordingly that, "these are states that occur [as accidents] to things in which they inhere as an existent in a subject." (MotH, Bk III. 1 (2))

But there are two accidents that remain, whose existence is not yet established, namely, quantity and quality. With these two the matter is not so simple. This is because some have held various quantities or qualities to be substance or even existent itself, or that all is reducible to one of them. (III. 1. (3)). Avicenna briefly summarizes some of their positions and proposes what must be considered regarding them to show that they are in fact accidents existing in a substance and not substances themselves. This is the focus of chapters 2-9 of book III, first considering the one and quantity and then quality. Finally chapter ten closes book III on the relative.

Dr. Knasas on "Maritain and the Cry of Rachel": Metaphysics and Evil

This past week at the Center for Thomistic Studies Dr. John Knasas presented the weekly colloquium paper. This paper was entitled, "Maritain and the Cry of Rachel" and was taken from his notes for a book on the problem of evil that he is currently working on. This particular lecture was on two different accounts that Jacques Maritain gives on the problem of evil, the first was his Aquinas lecture at Marquette the second was from a book he wrote later on.

There are two points I wish to present here, points that I myself found particularly illuminating from the lecture. 1) That God alone is an end in itself, with corrections to a few Kantian errors on this point, which take man to be an end in itself, and 2) The mistakes made with Being, and the consequences this has in our considerations of evil in reality.

I.

In the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is concerned with finding the end of all human action, and end that is an end-in-itself that is not sought for the sake of anything else. This end would then be absolutely sufficient in itself and all else that we seek would be for this end alone. Thomas Aquinas adopts this account for his of Philosophical-Theology and shows that God is this end. A robustness is added to the Saints account not found in the Peripatetic. The metaphysical doctrine of the Transcendentals allows Aquinas a certain felicity and elegance in undergirding Aristotle's ethics with a metaphysics and a theological end. For Thomas, God is Being Itself. But as we learn from the Transcendentals Being can be understood in a variety of ways. In so far as something exists it is a "being," being as known is "truth," as desired is "good" and so on. Aquinas can identify Being and the Good in reality; what is it that all things seek? The Good, which is "Being" under the aspect of the teleological desirable. The Absolute Being that is Absolute Goodness is God and all things seek this as the only end that is absolutely satisfying. The whole of Creation is ordered in its own way to God, Who is the only "whole" which is an end in itself.

Recently in theology and philosophy there has been a strong shift towards focusing on the primacy and excellence of human dignity. In virtue of the human soul, it is potentially all things and thus can be truly ordered to that which is infinitely Good and alone is satisfying, viz., God. This affords human beings a unique dignity, because of Man's infinite capacity for Absolute Goodness man can and should be taken as an end in itself. This infinite capacity allows one to consider man a "whole" unto himself and as such should be taken as an end in itself, that is, because of man's infinite dignity he can be infinitely satisfying as an ultimate end, fitting the sufficient conditions of being an "end-in-itself."

The criticism of this latter development is directed towards its Modernism; its subtle adoption of Modern atomism and the primacy of human autonomy and then its Kantian direction, taking a move from the categorical imperative that all men should be regarded as ends in themselves. This corrosive foundation has two unconscionable consequences one in theology and the other in the political order. 1) It subordinates the sovereignty and aseity of God as the only ultimate end, the only end-in-itself, it places human beings on a par with the Divine who IS infinitely superior. Man's infinite capacity for the Absolute Good, God, is a potency not an actuality. In those souls who have actually had some degree of this goodness realized within, still must necessarily "receive" this actualization from without. It is not theirs but is a gift. Taking this alone shows us that humans are still infinitely subordinate to the Divine Goodness; there infinite capacity is completely passive to the Divine Goodness causing in man what God has in simple perfection.
2) This subordination in political moral philosophy places the individual above the common good of all. It forces political philosophy into the deviant Modern turn denying the primacy of the common good of all and making it a secondary accidental social contract. This redefines human rights, placing the subject in the individual over the common good. Rights are defined then negatively as what you cannot do to the individual, it is what is owed to me as what capacities I deserve to exercise that you cannot deny me. I treat you as an end in itself without an essential context or teleology to the common good. I can am force to do good for you without the consideration of the good of the Whole. You and I treat each other as ends and provide goods for each other and not worry about others.

