The Thomistic commentator tradition almost ubiquitously holds that "immanent action" does not fall within the category of "action" but rather falls within the first species of the category of "quality." Yves Simon has a very forceful argument summarizing and defending the Commentator tradition on this point (cf. An Introduction to the Metaphysics of Knowledge, ch. 2 "Cognition and Activity"). The argument merits serious consideration as his analysis of the metaphysics of action, like all his other analysis in this impressive work (esp. his presentation of "abstraction"), is penetratingly perspicuous. Nevertheless, I believe he and the Commentator tradition are incorrect on this point and that they have made a categorical error by delimiting the categories of action and passion to exclude immanent action. It should be said from the beginning, as far as I know, and Simon admits, Aquinas has no explicit text confirming their thesis, any text to the contrary then reveals a lot about Aquinas' own position.
I know of no text in which Aristotle or Aquinas addresses specifically the question of whether immanent action belongs to the category of action or to the category of quality. (Simon, An Introduction to the Metaphysics of Knowledge, p. 66 n. 29)
Well, as we shall soon see, Aquinas does this very thing within the first ten opening chapters of Contra Gentiles II. He continues:
No importance should be attached to this, however, because Aquinas never tires of saying that immanent action lacks the characteristics that the whole Aristotelian school considers to be essential to the category of action: to exist with motion, to produce a passion, to be the perfection of the patient. Indeed, one would have to be rather obtuse to assume that anything could be preserved of the Thomistic theory of knowledge if immanent action were to be placed in the category of action. All major Thomists are unanimous in affirming that immanent action is a quality. The contrary is held by some minor Thomists and para-Thomists, which makes for an interesting discussion. (ibid.)
Indeed it does. I shall then be obtuse enough to assume the contrary, and hope that I do not become a para-Thomist by doing so. Again, I think that Simon would be quite right, if the Aristotelian schools were correct about what is essential to the Category of "action." What reason does he have for supposing Aquinas held what they held? Simon cites all the usual suspects that hold the same thesis as his own. Looking over this list of Thomists makes my own thesis seem rather unlikely considering the serious and admirable philosophical acumen of these masters. (The following comes from the same footnote in Simon, ibid.)
Cajetan, In de An. II, 5 (B. 114B): "It is only grammatically that immanent actions are actions; in reality they are operations that are truly kinds of qualities."
Sylvester of Ferrara, In Cont. gent. II, 9: "Immanent action does not belong to the genus of action but to the genus of quality."
Javellus, Compendium logicae, De Praedicamentis; Banez, In Sum. th. I. q. 79, a. 2 (D, II, 290A): "The act of intellection is not an action but a quality, though ti may have the mode of an action."
John of St. Thomas. See, in particular, Phil. nat. IV, q. 6, a. 4 (R, III, 195B41) [Simon cites many others.]
Of these references, the one from Sylvester is especially concerning, because this is the very text which we will examine. So long as Simon has cited him accurately, I cannot possibly understand how Sylvester has asserted anything other than the contradiction of what Aquinas has said in this exact text. This shall become apparent as we make our way through the texts of Aquinas from the beginning of Book II of the Contra Gentiles. These texts, so far as I can tell from looking through the vast range of texts cited by Simon, escape his attention. However, He does cite chapter one, as we will, but then he skips over chapters eight through ten which offer the clearest employment of the terms used in chapter one. He instead goes on to chapters twenty two and twenty three.
I have entitled this the "too short argument" because I simply wish to note one passage that I came across in Thomas Aquinas that makes it quite clear that Thomas does not hold the position that: the category of "action" excludes immanent action and only generically contains species of transitive action.
This is an essay written in haste merely to get these ideas down while my recent research on powers and operations is fresh. At some later date I hope to pursue a systematic textual and philosophical study of the categories of action and passion and produce a cogent response to Simon and the Commentator tradition on this point. For it seems to me, this categorical mistake makes Thomas' many discussions of the "operation" or the metaphorical "motion" of the will, intellect, etc. rather awkward and misplaced. For we often find in such discussions explicit suggestions and qualifications to the analysis, that are better known to us, of motion and action and passion. But if immanent action is in the category of quality, appealing to doctrines found within other categories to explain a different category is a rather muddled procedure, if not question begging. Certainly, we should expect a lot more explanation from Thomas if immanent action is a quality, why does he so frequently appeal to discussions of action from the category of action without the slightest qualification?
