Dr. John F.X. Knasas
Lecture Notes: 1
The following is my digest and reflections on the lecture notes given by Dr. Knasas. While I am indebted to his notes, texts, and comments, these reflections are not necessarily the views of Dr. Knasas.
The fundamental content of Thomistic metaphysics is two-fold: 1) its subject genus and 2) the cause of its subject genus.
The Subject of Metaphysics
Within the Aristotelian tradition any scientia has three parts 1) its subject-genus, 2) its principles, and 3) proper attributes or conclusions. “The object of which scientific knowledge is sought through demonstration is some conclusion in which a proper attribute is predicated of some subject, which conclusion is inferred from the principles.” (In PA, I.2) This reflection is concerned with the subject of metaphysics.
First, Aquinas suggests a variety of formulae for the subject of metaphysics such as: ens commune, ens qua ens, and ens inquantum ens. The subject of metaphysics, ens, has two features of note 1) its separateness or separatability and 2) its compositeness.
The Subject of Metaphysics: The Separateness of ens
Aquinas holds that metaphysics is concerned with "what is separate from matter both in existence and in thought." This is the highest grade of immateriality and therefore the highest order of intelligibility. This metaphysical "separateness" from matter is the last order in the tripartite degrees of abstraction. This doctrine has its roots in Plato's Divided Line and more importantly Aristotle's Metaphysics E 1. 1025b3-6a32. Our key texts for the separateness of ens are: In Meta. Proem and In BDT Q. V, 4., & ad. 5
Text A
However, even though the subject of this science [metaphysics] is being-in-general [ens commune], the whole science is said to concern what is separate from matter both in existence and in thought. For not only are those things called separate in existence and thought that can never exist in matter, like God and the intellectual substances, but also those that can be without matter, such as being-in-general. (In Meta., Proem. Trans by Armand Maurer, Division and Methods, p. 89)
Text B
. . . for something can exist separate from matter and motion . . . because by its nature it does not exist in matter and motion; but it can exist without them, though we sometimes find it with them. In this way being [ens], substance, potency, and act are separate from matter and motion, because they do not depend on them for their existence, unlike the objects of mathematics, which can only exist in matter. Thus philosophical theology [also called metaphysics] investigates beings separate in [this] second sense as its subjects, . . . (In de Trin. V, 4c; Maurer, Division and Methods, p. 45.)
Separateness admits of a two-fold division between 1) that which necessarily is separate, like God and angels and 2) that which can be separate such as being-in-general and substance. A further qualification of this second sort of separateness is found here:
Text CWe say that being [ens] and substance are separate from matter and motion not because it is of their nature to be without them, as it is of the nature of ass to be without reason, but because it is not of their nature to be in matter and motion, although sometimes they are in matter and motion as animal abstracts from reason, although some animals are rational. (In de Trin. V, 4, ad 5m; Maurer, Division and Methods, p. 48-9.)
The first sense of separateness is applicable of pure spiritual realities, but the second sense of separateness is broader. It is applicable to a greater variety of realities both immaterial and material. This second sense of separateness is the subject of metaphysics; it is of ens qua ens which is able to be found both in material and immaterial realities.
Text DIt is called metaphysics because it considers being [ens] and its attendant properties; for these objects that go beyond physics are discovered by a process of analysis as the more universal is discovered after the less universal. (In Meta., Proem: Maurer, Division and Methods, p. 89.)
Metaphysica, inquantum considerat ens et ea quae consequuntur ipsum. Haec enim transphysica inveniuntur in via resolutionis, sicut magis communia post minus communia.
Aquinas is here taking a suggestion from Book I of Avicenna's Metaphysics of the Shifa. Metaphysics considers being and its quasi-species or as Rowen translates "ea quae consequuntur ipsum," "the attributes which naturally accompany being." It is also of note that Aquinas says that the objects discovered that go beyond physics, like ens, are discovered by analysis (resolutionis). There is no qualification that a demonstration is necessary to discover this object. Simply by analysis, like when we are searching for the primordial genera of a universal. A human is a rational animal, which is an animated thing, which is corporeal, which is a substance. We also discover ens by ascending Porphryr's tree, however we do not stop with genera; we proceed to the top, to the order of the non-univocal transcendentals.