In the Medieval formula, where the Common Good is taken as essential and primary, rights are defined in terms of Justice. Justice being the Cardinal virtue that is essentially relational, it involves “the other” and is defined with the teleological aspect of the common good, as that which is due to another according to the common good. Human rights are seated in justice and the common good and the relation of affinity or friendship that supervenes when two or more are directed together to this end. Rights are defined in terms of justice as what is due to my fellow man according to the realization of the common good. This is a positive definition of human rights, affirming what must be done or what is “right’ for me to do according to my fellow man for his and my attainment and realization of the common good for all.

II.

The second point I wished to reflect on is related to Being and evil. Maritain’s initial objection is to one of Aquinas’s attempts to resolve the evil of human suffering. Aquinas responds to this by presenting a philosophical principle, often at work in Aquinas, relating to the teleological order of the whole, which is directed towards perfection in the ultimate good, God. Some parts may suffer evil, which is real, for the sake of the perfection of the whole, which is more real and is the ultimate and infinite good of All. Maritain finds this unsatisfactory because human beings can be taken as more than just principle parts of the whole. Humans can be understand as whole's in themselves and end in themselves, as was discussed above. As such there is nothing satisfactory about this explanation of Aquinas's as terminating in a pure philosophical conclusion.

The error pointed out here by Dr. Knasas is in a misunderstanding of Being, which is essentially the seat of why man sins and causes so much evil. Man misattributes what "Being" is, our one and only final end. We commit idolatry and obsessively mistake a part of being as Being Itself. We believe some thing or person to be our ultimate and satisfying end, when in fact God alone is this. Then, when we loose this thing or person, we mistakenly believe we have lost Being, we believe we have lost and are "deprived" of our only ultimate and satisfying end. This privation seems to us as the Ultimate Evil, the complete loss of Being. But this is in fact an idolatrous error. The loss of a child is a great evil, but the possession of the sublimity of a child is not close to having the infinite Goodness and fulfillment that God is and shares by His Love. It is a great evil itself to believe that the loss of only a part of being is the same as the privation of Actual Being, the loss of God.

I think there is a lot to be contemplated on in this latter point of Dr. Knasas's. How often we make the whole focus of our lives something that is not Being, something that is not Christ. We must pray and work to keep our soul fixed upon the Being that is Being Itself as our ultimate end, that lead us through the lesser goods up into the beatified consummation of ourselves with Being Itself.

Aristotle and the Science of Metaphysics lect. 3

Because this lecture occurred a number of weeks ago prior to hurricane Ike and I cannot seem to find all my notes from class this reflection will be rather spotty.

Aristotle's Metaphysics: I; II; IV. 1; V. 7-8; VI. 1-2

The scientific ordering and presentation has produced a myriad of interpretations from the traditionalist position influenced by the Medieval commentary tradition who took it for granted that the Metaphysics was Aristotle's presentation of a science that followed the order of a science as presented in his Posterior Analytics. Despite the perspicuous heritage of this tradition the recent Aristotelian progeny are not so confident in the merits or success of Aristotle's project to achieve scientific knowledge in the myriad of subject domains he investigates. Some members of this group go so far as to deny to the texts tradition has called the Metaphysics, any authorial continuity and presentation. They subscribe to a position that the Metaphysics was a unorganized collection of lecture notes "thrown" together by later Greek editors, not knowing what to label this discrete collection of texts, and seeing that it was arranged after the texts on natural philosophy or physics, decided to call it after-physics or meta-physics. H.G. Apostle offers a presentation of this account in the introduction to his translation of the Metaphysics along with his own argument to the contrary. There is a great abundance of literature on this topic but it is outside the concerns of my own class which is on Avicenna's Metaphysics.

Avicenna certainly thought Aristotle presented a unified science within treatise called the Metaphysics and it is incumbent on any interpretor of Avicenna's own Metaphysics of the Healing to take into consideration his perspective on the Aristotelian sciences, and of course especially, metaphysics.

