Dr. Knasas on "Maritain and the Cry of Rachel": Metaphysics and Evil

This past week at the Center for Thomistic Studies Dr. John Knasas presented the weekly colloquium paper. This paper was entitled, "Maritain and the Cry of Rachel" and was taken from his notes for a book on the problem of evil that he is currently working on. This particular lecture was on two different accounts that Jacques Maritain gives on the problem of evil, the first was his Aquinas lecture at Marquette the second was from a book he wrote later on.

There are two points I wish to present here, points that I myself found particularly illuminating from the lecture. 1) That God alone is an end in itself, with corrections to a few Kantian errors on this point, which take man to be an end in itself, and 2) The mistakes made with Being, and the consequences this has in our considerations of evil in reality.

I.

In the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is concerned with finding the end of all human action, and end that is an end-in-itself that is not sought for the sake of anything else. This end would then be absolutely sufficient in itself and all else that we seek would be for this end alone. Thomas Aquinas adopts this account for his of Philosophical-Theology and shows that God is this end. A robustness is added to the Saints account not found in the Peripatetic. The metaphysical doctrine of the Transcendentals allows Aquinas a certain felicity and elegance in undergirding Aristotle's ethics with a metaphysics and a theological end. For Thomas, God is Being Itself. But as we learn from the Transcendentals Being can be understood in a variety of ways. In so far as something exists it is a "being," being as known is "truth," as desired is "good" and so on. Aquinas can identify Being and the Good in reality; what is it that all things seek? The Good, which is "Being" under the aspect of the teleological desirable. The Absolute Being that is Absolute Goodness is God and all things seek this as the only end that is absolutely satisfying. The whole of Creation is ordered in its own way to God, Who is the only "whole" which is an end in itself.

Recently in theology and philosophy there has been a strong shift towards focusing on the primacy and excellence of human dignity. In virtue of the human soul, it is potentially all things and thus can be truly ordered to that which is infinitely Good and alone is satisfying, viz., God. This affords human beings a unique dignity, because of Man's infinite capacity for Absolute Goodness man can and should be taken as an end in itself. This infinite capacity allows one to consider man a "whole" unto himself and as such should be taken as an end in itself, that is, because of man's infinite dignity he can be infinitely satisfying as an ultimate end, fitting the sufficient conditions of being an "end-in-itself."

The criticism of this latter development is directed towards its Modernism; its subtle adoption of Modern atomism and the primacy of human autonomy and then its Kantian direction, taking a move from the categorical imperative that all men should be regarded as ends in themselves. This corrosive foundation has two unconscionable consequences one in theology and the other in the political order. 1) It subordinates the sovereignty and aseity of God as the only ultimate end, the only end-in-itself, it places human beings on a par with the Divine who IS infinitely superior. Man's infinite capacity for the Absolute Good, God, is a potency not an actuality. In those souls who have actually had some degree of this goodness realized within, still must necessarily "receive" this actualization from without. It is not theirs but is a gift. Taking this alone shows us that humans are still infinitely subordinate to the Divine Goodness; there infinite capacity is completely passive to the Divine Goodness causing in man what God has in simple perfection.
2) This subordination in political moral philosophy places the individual above the common good of all. It forces political philosophy into the deviant Modern turn denying the primacy of the common good of all and making it a secondary accidental social contract. This redefines human rights, placing the subject in the individual over the common good. Rights are defined then negatively as what you cannot do to the individual, it is what is owed to me as what capacities I deserve to exercise that you cannot deny me. I treat you as an end in itself without an essential context or teleology to the common good. I can am force to do good for you without the consideration of the good of the Whole. You and I treat each other as ends and provide goods for each other and not worry about others.

In the Medieval formula, where the Common Good is taken as essential and primary, rights are defined in terms of Justice. Justice being the Cardinal virtue that is essentially relational, it involves “the other” and is defined with the teleological aspect of the common good, as that which is due to another according to the common good. Human rights are seated in justice and the common good and the relation of affinity or friendship that supervenes when two or more are directed together to this end. Rights are defined in terms of justice as what is due to my fellow man according to the realization of the common good. This is a positive definition of human rights, affirming what must be done or what is “right’ for me to do according to my fellow man for his and my attainment and realization of the common good for all.

II.

The second point I wished to reflect on is related to Being and evil. Maritain’s initial objection is to one of Aquinas’s attempts to resolve the evil of human suffering. Aquinas responds to this by presenting a philosophical principle, often at work in Aquinas, relating to the teleological order of the whole, which is directed towards perfection in the ultimate good, God. Some parts may suffer evil, which is real, for the sake of the perfection of the whole, which is more real and is the ultimate and infinite good of All. Maritain finds this unsatisfactory because human beings can be taken as more than just principle parts of the whole. Humans can be understand as whole's in themselves and end in themselves, as was discussed above. As such there is nothing satisfactory about this explanation of Aquinas's as terminating in a pure philosophical conclusion.