The Subject of Metaphysics: The Compositeness of ensIt is therefore clear that composition of act and potentiality has greater extension than that of form and matter. Thus, matter and form divide natural substance, while potentiality and act divide common being [ens commune]. Accordingly, whatever follows upon potentiality and act, as such, is common to both material and immaterial created substances, as to receive and to be received, to perfect and to be perfected. Yet all that is proper to matter and form, as such, as to be generated and to be corrupted, and the like, are proper to material substances, and in no way belong to immaterial created substances. (Summa Contra Gentiles II. 54)
Text E
In the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas the Aristotelian act-potency composition extends beyond hylomorphic entities. It also divides ens commune which is able to be found without matter and would hence also admit of instances not hylomorphically composed. Aquinas does not hold a doctrine of universal hylomorphism. His doctrine of being is that ens commune is a composite of an actual and potential element.
Text F. . . there is in [intellectual and immaterial] substances but one composition of act and potentiality, namely, the composition of substance and being [substantia et esse], which by some is said to be of that which is [quod est] and being [esse], or of that which is and that by which a thing is.
On the other hand, in substances composed of matter and form there is a twofold composition of act and potentiality: the first, of the substance itself which is composed of matter and form; the second, of the substance thus composed, and being; and this composition also can be said to be of that which is and being or of that which is and that by which a thing is. (Summa Contra Gentiles II. 54)
The act-potency composition of ens commune is constituted by a substance-existence composition. Aquinas will often say that something is a being in virtue of possessing an act of existence (actus essendi). A being is "quasi habens esse" as if a haver or possessor of esse. Aquinas makes this point in many places, such as:
Group A“Cum autem in re sit quidditas ejus et suum esse, veritas fundatur in esse rei magis quam in quidditate, sicut et nomen entis ab esse imponitur” (In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1c)
“Sicut autem motus est actus ipsius mobilis inquantum mobile est; ita esse est actus existentis, inquantum ens est” (In I Sent., d. 19, q. 2, a. 2c)
“. . . quod cum dicitur: Diversum est esse, et quod est, distinguitur actus essendi ab eo cui actus ille convenit. Ratio autem entis ab actu essendi sumitur, non ab eo cui convenit actus essendi” (De Ver. I, 1, ad 3m second set)
“. . . esse dicitur actus entis inquantum est ens, idest quo denominatur aliquid ens actu in rerum natura” (Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 3c)
“et ipsum esse est quo substantia denominatur ens” (S.C.G. II, 54)
“Et ulterius aliqui erexerunt se ad considerandum ens inquantum est ens, et consideraverunt causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt haec vel talia, sed secundum quod sunt entia. Hoc igitur quod est causa rerum inquantum sunt entia, oportet esse causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt talia per formas accidentales, nec secundum quod sunt haec per formas substantiales, sed etiam secundum omne illud quod pertinet ad esse illorum quocumque modo” (S.T. I, 44, 2c)
“Nam ens dicitur quasi esse habens, hoc autem solum est substantia, quae subsistit” (In XII Meta., lect. 1)
Notes and Further Texts: On Esse
Group B“Sciendum est quod, sicut in 5 Metaphys. Philosophus dicit, ens per se dicitur dupliciter: Uno modo, quod dividitur per decem genera: alio modo, quod significant propositionum veritatem” (De Ente, ch. 1.)
“Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio Metaphysicae suae. Unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens. Sed enti non potest addi aliquid quasi extranea natura, per modum quo differentia additur generi, vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens” (De Ver. I, 1c).
In the latter passage we have Aquinas repeating his remarks from the Proem to his commentary on the Metaphysics. All of our intellectual conceptions all resolvit to being (ens). "As Avicenna says, in the principles of his Metaphysics (I.v), that which the intellect first conceives as, in a way, the most knowable [or evident], in which all our concepts resolve, is being." (ibid.)