The problem that leads to such great diversity of opinion on the proper assesment of Aristotle's Metaphysics is the seemingly incongruent definitions found within the Metaphyiscs itself, definitions of a subject-genus that lead to different understanding of the underlying intelligible arrangement of the books themselves. In some places we find Aristotle defining the particular science under investigation as a science of being qua being and its proper attributes. (Meta. IV, 1) However in other places he defines his inquiry as a divine science or theology (Meta. VI, 1)

Nearly all of Aristotle's sciences offer an introductory dialectical treatment of past attempts to establish the principles of a particular science. There is a precedence for this in the De Anima and Phyiscs amongst other treatises. If we take this into consideration then there are two possible interpretation suggested for the whole order of the Metaphysics.

What is a Science?

A brief reminder, a science consists in three parts:

1. A Subject-Genus
2. Proper Principles
3. Proper Attributes (Conclusions)
   

What Kind of Science is the Metaphysics?

1. Theology: If we take the science of first philosophy as being a divine science it would suggest that Aristotle is presenting an enduraing dialectical treatment of principles up until Bk. XII where the Science of Theology finally begins.
2. Being qua Being: If we take first philosophy as a science of being as such then the dialectical treatment ends at bk. III because he begins his treatment of being qua being with bk. IV
3. There is a possible synthesis available wherein 2. leads into 1., but this would require a deeper textual explanation, and as we shall see this is in fact what Avicenna does himself, though much more explicitly.

Accordingly a divisio textus of the Metaphysics could be taken as:

• Bk. I-III : Dialectial investigation of principles and proper attributes to be considered in the science.
• Bk. IV and VI : Accounts of the subject and principles of Metaphysics
• Bk. V : Definitions
• Bk. VII-IX : Primary Considerations of the subject of Metaphyisics
• Bk. X-XI : Unifying of the former
• Bk. XII-XIV : Theology

n.b. For the Arab commentators books I (A) and II (a) were inverted.

Excerpt. Klubertanz "Discursive Power" Thomas Aquinas textual sources on vis cogitativa

The following is an excerpt from an important textual study on Thomas Aquinas's doctrine on the vis cogitativa. This doctrine is currently my primary area of study. The following excerpt provides a very long listing of important textual sources for this doctrine. I am making it available online, becuase this book is nearly impossible to find and so I can have access to this index at any internet connection. Unfortunately I do not know how to keep formatting when I import from a word document, so this doesn't look as nice as it should.

The Discursive Power: sources and doctrine of the vis cogitativa according to St. Thomas Aquinas

By George P. Klubertanz
Part II.
Chapter 5
Introduction to Thomistic Texts

In St. Thomas, the “key” texts are very brief, but there is a very large number of
shorter references to the same problem. Almost all the modern authors who have touched on this problem in St. Thomas agree that the main texts are five: Commentary on the Sentences, bk. 3, d. 26, q. 1, a.2; Contra Gentiles, bk. 2, 60, 73,76; Commentary on the De Anima, bk. 2, lect. 13; Summa Theologiae I. 78. 4, 81. 3; Quaestio Disputata de Anima, a. 13. These five texts are very brief; almost astonishingly so in comparison with the discussions of St. Albert. The one
extended discussion, that in the Contra Gentiles, really contains very little positive doctrine, as we shall see; it is almost entirely concerned with the refutation of a particular Averroes’s theory.
[See footnotes for the following references]

Additional direct references to the vis cogitative occur in the Commentary on the Sentences,1 De Veritate,2 Contra Gentiles,3 Commentary on the Ethics,4 Summa Theologiae,5 Quaestio Disputata de Anima,6 and in the doubtful work De Principio Individuationis7.

Ratio particularis is spoken of in Commentary on the Sentences,8 De Veritate,9 Contra Gentiles,10 Commentary on the Ethics,11 Commentary on the De Anima,12 De Principio Individuationis, and Summa Theologiae.13

Vis aestimativa is discussed in Commentary on the Sentences,14 De Veritate,15 Contra Gentiles,16 Commentary on the Ethics,17 Commentary on De Sensu et Sensato,18 and Commentary on De Memoria et Reminiscentia,19 and in Summa Theologiae.20

Instinctus is mentioned with reference to the actions of animals in Commentary on the Sentences,21 Contra Gentiles,22 Commentary on the Metaphysics,23 Commentary on De Memoria et Reminiscentia,24 Summa Theologiae,25 and Quaestio Disputata de Anima.26

It is obvious that some of these references will overlap, since these terms naturally combine and contract among themselves. It should also be stated that this list does not pretend to be exhaustive, except in the sense that all the important passages are considered.