The error pointed out here by Dr. Knasas is in a misunderstanding of Being, which is essentially the seat of why man sins and causes so much evil. Man misattributes what "Being" is, our one and only final end. We commit idolatry and obsessively mistake a part of being as Being Itself. We believe some thing or person to be our ultimate and satisfying end, when in fact God alone is this. Then, when we loose this thing or person, we mistakenly believe we have lost Being, we believe we have lost and are "deprived" of our only ultimate and satisfying end. This privation seems to us as the Ultimate Evil, the complete loss of Being. But this is in fact an idolatrous error. The loss of a child is a great evil, but the possession of the sublimity of a child is not close to having the infinite Goodness and fulfillment that God is and shares by His Love. It is a great evil itself to believe that the loss of only a part of being is the same as the privation of Actual Being, the loss of God.

I think there is a lot to be contemplated on in this latter point of Dr. Knasas's. How often we make the whole focus of our lives something that is not Being, something that is not Christ. We must pray and work to keep our soul fixed upon the Being that is Being Itself as our ultimate end, that lead us through the lesser goods up into the beatified consummation of ourselves with Being Itself.

Aristotle and the Science of Metaphysics lect. 3

Because this lecture occurred a number of weeks ago prior to hurricane Ike and I cannot seem to find all my notes from class this reflection will be rather spotty.

Aristotle's Metaphysics: I; II; IV. 1; V. 7-8; VI. 1-2

The scientific ordering and presentation has produced a myriad of interpretations from the traditionalist position influenced by the Medieval commentary tradition who took it for granted that the Metaphysics was Aristotle's presentation of a science that followed the order of a science as presented in his Posterior Analytics. Despite the perspicuous heritage of this tradition the recent Aristotelian progeny are not so confident in the merits or success of Aristotle's project to achieve scientific knowledge in the myriad of subject domains he investigates. Some members of this group go so far as to deny to the texts tradition has called the Metaphysics, any authorial continuity and presentation. They subscribe to a position that the Metaphysics was a unorganized collection of lecture notes "thrown" together by later Greek editors, not knowing what to label this discrete collection of texts, and seeing that it was arranged after the texts on natural philosophy or physics, decided to call it after-physics or meta-physics. H.G. Apostle offers a presentation of this account in the introduction to his translation of the Metaphysics along with his own argument to the contrary. There is a great abundance of literature on this topic but it is outside the concerns of my own class which is on Avicenna's Metaphysics.

Avicenna certainly thought Aristotle presented a unified science within treatise called the Metaphysics and it is incumbent on any interpretor of Avicenna's own Metaphysics of the Healing to take into consideration his perspective on the Aristotelian sciences, and of course especially, metaphysics.

The problem that leads to such great diversity of opinion on the proper assesment of Aristotle's Metaphysics is the seemingly incongruent definitions found within the Metaphyiscs itself, definitions of a subject-genus that lead to different understanding of the underlying intelligible arrangement of the books themselves. In some places we find Aristotle defining the particular science under investigation as a science of being qua being and its proper attributes. (Meta. IV, 1) However in other places he defines his inquiry as a divine science or theology (Meta. VI, 1)

Nearly all of Aristotle's sciences offer an introductory dialectical treatment of past attempts to establish the principles of a particular science. There is a precedence for this in the De Anima and Phyiscs amongst other treatises. If we take this into consideration then there are two possible interpretation suggested for the whole order of the Metaphysics.

What is a Science?

A brief reminder, a science consists in three parts:

1. A Subject-Genus
2. Proper Principles
3. Proper Attributes (Conclusions)
   

What Kind of Science is the Metaphysics?

1. Theology: If we take the science of first philosophy as being a divine science it would suggest that Aristotle is presenting an enduraing dialectical treatment of principles up until Bk. XII where the Science of Theology finally begins.
2. Being qua Being: If we take first philosophy as a science of being as such then the dialectical treatment ends at bk. III because he begins his treatment of being qua being with bk. IV
3. There is a possible synthesis available wherein 2. leads into 1., but this would require a deeper textual explanation, and as we shall see this is in fact what Avicenna does himself, though much more explicitly.

Accordingly a divisio textus of the Metaphysics could be taken as:

• Bk. I-III : Dialectial investigation of principles and proper attributes to be considered in the science.
• Bk. IV and VI : Accounts of the subject and principles of Metaphysics
• Bk. V : Definitions
• Bk. VII-IX : Primary Considerations of the subject of Metaphyisics
• Bk. X-XI : Unifying of the former
• Bk. XII-XIV : Theology

n.b. For the Arab commentators books I (A) and II (a) were inverted.