Group C“Videmus in mundo quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non esse, scilicet generabilia et corruptibilia. Omne autem quod est possible esse, causam habet: quia, cum de se aequaliter se habeat ad duo, scilicet esse et non esse, oportet, si ei approprietur esse, quod hoc sit ex aliqua causa. (S.C.G. I, 15); “Omne quod est possible esse et non esse, habe causam aliquam: quia in se consideratum ad utrumlibet se habet; et sic oportet esse aliquod aliud quod ipsum ad unum determinet” (S.C.G. II, 15)
Here we have Aquinas explicating his doctrine of esse in modal terms, just as Avicenna introduces them in his Metaphysics of the Shifa I. vi-vii. Aquinas also does this in De Ente et Essentia when distinguishing God, necessary existence, from creatures, possibles.
Group C. 5Primo ponit differentiam eius quod est esse, ad id quod est. Secundo manifestat huiusmodi differentiam, ibi, ipsum enim esse nondum est. Dicit ergo primo, quod diversum est esse, et id quod est. Quae quidem diversitas non est hic referenda ad res, de quibus adhuc non loquitur, sed ad ipsas rationes seu intentiones. Aliud autem significamus per hoc quod dicimus esse, et aliud: per hoc quod dicimus id quod est; sicut et aliud significamus cum dicimus currere, et aliud per hoc quod dicitur currens. Nam currere et esse significantur in abstracto, sicut et albedo; sed quod est, idest ens et currens, significantur sicut in concreto, velut album. (In de Hebd. ch. II)
Here Aquinas compares the meaning of ens and esse to currens and currere. He is making a distinction between the thing which is and its act. The signifance of esse is not the same as the significance of quod est (that-which-is), and this signficance refers to distinct aspects (ratio) of the reality.
"For we signify one thing by saying 'to be,' and something else by saying 'that-which- is,' just as we also signify one thing when we say 'to run,' and something else by saying 'one running.' For 'to run' and 'to be' are signified in the abstract, just as 'whiteness' is; but 'that-which-is,' that is, 'a being,' and 'one running' are signified in the concrete, as is 'a white thing.'" (ibid.)
This to be (esse) Aquinas takes to be the act of all acts and the perfection of all perfections. It is not an act consequent upon that-which-is or the act of the form/essence. It is, as we will see, prior to the act of the form. It is only through the actus essendi that the form exists and is thereby able to act in its order of essential causality. Thus, the actus essendi is the supreme act and perfection in the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas, as we see in the following:
Group D“Esse actum quondam nominat: non enim dicitur esse aliquid ex hoc quod est in potentia, sed ex eo quod est in actu. Omne autem cui convenit actus aliquis diversum ab eo existens, se habet ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum: actus enim et potentia ad se invicem dicuntur” (S.C.G. I, 22)
“. . . quod hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia perfectissimum: quod ex hoc patet quia actus est semper perfectio potentia. Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod esse ponitur. Nam humanitas vel igneitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu: sed hoc quod habet esse, efficitur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum” (De Pot. VII, 2, ad 9m)
“Dicendum quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium; comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est; unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis sicut receptum ad recipiens. Cum enim dico esse hominis, vel equi, vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut formale et receptum, non autem ut illud cui competit esse” (S.T. I, 4, 1, ad 3m)
A important point arises in the text from the SCG I. 22. We read in the same chapter that:
". . . sequitur quod aliquid sit sibi ipsi causa essendi. Hoc autem est impossibile: quia prius secundum intellectum est causam esse quam effectum; si ergo aliquid sibi ipsi esset causa essendi, intelligeretur esse antequam haberet esse, quod est impossibile” (S.C.G. I, 22)
Not only is esse the act in composition with the substance as an existential potency, but esse is also prior (prius) to substance as the cause of its existence. It is also first (primus), most profound (profundius), and most intimate (magis intimum):
“Primus autem effectus est ipsum esse, quod omnibus aliis effectibus praesupponitur et ipsum non praesupponit aliquem alium effectum” (De Pot. III, 4c). (The first effect is esse, which all other effects presupposes and it itself does not presuppose any other effect.)Group E“Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt” (S.T. I, 8, 1c)
“. . . ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur, non solum esse, sed ipsa quidditas creari dicitur: quia antequam esse habeat, nihil est, nisi forte in intellectu creantis, ubi non est creatura, sed creatrix essentia” (De Pot. 3, 5, ad 2m)
“. . . quod Deus simul dans esse, producit id quod esse recipit: et sic non oportet quod agat ex aliquo praeexistenti” (De Pot. 3, 1, ad 17m)
“. . . esse est accidens, non quasi per accidens se habens, sed quasi actualitas cuiuslibet substantiae” (Quodl., II, 2, 1, ad 2m)
There are other texts that emphasize the complementariness of esse and its essence or form. Existence is the act of form -which is in potency to this existential act- and yet there is a sense in which form is the cause of esse. Yet, we should be clear this does not contradiction the primary act of esse and its priority to form.
