Lecture 1. Part I.
Dr. Christopher Martin
1/20/09
Analytic Thomism is a neologism attributed to John Haldane. It designates a small group of predominately British-American Thomists who apply their analytic philosophical acumen to the study St. Thomas Aquinas either as interpreters or as philosophers influenced by Aquinas. Although, not a course on meta-analytic Thomism, it should at least be made clear initially what exactly is meant by "Analytic Thomism" and whether prima facie this is a promising endeavor.
Is Analytic Thomism the coalescing of two doctrines? If so, it might be inquired whether or not such a task suggests an impossibility. Already in the twentieth century we saw two such attempts utterly fail. Critical Thomism, which attempted to combine Cartesian epistemology with Thomism and Transcendental Thomism, which attempted to defeat Kant at his own game by virtue of Thomistic insights. Both were destined to fail and have. Is Analytic Thomism attempting the same?
It seems not. Analytic Thomism would regard analytic philosophy as not a set of doctrines but as a method and technique for approaching philosophical problems. If this is the case then there is nothing on the surface to suggest that this would be an impossible task.
But are not many, if not most, analytic philosophers materialists and empiricists? Yes, but this is perhaps better explained because most of them are British and American philosophers, who come countries whose predominant philosophical attitude is materialism and empiricism. Many Analytic Thomists actual consider the methods of analytic philosophy to be ones which undermine both the empiricism and rationalism of modern philosophy. This is especially taken to be the case by those influenced by the later Wittgenstein.
But could not analytic philosophy and Wittgenstein's focus on language constitute another rationalism, one that undermines the possibility of philosophical realism? The linguistic approach to philosophy, so often pejoratively attributed to analytic philosophy, is not an obsession with language that brings about another innovative logical sophism. At least this is certainly not the case for those following the lead of Wittgenstein. These philosophers, in a qualified sense, start with words or language to get to realities. One might immediately object: "But is this not the same error as Descartes? You have only replaced thought (cogito) with language, and from there you shall never break out of language (an aspect of mind) to obtain reality." And of course this is quite true if we uncritically start with language as a mental phenomenon simpliciter. However, the philosophical progeny of Wittgenstein are not starting with language as if it were some a priori phenomenon. As a matter of fact, this the very reason they do begin with language, because language is inextricably a posteriori. Language is ordinary; it is necessarily common and therefore requires supersubjective reality, so to speak, as a necessary condition. Language is communication; it is the conveyance of meaning. In order to have language there must be some shared common reality between subjects in and by which they can participate in language. There is no primitive subjective experience before the real. Language must be learned in re antecedent to its utilization and employment in our thoughts. Descartes cogito ergo sum presupposes a mastery of language; it speaks of a prior reception and assimilation of reality into thought via, inter alia, language. It is through language that we are able to carry and convey our thoughts and concepts to ourselves and to others . Language is necessarily extrinsic to the subject. A subject that thinks and speaks via language entails a precedence of reality to thought. In this way Wittgenstein points away from modernity.
Analytic philosophers of this stripe do not confound reality like the moderns, their methods undermine modernity. They employ their reflective acumen on the common intuitions of reality. They take serious the initial connatural questions.
Is Analytic Thomism the coalescing of two doctrines? If so, it might be inquired whether or not such a task suggests an impossibility. Already in the twentieth century we saw two such attempts utterly fail. Critical Thomism, which attempted to combine Cartesian epistemology with Thomism and Transcendental Thomism, which attempted to defeat Kant at his own game by virtue of Thomistic insights. Both were destined to fail and have. Is Analytic Thomism attempting the same?
It seems not. Analytic Thomism would regard analytic philosophy as not a set of doctrines but as a method and technique for approaching philosophical problems. If this is the case then there is nothing on the surface to suggest that this would be an impossible task.
But are not many, if not most, analytic philosophers materialists and empiricists? Yes, but this is perhaps better explained because most of them are British and American philosophers, who come countries whose predominant philosophical attitude is materialism and empiricism. Many Analytic Thomists actual consider the methods of analytic philosophy to be ones which undermine both the empiricism and rationalism of modern philosophy. This is especially taken to be the case by those influenced by the later Wittgenstein.
But could not analytic philosophy and Wittgenstein's focus on language constitute another rationalism, one that undermines the possibility of philosophical realism? The linguistic approach to philosophy, so often pejoratively attributed to analytic philosophy, is not an obsession with language that brings about another innovative logical sophism. At least this is certainly not the case for those following the lead of Wittgenstein. These philosophers, in a qualified sense, start with words or language to get to realities. One might immediately object: "But is this not the same error as Descartes? You have only replaced thought (cogito) with language, and from there you shall never break out of language (an aspect of mind) to obtain reality." And of course this is quite true if we uncritically start with language as a mental phenomenon simpliciter. However, the philosophical progeny of Wittgenstein are not starting with language as if it were some a priori phenomenon. As a matter of fact, this the very reason they do begin with language, because language is inextricably a posteriori. Language is ordinary; it is necessarily common and therefore requires supersubjective reality, so to speak, as a necessary condition. Language is communication; it is the conveyance of meaning. In order to have language there must be some shared common reality between subjects in and by which they can participate in language. There is no primitive subjective experience before the real. Language must be learned in re antecedent to its utilization and employment in our thoughts. Descartes cogito ergo sum presupposes a mastery of language; it speaks of a prior reception and assimilation of reality into thought via, inter alia, language. It is through language that we are able to carry and convey our thoughts and concepts to ourselves and to others . Language is necessarily extrinsic to the subject. A subject that thinks and speaks via language entails a precedence of reality to thought. In this way Wittgenstein points away from modernity.
Analytic philosophers of this stripe do not confound reality like the moderns, their methods undermine modernity. They employ their reflective acumen on the common intuitions of reality. They take serious the initial connatural questions.
Q: What is given?
A: The Lot!
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