Another point to be noted is that some very important texts do not explicitly refer to any of these terms. For example, the long and very important discussion on prudence in Summa Theologiae II-II, qq. 47 and 49, is shown to concern our problem only by means of St. Thomas’s own reference to the sixth book of Aristotle’s Ethics, and by means of St. Thomas’s own development of the Aristotelian doctrine.

The chapter divisions on this part follow almost naturally from the chronology of the works. A glance at the “key” texts shows a division into three groups: the first comprising of Commentary on the Sentences, the De Veritate, and the Contra Gentiles, which precede most if not all of the commentaries on Aristotle; the second group will take in the passages occurring in commentaries on Aristotelian works; the third including the Summa Theologiae and the Quaestio Disputata de Anima. More accurate dating, for example, of the relative position of the Aristotelian Commentaries with relation to each other, is not always certain, and, as we shall see, has almost nothing to offer us.[...]

Standard translations of the works of St. Thomas, where they exist, will not be made use of. One reason is that a textual study requires a certain literalness of translation that would otherwise be out of place. Another reason is to ensure the same translation for the same terms. A third is to show, by textual analysis, that the term “vis cogitativa” is capable of translation and not merely transliteration.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1
Loci in the Commentary on the Sentences: III d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, q. 1 ad 3; IV d. 7 q. 3, a. 3, q. 2, obj. 1 and ad 1; III d. 26, q. 1, a. 2; IV d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, q. 1 ad 3; d. 49, q. 22, a. 2, sol.; d. 50, q. 1, a.1 ad 3; a. 3 ad 3 in contrar.
2
De Veritate: I. 11, X. 5, XV. 1 ad 9, XV. 1, XVIII. 7 ad 5.
3
Contra Gentiles: II. 60, 73, 76, 80, 81; III. 84.
4
Commentary on the Ethics: VI, lect. 1, 7, 9.
5
Summa Theologiae, I. 85.7, 111.2 ad 2, 115.3, 79.2; I-II. 50.3 ad 3, 51.3, 30.3 ad 3, 74.3 ad 1; II-II. 2.1 ad 2; III. 72 11, arg. 3 and ad 3.
6
Quaestio Disputata de Anima: XX ad 1 in contrar.
7
De Principio Individuationis: a medio.
8
Commentary on the Sentences: II d. 24, q. 2, a. 1 ad 3; IV d. 50, q. 1, a. 1 ad 3; a. 3 ad 3 in contrar.
9
De Veritate: II. 6, X. 5, XIV. 1 ad 9, XV. 1.
10
Contra Gentiles: II. 60.
11
Commentary on the Ethics: VI, lect. 1, 7, 9.
12
Commentary on the De Anima: II, lect. 16.
13
Summa Theologiae: I. 20, 1 ad 1, 19. 2 ad 2; 80. 2 ad 3; I-II. 51. 3, 30. 3 ad 3.
14
Commentary on the Sentences: II. d. 20, q. 2, a. 2 ad 5; II d. 24, q. 2, a. 1 and ad 2; d. 25, q. 1, a. 1 ad 7; III d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, q. 3 ad 2; d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, q. 3 ad 3; d. 35, q. 1, a 2, q. 2 ad 1; IV d. 49, q. 2, a. 2.
15
De Veritate: I. 11, XV. 1, XVIII. 7 and ad 7; XXIV. 2; XXV. 2.
16
Contra Gentiles: II. 47, 48, 60.
17
Commentary on the Ethics: VI, lect. 7, 9.
18
Commentary on De Sensu et Sensato: lect. 1.
19
Commentary on De Memoria et Reminiscentia: lect. 2.
20
Summa Theologiae: I. 81.2 ad 2; I-II. 6.2, 77.1
21
Commentary on the Sentences: II d. 20, q. 2, a. 2 ad 5.
22
Contra Gentiles: II. 47; III. 131.
23
Commentary on Metaphysics: I. Lect. 1.
24
Commentary on De Memoria et Reminiscentia: lect. 1, 8.
25
Summa Theologiae: I. 18. 3, 83.1; I-II. 3. 6, 9. 1 ad 2, 11. 2, 12. 5 and ad 3, 15. 2, 17. 2 ad 3, 40. 3 and ad 1, 46. 4 ad 2, 50. 3 and ad 2. 26
Quaestio Disputata de Anima: XIII.