In Contra Gentiles II. ch. 1, Aquinas distinguishes between two Aristotelian senses of "operation" or second act. "One that remains in the agent and is a perfection of it, as the act of sensing, understanding, and willing; another that passes over into an external thing, and is a perfection of the thing made as a result of that operation, the acts of healing, cutting and building, for example." Aquinas immediately follows up this division affirming that both kinds of operations belong to God, but the former is the ground of the second. To further clarify terminology Aquinas says that immanent action, as the simple perfection of the operator, claims the appellations "operation" (operationis) and "action" (actionis); whereas transitive action, as the perfection of the thing made, more properly called, "making" (factionis) and not "action". (N.B. The translator placed in italics these three terms, and as we will see does so again in the text cited below.)
Aquinas proceeds to establish in the following chapters a number of clarifications about God's entitative and operative attributes in view of Divine Simplicity. In chapter nine Thomas introduces the unity and identity of God's power and his action. Just as God's substance and power are identical, likewise are his powers and their action one. "God's power is His substance, [...] And His action is His Substance, as was shown in Book I with regard to His intellectual operation; for the same argument applies to His other operations." (ibid., ch. 9 [2]) In paragraph five of this chapter we meet Aquinas' final argument.
In Contra Gentiles II. ch. 1, Aquinas distinguishes between two Aristotelian senses of "operation" or second act. "One that remains in the agent and is a perfection of it, as the act of sensing, understanding, and willing; another that passes over into an external thing, and is a perfection of the thing made as a result of that operation, the acts of healing, cutting and building, for example." Aquinas immediately follows up this division affirming that both kinds of operations belong to God, but the former is the ground of the second. To further clarify terminology Aquinas says that immanent action, as the simple perfection of the operator, claims the appellations "operation" (operationis) and "action" (actionis); whereas transitive action, as the perfection of the thing made, more properly called, "making" (factionis) and not "action". (N.B. The translator placed in italics these three terms, and as we will see does so again in the text cited below.)
Aquinas proceeds to establish in the following chapters a number of clarifications about God's entitative and operative attributes in view of Divine Simplicity. In chapter nine Thomas introduces the unity and identity of God's power and his action. Just as God's substance and power are identical, likewise are his powers and their action one. "God's power is His substance, [...] And His action is His Substance, as was shown in Book I with regard to His intellectual operation; for the same argument applies to His other operations." (ibid., ch. 9 [2]) In paragraph five of this chapter we meet Aquinas' final argument.
Furthermore, an action that is not the substance of the agent is in the agent as an accident in its subject; and that is why action is reckoned as one of the nine categories of accident. But nothing can exist in God in the manner of an accident. Therefore, God's action is not other than his substance and His power. (SCG. II.9 [5])
Adhuc. Actio quae non est substantia agentis, inest ei sicut accidens subiecto: unde et actio unum inter novem praedicamenta accidentis computatur. In Deo autem non potest esse aliquid per modum accidentis. In Deo igitur sua actio non est aliud a sua substantia et sua potentia.
There is nothing within this short chapter of Aquinas to suggest that he is only thinking of and discussing transitive action. On the contrary, it seems more reasonable to think that this entire discussion is directed towards power's with immanent action. Of course, Aquinas makes the qualification that the argument in [2] applies to all the powers, and we should agree with him on this point. But again, the only example Thomas provides for us here is of intellectual operations, and the intellect is a power with an immanent action.
Further in the quote just cited, Aquinas brings up that an action of an agent that is not commensurate with the substance simpliciter, is in the agent as an accident. An obvious example that fits this criterion is a created intellect; it is an accidental power with an accidental act. No Thomist will disagree this. But where does Thomas place this generally considered accident of action? Not in the category of quality. He places it in the category of "action".
Now why would Aquinas do this, especially if he held the position attributed to him by Simon and many of the Commentators? Further, in a discussion where "action" has been specifically designated as the proper appellation of immanent action, how could Aquinas maintain the Simon thesis in this context without some qualification?
