Thomistic Metaphysics. Lecture Notes: 2. Commonality of Ens Commune

Thomistic Metaphysics: Directed Study

Dr. John F.X. Knasas

Lecture Notes: 2. Commonality of ens commune

The following is my digest and reflections on the lecture notes given by Dr. Knasas. While I am indebted to his notes, texts, and comments, these reflections are not necessarily the views of Dr. Knasas.

The Subject of Metaphysics:

The Commonality and Separateness of Ens Commune

This reflection will be a further clarification of the first part of the subject of metaphysics, namely, its separateness. The question posed at the end of the last reflection queried what must be established concerning the subject of metaphysics at the initial steps of the science. Must we know and have had established ens commune as separability, composite, or both to begin genuine metaphysics? If separability simpliciter had to be established, then we could not legitimately begin metaphysics until we demonstrated the existence of an immaterial subsisting existent. However, in light of the procedure set out by Aquinas, following Avicenna and Aristotle, it seems clear such demonstrations come at the end of metaphysics when we demonstrate the causes of our subject, ens commune. But what about the second sort of separability that we find in being, substance, act, and potency. (In de Trin. V, 4, ad 5m) The sort of separateness of things that are not necessarily immaterial but are able to be immaterial. Must we establish the immaterial separateness of such realities in order to begin the science of metaphysics?

If not, how else can we say we have successfully achieved distinguishing ens commune from ens mobile, the subject of natural philosophy? How can we hold that a science of ens qua ens is any different from a science of ens mobile if we have not established that ens commune can be separate from matter?

Also, does it not seem that we are unable to establish the second element of ens commune, its compositeness, if we are unable to grasp ens commune in its separateness from matter?

In analysis the intellect, by its first act, is able to grasp what is common to many; it is able to apprehend the quiddity shared amongst many particulars. The intellect can grasp that what is common to Peter, Paul, and John is the quiddity, "humanness." If an ox and ass are added to this list the intellect will grasp the more general commonness "animalness" that is shared by all. Similarly in the case of generation-corruption, increase-decrease, alteration, and locomotion the intellect readily grasps ens mobile (mobile being) as the commonality found in these distinct types of change. Our problem is: how can we establish the subject of metaphysics, ens commune, as distinct from ens mobile without demonstrating the existence of separatable or immaterial beings? It would seem pace the latter demonstration there is initially no clear distinction between ens mobile and ens commune. However we have Aquinas suggesting that our subject matter is "discovered by a process of analysis as the more universal is discovered after the less universal." (In Meta., Proem)

There is one type of immaterial existence that is discovered and established without the demonstrations of metaphysics, namely, intentional being (esse intentionale) or cognitional being (ST. I. 14.1; 78.3). The unique causality found in cognitional being is not embeded with matter but operates without matter - although not always without material conditions. Unlike natural immutation, cognitional immutation must occur in a manner wherein the form is impressed on the cognitive subject without corrupting the form of its terminus, that is, the cognitive faculty. The form is received as other while the cognitive faculty remains itself. Hence, the natural material immutation (the immutation of ens mobile) found in esse naturale is distinct from the immaterial immutation found in esse intentionale. Here we have a readily discoverable order of causality distinct from that of ens mobile. Further, the commoness able to be grasped by the intellect from ens mobile and esse intentionale is ens commune. Therefore we are able to sufficiently establish ens commune as a distinct subject from ens mobile without the demonstration of subsisting immaterial beings.