ST. Ia. 89. 1-2 Outline

I am required to give a sketch of some assigned articles from the Summa Theologica for my class on Aquinas and Human Nature. My assigned articles are from the Prima Pars question 89 articles 1 and 2. In question 89 Aquinas is treating the problematic of the separated human soul's ability to understand without the body. Here is my sort of propositionalized outline of these questions meant to be read with the Summa not as a substitution. Two difficulties with the following. It was produced hastily so I used my own nomenclature and shorthand, and blogspot has a very difficult bulleting format. So I just pasted in my word document which is not tabbed very well in the pasted format.

Summa Theologica. Prima Pars Q. 89 Art. 1

Whether a human soul separated from its body (henceforth: SHS) can understand anything?

• It seems that the human soul separated from the body can know nothing.

Obj. 1: Aristotle asserts in the De Anima (i, 4) that
i. “Understanding is corrupted together with its interior principle.”
ii. In death all human interior principles are corrupted
iii. Ergo, the intellect [which is the faculty for understanding] is corrupted

Obj. 2:
i. The human soul is hindered from understanding when there is an impediment/distraction to the senses or imagination. (cf. 84.7/8)
ii. Death destroys the sense and imagination (cf. 77.8)
iii. Ergo, after death the SHS understands nothing

Obj. 3: If the SHS can understand it must be by means of an intelligible species.
i. However, the SHS does not understand by means of innate species.
a. B/c it is at first like a blank tablet
ii. SHS also cannot know by species abstracted from things
a. B/c separated the soul is w/o the organs of sensation and imagination which are both
necessary for the abstraction of species.
iii. SHS also cannot understand by means of previously abstracted species stored in the soul.
a. If this were the case, a child’s soul would have no means of understanding at all [after the
child has died and the soul is separated]. (This supposes that children have not yet come to the age of understanding and abstraction)
iv. Finally, the SHS does not understand by a Divine influx of species intelligibiles.
a. B/c that would not be natural cognition but gratuitous cognition. And this question is of
natural cognition.

Sed contra: Aristotle says in de Anima (i.1)

i. “If the soul had no proper operation, it could not be separated from the body.”
ii. But there is a SHS.
iii. Ergo, it has a proper operation, and this is above all, is understanding.
iv. Ergo, the SHS can understand apart from the body.

Reply:

I. Overview of the Problem w/ Platonic considerations

i. There is a problem here b/c when the soul is united to the body in can understand only by means of abstraction from the phantasms.
a. Platonic Psychology Digression: If this were accidental to the soul’s nature, as the
Platonists hold, the problem would vanish. B/c the Platonists held the soul’s natural state is w/o the body.
i. The soul would then understand things simply like the other separated substances.
b. However in this case the union of soul and body would not be for the soul’s good, but for
the body’s good. B/c the soul would understand worse united,
c. This is unreasonable b/c matter exists for the sake of form, not the reverse.
ii. And a SHS is without phantasms.
iii. And death does not change the soul’s nature.
iv. Ergo it cannot understand anything naturally.

II. Thomas's Initial Solution

i. Recall, nothing operates unless it is actual.
a. The mode of operation in a thing follows on its mode of existence (essendi ipsius).
ii. Soul has two modes of being w/ a nature that does not alter between the two modes. And this does not negate the soul’s natural union with the body, making it therefore accidental. (Example of objects natural location). The two modes accordingly are:
a. Soul unified to the body.
b. SHS
iii. The soul when unified to the body has the appropriate mode of operation.
iv. SHS has a mode of understanding, where it turns to simply intelligible objects, like separated substances.
a. But this is contrary to its natural union with the body and its natural mode of
understanding by phantasms, which is why it is naturally united to the body.