“Unde oportet ut essentia, qua res denominatur ens, non tantum sit forma nec tantum materia, sed utrumque: quamvis huiusmodi esse suo modo sola forma sit caussa.” (De Ente, ch. II)
“Per hoc enim in compositas ex material et forma dicitur forma esse principium essendi, quia est complementum substantiae cuius actus est ipsum esse.” (S.C.G. II, 54) "For in things composed of matter and form the form is said to be the principle of existence (essendi), because it is the compliment of substance whose act is existence."
The act of existence is, in a sense, dependent on the potency that it actuates (like in a hylomorphic unity). Its metaphysical raison d'être, is to be the act of something. Any conditions of a potency, (refered in the text as "complementum") becomes a cause of esse.
The Cause of the Subject of Metaphysics
The second part of the content of metaphysics is the cause of its subject, namely, being. This cause is found in the first sense of separatness. In particular, one spiritual reality unlike all others. This will established by the demonstrations for the one who is ipsum esse subsitens.
Text GThus philosophical theology [i.e., metaphysics] investigates being separate in the second sense as its subjects, and beings separate in the first sense [God and the angels] as the principles of its subject. (In de Trin. V, 4c)Text HWhat is more, it belongs to the same science to investigate the proper causes of any genus and the genus itself, as for example natural philosophy investigates the principles of natural body. So it must belong to the same science to investigate the separated substances and being-in-general [ens commune], which is the genus of which the above-mentioned substances [God and the Intelligences] are the common and universal causes. (In Meta. Proem)
There is accordingly a proper order in the treatment of these two contents of metaphysics, first its subject and second, its causes.
Text IWe can reach them [divine beings] by the light of natural reason only to the extent that their effects reveal them to us . . . Philosophers, then, study these divine beings only insofar [nisi prout] as they are the principles of all things. Consequently, they are the objects of the science that investigates what is common to all being, which has for its subject being as being. The philosophers call this divine science. (In de Trin. V, 4c)
God is "agens per modum dantis esse" (In VI Meta., lect. 3, n. 1215).
Concluding Remarks
The attainment of the subject of metaphysics is essential, because without knowing how to attain a science's subject-genus we cannot begin the study of it. The subject, ens, admitted of two features, 1) its separatability and 2) its composition. Does the intial attainment of the subject require establishing one or both of these features? As we saw in the texts above (text I) the knowledge of spiritual realities follows demonstrations of metaphysics, strict separateness is something established within metaphysics itself, not something initially held. This suggests that the feature of separatability itself is not necessary to the intitial attainment of the subject. Also, it has been made clear (texts B, C) that separateness is not unique to ens but is also true of substance, one, many, potency, and act. However, the second feature, compositeness, is a salient facet of ens. Its composition of act-potency is fundamental. The most important aspect of this composition is its act, which for ens commune is its actus essendi. Understanding things, quiddity, in virtue of habens esse will be necessary for the initial attainment of the subject of metaphysics.