If we look to the previous chapter and the subsequent chapter, the Simon thesis becomes more peculiar. In chapter eight paragraph five Aquinas has nearly the exact same argument as paragraph five of chapter nine. He has simply substituted power for action.
Further in the quote just cited, Aquinas brings up that an action of an agent that is not commensurate with the substance simpliciter, is in the agent as an accident. An obvious example that fits this criterion is a created intellect; it is an accidental power with an accidental act. No Thomist will disagree this. But where does Thomas place this generally considered accident of action? Not in the category of quality. He places it in the category of "action".
Now why would Aquinas do this, especially if he held the position attributed to him by Simon and many of the Commentators? Further, in a discussion where "action" has been specifically designated as the proper appellation of immanent action, how could Aquinas maintain the Simon thesis in this context without some qualification?
If we look to the previous chapter and the subsequent chapter, the Simon thesis becomes more peculiar. In chapter eight paragraph five Aquinas has nearly the exact same argument as paragraph five of chapter nine. He has simply substituted power for action.
Again, in things whose powers are not their substance, the powers themselves are accidents. Hence, natural power is placed in the second species of quality. But in God there can be no accident, as was shown in Book I. Therefore, God is His power. (SCG. II. 8. [5])
The category of "quality" is not far from Thomas's mind. If immanent action was the first species of "quality" as Simon and many of the Commentators hold, then why Thomas fail to make this distinction is the following chapter, that uses the exact same argument for "action"? And why would Thomas use the term, "action" to exclusively signify transitive action in this paragraph alone without explicitly mentioning it or even suggesting it by example? Especially considered the entire context of this discussion on powers and action began, as we have seen, by designating immanent action as the proper sense of the term, "action." The Simon thesis continues to become more implausible. Just from what we have seen so far in chapter one, eight and nine, how does Sylvester of Ferrara's assertion make any sense here?
One thing should be apparent from the quotes from Aquinas we have seen so far, namely, Thomas is taking every opportunity he can to make categorical distinctions and appeal to them in his arguments. The Aristotelian Categories are playing a crucial role in his many arguments here at the beginning of Contra Gentiles II. This is not to say Aquinas is inconsistent in his appeals to the Categories, but rather their emphasis here in this chapters is perhaps more striking then it is in other passages. This point is suggestive interpretative point for my own thesis. Why in a set of interconnected chapters wherein Aquinas is making numerous explicit categorical distinctions on powers and their operations by referencing Aristotle's Categories, would he not only fail to explicitly place immanent action in the category of quality; but further properly designate immanent action as "action" and then a few chapters later make an explicit reference that "action" is itse own distinct category of action?
If we look to the subsequent chapter, Aquinas makes a unique qualification on how we attribute powers to God. The concern of this chapter is God's relation to creatures, which seems to undermine Divine Simplicity. It is directly related to the discussion of powers, because powers implies a relation to something else. The appellative distinctions that come into relief, in the paragraph immediately following his placement of action as one of the nine categories of action, are the same found in the first chapter, namely, "action" and "thing made". Clearly Aquinas has not forgotten the distinctions made in the first chapter.
One thing should be apparent from the quotes from Aquinas we have seen so far, namely, Thomas is taking every opportunity he can to make categorical distinctions and appeal to them in his arguments. The Aristotelian Categories are playing a crucial role in his many arguments here at the beginning of Contra Gentiles II. This is not to say Aquinas is inconsistent in his appeals to the Categories, but rather their emphasis here in this chapters is perhaps more striking then it is in other passages. This point is suggestive interpretative point for my own thesis. Why in a set of interconnected chapters wherein Aquinas is making numerous explicit categorical distinctions on powers and their operations by referencing Aristotle's Categories, would he not only fail to explicitly place immanent action in the category of quality; but further properly designate immanent action as "action" and then a few chapters later make an explicit reference that "action" is itse own distinct category of action?
If we look to the subsequent chapter, Aquinas makes a unique qualification on how we attribute powers to God. The concern of this chapter is God's relation to creatures, which seems to undermine Divine Simplicity. It is directly related to the discussion of powers, because powers implies a relation to something else. The appellative distinctions that come into relief, in the paragraph immediately following his placement of action as one of the nine categories of action, are the same found in the first chapter, namely, "action" and "thing made". Clearly Aquinas has not forgotten the distinctions made in the first chapter.