III. Challenge to God’s Providence

1. Nature is always ordered to what is best.
2. It is better to understand intelligibles simply than by phantasms.
3. God should have ordered the soul’s nature in accordance with the nobler mode of understanding.

IV. 2nd Solution

1. It is nobler in itself to understand by turning to something higher than lower.
2. But this mode of understanding was not so perfect given what was possible for the soul.

• Divergence: The Order of Intellects
• The further an intellects is from the first principle the more diversified its mode of
understanding.
• God > Higher Intellectual Substances > Inferior Intellectual Substances > Man.
• If lower intellects received species with the same degree of universality, it would be
incommensurate to their own faculties and they wound be confused and at best only have
improper knowledge.

3. Humans are the lowest of the intellectual substances.
4. Perfection of the universe required diverse grades of being.
5. If God has willed human souls to understand like separated substances, they would only understand confusedly.
6. Ergo: So that humans could come to perfect and proper understanding they were untied to bodies by nature.

V. Resolution

Therefore it is for the soul’s natural good that it is united to the body. Nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart from the body and to understand another way.

Reply: Obj. 1
1. Aristotle asserts this assuming a the prior supposition that understanding is a movement of body and soul together, sensation is the same.
2. Also, he is referring here to the way of understanding by turning to phantasms.

Same Reply for Obj. 2

Reply: Obj. 3
1. The objection does prove: A) no innate species B) nor by abstracted species presently or C) retained.
2. SHS understands by means of participated species arising from the influence of the Divine Light. The SHS shares in this, like other separated substances; though to a lesser degree.

Summa Theologica. Prima Pars. Q. 89. Art. 2

Whether the separated soul understands separate substances?

• It seems the SHS does not understand separate substances.

Obj. 1:
1. Soul is more perfect with the body, b/c every part of a whole is more perfect in union with the whole.
2. Soul in the body does not understand separated substances (88.1)
3. Ergo, it is much less able to w/o the body.

Obj. 2:
1. Whatever is know by its presence or by its species.
2. Only God can enter the soul and be present.
3. Nor by abstraction of species, for angels are simpler than the soul.
4. Therefore the SHS cannot understand separate substances.

Obj. 3:
1. Some philosophers held man’s ultimate happiness is in knowing separated substances.
2. But if the SHS could understand them, its happiness would be obtained simply by separation which is unreasonable.

Sed contra:
1. SHS know other SHS: example of the rich man who saw Lazarus and Abraham.
2. Therefore SHS can see them.

Reply:
1. Our mind acquires knowledge of incorporeal things by knowing itself. (Augustine says the same.)
a. This operation will inform the present investigation. The operation of understanding itself through its own act.
2. SHS, does not turn to phantasms, but directly to simple intelligible objects.
a. Ergo, in this state it understands itself through itself.
3. Every Separated Substance: “understands what is above itself and what is below itself according to the mode of its subsistence.”
a. A thing is understood according as it is in the one who understands; while one thing is in another according to the nature of that in which it is.
4. SHS is inferior to angels, but is the same as other SHS
5. Therefore, the SHS has perfect knowledge of other SHS, but imperfect and defective knowledge of angels and only to the degree its natural knowledge is concerned.
6. The knowledge of Glory is otherwise.

Reply Obj. 1:
1. SHS is less perfect in consideration of its natural union with the body.
2. But the SHS has a greater freedom of intelligence as a SHS

Reply Obj. 2:
1. SHS understands angels by means of divinely impressas similitudes;
2. Yet these fail to give perfect representations of them.
3. B/c the nature of SHS is inferior to angels.

Reply Obj. 3:
1. Man’s happiness is in knowledge of God, not angles.
2. God is only seen by grace.
3. Perfect Knowledge of other separate substances does give great happiness, but not ultimate.
4. SHS however does not have perfect knowledge of them.

Aristotle's Theory of Scientific Demonstration: Lect. 2

This second lecture was dedicated to a brief glossing of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics and theory of scientific demonstration. It is Aristotle's own solution to a number of problems addressed by Plato regarding metaphysics, epistemology, logic/demonstration, and cognitive states. As a glossing of the text, we only covered the skeleton of this treatise's rather exhaustive inquiry into the nature of scientific demonstration. The Posterior Analytics can take years to get even a handle on its nuances, let alone assimilate its modes into solidified habitus or cognitive propositional dispositions. And it seems rather clear that this was an endevor of fundamental importance for the medievals who wrote a sundry of commentaries on this task for the purpose of apprehending every nuance. Avicenna is amongst the medievals who say the wisdom of this text, and an awareness of this influence will certainly provide an schema by which one can follow the philosophical moves Avicenna is making while attempting to explicate scientifcally on any particular subject genus.

The unity of the Posterior Analytics lies in that the question of the first chapter is dealt with again with a new solution in the last chapter of the text. The mode of knowing of the higher cognitive states as found in Plato's "Divided Line" has reached a level of maturity and precision in Aristotle.

Major contrasts in Aristotle from Plato is the diversity of sciences. For Plato there is one universal science towards the Good. All knowledge is a process on the way to knowing the Good, and to know the Good is then to have episteme. For Aristotle there are a diversity of sciences, as many as their are subject genus. This allows Aristotle to hold that one can have episteme and know nothing about the Good.

Posterior Analytics: Book I. Ch. 1

Thesis: New knowledge is acquired from/by prior knowledge

Prior Knowledge is of three kinds:

1) Of a Principle: that it is - quia est
2) Of a Proper Attribute: What it is - quid est
3) Of a Subject: Both That it is & What it is - et quia est, et quid est

Posterior Analytics: Book I. Ch. 2

Thesis: To know scientifically is to (A) know the cause of the thing and (B) know that it cannot be other wise than what it is.

There is another way of knowing, but the first topic treated is of knowing through a demonstration. Demonstration is obtained by a scientific syllogism, and the latter is that that in virtue of which, by possessing, we know something.

Demonstrated knowledge must necessarily proceed from appropriate principles that are
1) True
2) Primary
3) Immediate
4) More known than
5) Prior to, and
6) The causes of the conclusion

Note: There can be a syllogism without these requirements for principles, but such a syllogism will not be a demonstration, for it will not produce knowledge.
Digest of the Requirements of a Demonstrative Syllogism’s Principles

1) True: Principles should be true because non-being (falsity) cannot be known
2) Primary: Demonstrated knowledge must be acquired from primary principles which are indemonstrable. Primary also means appropriate to the thing known.
3) Immediate: not mediated for that would require another demonstration. Immediate means there is no other premise before it.
a) Thesis: is any immediate syllogistic principle that cannot be proved and it not
necessary for a learner to have in order to learn something.
i) Hypothesis: is a thesis that states something is the case or not.
ii) Definition: is a thesis that does not, such as “a unit is that which is
indivisible with respect to quantity.”
b) Axiom: is a principle a learner must possess to learn anything
4) More known than (and to a higher degree): not simply understood but knowing that. Also Prior and More Know without qualification, that is, as most universal.
a) To a higher degree: “for that because of which a thing exists always exists to a
higher degree” (Note: this is an aspect of the Principle of Causality)
5) Prior to: Principles must be prior by nature to the conclusion if they are the cause of it.
6) The cause: Because we know a thing only when we know the causes of it.

Posterior Analytics: Book I. Ch. 10

Principles in a demonstration are of two kinds.

Some are Proper principles and some are common to many sciences.(common by analogy: since they are used as far as the genus of things under each science extends)

Proper Principles are also those whose existence is posited and whose essential attributes are investigated by a given science.

A science posits that each of these exists and is so-and-so.
The definition of essential attributes is posited. But that each essential attribute exists is proved though the common principles or axioms and from what has been demonstrated.

Every Demonstrative Science is concerned with three things:
1) those which it posits to exist (and these are things under the genus whose essential attributes it investigates.
2) The so-called “common axioms” from which it demonstrates as from first principles,
3) The attributes, the meaning of whose corresponding terms it posits.


Principles are of three kinds:

1) the genus concerning which something is proved
2) the attributes which are proved of the genus
3) the common axioms from which something is proved.