But, since nothing is its own principle, and God's action is not other than his power, it is clear from the foregoing that power is attributed to God, not as a principle of action, but as a principle of things made. (SCG II. 10 [1])
This is the first paragraph of chapter ten that immediately follows paragraph five of chapter nine. Aquinas is explicitly referring to the arguments of the preceding chapter, that God's action is not other than his power. Further, this opening line explicitly confirms that the entire discussion of chapter nine was about immanent action. Aquinas clearly contrasts "action" from things "made", which is the proper appellation for transitive action. If we read further on the contrasts between immanent action as action and transitive action as making or as "actions passing into something made" are only clearer. Aquinas is especially fastidious with his terminology in this chapter, and he gives us every suggestion that the same care in terminological consistency has been kept throughout these chapters. I will only quote the final part of the first paragraph of chapter ten where Aquinas explicitly identifies immanent action with the operations of the intellect and the will.
Hence, if certain actions are proper to God which do not pass into something made but remain in Him, power is not attributed to Him in their regard, except according to our manner of understanding, and not according to reality. Such actions are understanding and willing. Properly speaking, therefore, God's power does not regard such actions, but only effects. Consequently, intellect and will are in God, not as powers, but only as actions. (SCG II. 10. [1])
Immanent actions, actions that remain in God like understanding and willing, are "actions" in the most proper sense, whereas transitive actions that do not remain in God are not properly referred to as actions. This is likewise the force behind maintaining that the latter still impliey a power whereas properly speaking immanent actions in God are simply God with no real need to speak of them as having power in God.
Unless Aquinas completely changes this fundamental categorical doctrine later on, these quotations from the Contra Gentiles make his position explicitly clear. Aquinas holds that not only is immanent action in the category of "action", but that is it also the most proper sense of action. This does not exclude transitive action from the category of action, but merely clarifies that it is a less proper sense of action. And this should go without saying, for the less perfect is secondary to what is perfect more simply. That which perfects itself in action is more perfect then that which can only perfect another. (SCG II. 1. [4])
I certainly believe that this textual argument, barring some other equally cogent textual argument, settles the position of Thomas Aquinas contra Simon and the many commentators whom he cites in support of his thesis. This brief essay is not meant to distance myself from the latter's other positions and works. On the contrary, I have never read anything by Yves Simon that I did not think was simply amazing. I have always learned a lot reading his articles and books, and admire the quality of his scholarship. The chapter we have been discussing comes from one of the best books I have ever read on Thomistic cognition, and its final chapter's presentation on the doctrine of abstraction in Aquinas is the finest piece of 20th century scholarship I have read on the subject. John Piefer's The Concept in Thomism discussion on abstraction is the next closest.
I would be interested in any comments or texts and arguments to the contrary. As I said this is just the principle textual argument of a longer essay I hope to pursue in the future. An essay that takes on the philosophical arguments of Simon and the Commentators.
Unless Aquinas completely changes this fundamental categorical doctrine later on, these quotations from the Contra Gentiles make his position explicitly clear. Aquinas holds that not only is immanent action in the category of "action", but that is it also the most proper sense of action. This does not exclude transitive action from the category of action, but merely clarifies that it is a less proper sense of action. And this should go without saying, for the less perfect is secondary to what is perfect more simply. That which perfects itself in action is more perfect then that which can only perfect another. (SCG II. 1. [4])
I certainly believe that this textual argument, barring some other equally cogent textual argument, settles the position of Thomas Aquinas contra Simon and the many commentators whom he cites in support of his thesis. This brief essay is not meant to distance myself from the latter's other positions and works. On the contrary, I have never read anything by Yves Simon that I did not think was simply amazing. I have always learned a lot reading his articles and books, and admire the quality of his scholarship. The chapter we have been discussing comes from one of the best books I have ever read on Thomistic cognition, and its final chapter's presentation on the doctrine of abstraction in Aquinas is the finest piece of 20th century scholarship I have read on the subject. John Piefer's The Concept in Thomism discussion on abstraction is the next closest.
I would be interested in any comments or texts and arguments to the contrary. As I said this is just the principle textual argument of a longer essay I hope to pursue in the future. An essay that takes on the philosophical arguments of Simon and the Commentators.