Posterior Analytics: Book II. Ch. 1

The things we know about and the things we inquiry about:

1) a fact
2) the reason for a fact
3) if an object exists
4) what a thing is.

Posterior Analytics: Book II. Ch. 2

When we inquire 1) whether something is or is not a fact or 3) whether an object simply exists or not, we inquire whether it has a middle or not.

Following knowledge of a fact or that a thing exists we sometimes inquiry further. We inquiry the 2) why of the fact or 4) the whatness of it, in this case we ask “what is its middle?”

In all inquiries we therefore inquire either a) whether there is a middle or b) what the middle is; for the cause is a middle and in all cases it is what is sought.

To understand the whatness of a thing is to understand the why of it


Posterior Analytics: Book II. Ch. 19

First must be acquired but not by demonstration (which would entail circularity or infinite regress cf. P.A. I. 3). Aristotle, contra the Platonic thesis, thinks that principles are not grasped by intellectual apprehension of Forms separate from the things themselves. Rather Aristotle thinks that forms can be grasped in the things themselves.

Aristotle (100a4)

• Sense perception
  
• Memory } Out these three cognitive operations arises the arts and sciences
  
• Experience
  

To illustrate the latter cognitive transition Aristotle uses the famous metaphor of the army in a rout that suddenly makes a stand, becoming stronger and more secure as the ranks increase. A locus where this metaphor is enforced is within Aristotle's account of "incidental sensation" (cf. De Anima II. 6 418a7-418a26) Our sense-perception is of the particular but the particular itself is an instantiated form - which is universal as known, and is perceived as a particular instantiation of the universal in incidental sensation (as later commentators bring to light, e.g. Avicenna, Aquinas, etc.)



Dialectic: For Plato is a comparing and motion up a genus-species tree. However, Aristotle's account of dialectic takes on an expanded inductive inference from what we see in the Divided Line. It includes also particulars to generalization, as well as Plato's account of the motion from species to genus. Aristotle expands induction because he does not think we start with the forms but must first acquire them from the particulars which bear them in re. The particularized universal instantiations are "gathered" together prior to grasping a "real universal. The scheme of Aristotle looks something like this:

Individual -> Universals (specific) -> Universals (generic to most generic)

Induction is capped or culiminates in nous- intellectual insight. Nous should be taken here as a unified dyadic act of apprehension (concept-formation) and judgement (proposition-formation) as the Medievals will come to identify them. This account is verified in a number of Aristotelian passages; earlier in the PA I. 2 and 10 he explains propositions as divided into two species 1) definitions and 2) hypothesis. The latter has for its constituents the former. This account of the unity of the first two acts of intellect will receive a must fuller treatment in the later commentators, in particular, I will later be addressing Avicenna's treatment in his Metaphysics of the Healing Bk. I ch. 5-7.

Veracity of the Intellect in Aristotle:
In PA II. 19 we get the completed epistemic account that not only Scientia (episteme) but also intellectus (nous) are unfailingly true. Opinions, justified true beliefs, and inductions as found in sense-perception, memory, and experience are generalized or universal in a sense, in Aristotle and Plato, but they are not necessarily true as they are in nous.

We have here different intellectual habitus:

• Scientia - as discursive and mediative
• Intellectus - as insight and immediate

N.b. - A question is often raised in this context and I wish to provide the brief response given by my professor to this question. Due to the high epistemic status Aristotle grants this intellectual insight (nous) many question the frequency of the occasion of nous. How often do humans have insight into the essence of things? There is no unequivocal and strait forward answer to this question. One must keep in my the complexity of things man knows and the gradient of intelligibilities in things that must be actualized through human cognition and its correlative habitus. Since nous is a habitus, those who are more active in their pursuit of insight will have a greater frequency in the apprehension of natures. However, and perhaps more important, is not the frequency of apprehension but the clarity and understanding of the natures grasped, which is certainly cultivated by a habitus. In this way one can admit with Aristotle in the Ethics that there is insight (nous) occurring at the most abstract and most preliminary cognitive interfaces with real things. The most preliminary insights are no less true, just perhaps less clear and lacking in penetration to the depths of the reality they apprehend.